CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

AFFAIRS IN JAPAN.

MARCH AND APRIL, 1861.

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Correspondence respecting Affairs in Japan.

No. 1.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 16.)

(Extract.) *Yeddo, January* 1, 1861.

I HAVE just received intimation, conveyed by one of the Governors in person, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Council of State are advised of a band of "loonins," to the number of several hundred, and supposed to be disbanded retainers of the late Prince of Meto, having combined, with the intention of setting fire to the Foreign Settlement at Yokohama, for the destruction of the foreign residents and trade at that place; and, at the same time, of attacking each of the foreign Legations in the capital, and murdering their inmates. This startling intelligence had been already conveyed to the American Minister Mr. Harris, early in the morning, by a Governor of Foreign Affairs, sent down to Kanagawa express for that purpose: Mr. Harris being there on a visit. He was good enough immediately to despatch Mr. Heusken, the Secretary of Legation, to make me acquainted with the communication he had received, and with a proposition made to him on the part of the Government, that all the foreign Consuls should move over to Yokohama to one spot, where it was stated they could be more easily protected, while he, and the other foreign Representatives in Yeddo, should also consent to abandon their Legations for a time, and take refuge all in one place within the castle moats, until these disturbers of the peace could be seized, or the country was reported in a quieter state. Mr. Harris informs me he will return here to-morrow to consult with me, as also M. de Wit, the Dutch Consul-General. M. de Bellecourt, the French Chargé d'Affaires, left this for Kanagawa yesterday before the intelligence was received, As yet, therefore, I have had no opportunity of consulting with any of my colleagues; or of learning very definitely the impression made upon them by such a communication from the Government of the country. But I have no hesitation in stating my own; and as the "Impérieuse" is under orders to leave the day after to-morrow with the mail, unless a note I have just addressed to Rear-Admiral Jones may cause his detention, I must either profit by the opportunity at once, or not at all.

These alarms of a general massacre are, so to speak, periodical. Rumours of this kind have reached me, either through the Government or from other sources, many times already, even before the murder of the Regent in March last by a party of these said loonins (a name for disbanded soldiers and brigands), or the late Prince of Meto's armed followers, as is more generally asserted and believed. The Government then made very similar proposals to the foreign Representatives; and, failing in convincing us either of the necessity or the expediency of the steps recommended, they sought to induce us for a time not to stir outside our walls. Failing in this also, they took the opportunity of grafting upon the establishment of spies, watchmen, and police officers at the several Legations, a mounted escort of yaconins (officials, soldiers, &c., of indeterminate rank and function, in the Tycoon's pay) to accompany the members of the several Legations whenever they stirred out. This arrangement has continued ever since, although it has been repeatedly demonstrated, at our risk and peril, that they are in reality no

protection whatever, and look with terror themselves upon any chance of collision with these two-sworded bravos of the Daimios resident in the capital, who keep many thousands of this dangerous class as armed retainers in their service and afford them sanctuary. The Government can hardly believe, after all they have heard from us, that any protection is in effect afforded; but they cling not the less tenaciously to the appearance by sending two or three of these useless and poltroon officials with any member of the Legations who may go out. If they really saw cause of alarm, would they not take some more effective means of securing our safety?

So at the time of the Regent's death there was great manifestation of alarm and anxiety on the part of the Government, new palisades were erected round the Legations, drawing within narrower limits the ground to be watched and guarded, and the numbers of the guards were doubled at night. Precisely the same series of demonstrations appear now. A large addition has been made to-night to the officers and police on duty, and probably to-morrow an urgent request will come from the Minister that I will not venture outside the Legation until the danger be past, which I must disregard under penalty of finding myself virtually a prisoner for the whole remainder of my term of residence in the capital, be it long or short.

Under these circumstances your Lordship will readily understand how difficult it is to form a decided opinion upon the actual amount of danger that may exist beneath these manifestations of alarm and anxiety on the part of the Government. How much of this is real or what may be feigned in furtherance of a policy it is calculated to advance must remain very doubtful in a country like Japan, where it is difficult to obtain even a modicum of truth, and no efforts are spared by the same Government to keep from us all sources of exact or reliable information, and to mislead and deceive us as to the real state of things, even to throwing obstacles in the way of learning their language.

They have at present a great object to attain, and one which it cannot be doubted those who hold the executive power in their hands have much at heart, namely, the deferring of the opening of more ports, and the inauguration of a still more restrictive system, both as to intercourse and trade, than they have hitherto been able, or, perhaps, ventured upon attempting, to establish. I believe there are men among those ruling powers capable, in furtherance of this policy, if all less violent means should fail, of bringing about a simulated popular movement, in which foreign lives would be sacrificed, either those of the Legations or of the merchants at the neighbouring ports, or both.

I say simulated, for, although I know to my cost that the general dearness of every article of consumption, the alleged cause of popular discontent, exists, so far as we are concerned, I have strong doubts whether it exists for the Japanese, and if it does I should be further inclined to believe that it was artificial in its source, and brought about by the direct action of the ruling classes with a view to make out their case. And still I can see no sign of popular ill-feeling or hostility towards foreigners. If ever insult or menace is offered it comes from the bearers of two swords, and this class alone.

I believe this the more strongly, because satisfied from my own observation that there are among the body of Daimios and chief officers of State some at least who look upon all foreign trade and intercourse as containing the seeds of revolution, and rather than these should be allowed to take root and germinate they are ready to risk the chances of a rupture with all the Western Powers put togther. And the whole course of the policy followed shows that these must be influential in the Great Council of State. In the first place they may argue that a revolutionary movement would be the worst evil that could happen to them, if not to the country, as it would be the knell of their existing régime, where the Daimios and officials are everything, and the people only their serfs, or voiceless. And in the second place, that after all, great and powerful as those Western nations may be by fleets and armaments, there is a limit to their ability to inflict mischief in such a country as Japan. They might destroy Yeddo and one or two other large cities, but the Daimios, the persons chiefly concerned and the real authors of the counter-movement, could all retire to their territories and inland fastnesses, where they could hardly be followed, and there remain in comparative security until the foreign Powers would be wearied out, their resources for war so far from home and their patience alike exhausted. And, finally, they had better risk this than see all the established institutions of the country over-

turned, themselves cast down from their hitherto unapproachable position, and the whole land impoverished and ruined by a foreign trade which brings an unlimited demand for articles wanted for their own consumption, and gives in exchange only silver, or things which are superfluities and better dispensed with, to the enrichment at best of the few, and the serious injury of the many. Nor are these arguments invented for them by Europeans as a mode of accounting for effects by a preconceived theory. They have at different times and piecemeal been all brought forward by the Ministers and Governors of Foreign Affairs, who are often their mouthpieces when discussing various measures with me, for arresting execution of the Treaty.

In so far as these views prevail, therefore, they who direct the government of the country have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by throwing down the gauntlet. If ever this should be resolved on, there is little doubt that all foreigners in and about the capital will be swept away as the first step. I do not wish Her Majesty's Government to understand that I see with any certainty such an issue to the efforts now making to establish friendly and permanent commercial relations in the country. But still we are now actually threatened with a catastrophe of this kind; and I think your Lordship should know that we carry on our relations under a menace, which may at any moment be carried into execution. Nor do I see what prudence or courage can do to avert such a calamity, if it were really determined upon. In all probability we should either have no warning, or none distinguishable from those we are now receiving at this moment, in time for us to escape; or there would be no British ship of war (still less likely that of any other nation) into which we could make our escape. At this moment there is a small British squadron in the bay; and, in addition, French, Dutch, and Prussian men-of-war.

Surrounded, therefore, by menace, doubt, and suspicion—by dangers, the extent of which we are utterly without means of verifying, it is hard to determine on what course to steer, or how disastrous results may most securely be averted. But taking all the circumstances into consideration, I have not felt justified in allowing Admiral Jones to leave without taking some steps to prevent my being left without a single ship-of-war within reach at this time. And as the "Pioneer" is required to convey Mr. Eusden to Hakodadi, in order to take charge, and, indeed, to communicate with Mr. Fletcher, who has been left alone there without communication, except by a long and circuitous overland route, ever since Mr. Hodgson's departure, I have in a despatch, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, requested the Admiral to leave a second vessel on the station, until it can be more clearly ascertained what is the real amount of danger to be guarded against. I shall also give Admiral Jones perusal of this despatch, that he may more fully understand our actual situation, and my views respecting it.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. Alcock to Rear-Admiral Jones.

Sir, *Yeddo, January* 1, 1861.

THE information conveyed to you in my private note of this date, as received from the Resident Minister of the United States, has since been confirmed by one of the Governors of Foreign Affairs, sent this evening by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs for that purpose.

The Japanese Government inform me they have certain information that within a few miles or leagues from Yokohama, a band of some 600 "loonins" are collected, with intent to burn the Foreign Settlement at Yokohama, and destroy at one blow both the trade and the merchants, and simultaneously or successively to attack the Legations, and murder their inmates.

It is impossible to ascertain what amount of truth there may be in this, or the foundation that actually exists for the superstructure raised; but I learn the rumour is general at Kanagawa of something of the kind impending. Under these circumstances it would hardly be prudent, I think, to remove the whole squadron; I conceive that there should be one ship at least left as a security for British subjects and property at Yokohama and Kanagawa, and another opposite to Yeddo, in communication with the Legation. If you cannot detach two

vessels from your squadron, allowing the "Pioneer" to proceed up to Hakodadi as at present contemplated, I should in that case propose, though to my regret, to defer the departure of Mr. Eusden, rather than that the Bay of Yeddo should be left with less than two ships of war, until something more reassuring can be obtained as to the reality of any existing danger.

It is my purpose to enter more fully into the circumstances connected with our position in Japan, in a despatch to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which I shall inclose a copy of this despatch, and I will also take an early opportunity of requesting you to peruse my communication to his Lordship, that you may have fuller information on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 2.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 16.)

(Extract.) *Yeddo, January* 4, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a further correspondence with Rear-Admiral Jones, regarding the present aspect of affairs here.

For the urgent terms in which I have written to the officer in command, I trust your Lordship will see sufficient justification in the urgency of the circumstances. The signs of danger and alarm in the minds of the Government are too palpable to be mistaken, and of too serious a character to leave me any longer in doubt as to the reality of both. When the Regent of the Kingdom was slain in the streets of Yeddo, in the midst of his own armed retainers, the manifestations of panic and distrust of their own powers of protection were far less apparent. As regards my own personal safety, and that of those attached to me, your Lordship knows that there is no protection to be looked for from ships of war lying many miles off in the roadstead. Nothing but the landing of a force to occupy the Legation could avail, and that I have not asked, although so great is the alarm of the Government that I have reason to believe they would see such a step taken with pleasure.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Rear-Admiral Jones to Mr. Alcock.

Sir, "*Impérieuse*," *off Kanagawa, January* 3, 1861.

I HAVE received your letter of the 1st instant, bringing to my notice the threatened aspect of affairs at Yeddo and Yokohama; also your despatch to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and to Admiral Hope left open for my perusal.

I have duly weighed and considered the substance of these documents, and in consequence of your representation I feel that it will be expedient to deviate in part from the instructions of the Naval Commander-in-chief, and have, therefore, determined to leave the "Encounter" at this anchorage for the present.

Captain Dew will be instructed to keep in constant communication with yourself at Yeddo, and the authorities at Yokohama, and to afford Her Majesty's subjects in particular, and the members of the foreign community generally, any possible protection in his power.

The presence of one ship of war will enable you, I hope, to send Mr. Eusden on his mission, whenever he may be ready to proceed.

The despatch for Lord John Russell is herewith returned; that for the Naval Commander-in-chief, Vice-Admiral Hope, shall be forwarded to him by the "Scout" on Saturday, on which day I purpose leaving this for Hong Kong, the "Scout" at the same time going to Shanghae, touching *en route* at Nagasaki to complete coal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LEWIS S. JONES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Mr. Alcock to Rear-Admiral Jones.

(Extract.) *Yeddo, January* 4, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant in reply to mine of the 1st, respecting the danger alleged to exist by the Government of the country, of a simultaneous attack on the foreign community at Yokohama, the Consuls, and the several Legations in the capital.

Since my letter of the 1st, various representations have reached me from official and other sources, which leave no doubt in my mind that some serious danger does exist of a very unusual character, threatening the lives of every foreigner in the capital and the neighbouring port, and that the Japanese Government distrust their own power effectually to protect them. Not only is this the tenour of their communications to me personally, and through the Governor of Kanagawa to Her Majesty's Acting Consul, as I learn at this moment by an express from that officer, but my own observation of the measures taken by the Government here undoubtedly prove a state of the greatest alarm. The whole road from Yokohama to the Legation is kept by large patrols of armed men. A Daimio has been given charge of this Legation, and some 200 of his followers are here with two field-pieces. Some crisis is plainly anticipated, and whether the blow is to be aimed at the foreigners alone, or the Government through the foreigners, there must be danger to both of no light or ordinary character.

Under these circumstances, I should utterly fail in my duty as Her Majesty s Minister and Representative, if I allowed you to depart, leaving only a single ship of your squadron as you propose, without again calling your attention in the most urgent terms to the present aspect of affairs.

No. 3.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 16.)

My Lord, *Yeddo, January* 8, 1861.

REFERRING to my preceding despatches of this year, respecting the alarm given by the Japanese Government of an attack upon foreigners, I have now the honour to inclose copy of a despatch to Rear-Admiral Jones, reporting the final result of all the endeavours I have made to obtain some more determinate measure of the reality and extent of the anticipated danger, and leaving it to that officer to take such steps in the disposal of the force under his command as might to him seem best.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Mr. Alcock to Rear-Admiral Jones.

Sir, *Yeddo, January* 8, 1861.

SINCE the date of my last of the 4th instant, on the subject of insecurity to British life and property in connection with the reports made to me by the Government here, I have been anxiously engaged in the endeavour to ascertain upon what data the Japanese authorities were acting in the estimates they made of any immediate danger to themselves or foreigners, and the result has been that I am led to conclude there is no danger so determinate either in its character or as regards the time when it may be expected to be over, as any longer to justify on my part the detention of a considerable naval force for the protection of British interests.

For anything I can see to the contrary, indeed, the present state of uncertainty as to our actual position may continue indefinitely for weeks or months.

The Government certainly either cannot or does not deem it expedient to furnish any more precise information than such as I have already communicated to you respecting the true nature of the danger anticipated. I have seen all my colleagues within the last forty-eight hours, and also the Governor at Kanagawa; and I have further, by personal observation in Yeddo and the road between the capital and Kanagawa, satisfied myself that there is no evidence in the demeanour of the people indicative of their sense of any impending danger; while, on the other hand, it appears the Japanese authorities, both here for the Legations and at the port for the foreign Consuls and residents, have now taken all the precautionary measures they deem necessary for protection.

Under these circumstances, I see no alternative but to trust to the efficiency of the measures for which the Government of the country is responsible, and leave it to you to make such disposition of the ships under your command as may seem best, taking it for granted that you will not leave the port without some ship-of-war, in case of emergency, to fall back upon. As I believe one of the Prussian frigates and a Dutch vessel may also be counted upon for some time, the foreign community will not then be left entirely at the mercy of Japanese measures for their security.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No 4.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 28.)

(Extract.) *Yeddo, January* 26, 1861.

THE sudden departure of the Prussian ship "Elbe," with information of the signature of a Treaty between Japan and Prussia on the 24th instant, leaves me but short time to write. As it is just possible, however, that she may save the mail which leaves Shanghae on the 7th, it is important that your Lordship should at least receive a few lines on the present aspect of affairs. My previous despatches of this year will in some degree have prepared Her Majesty's Government for much that has followed. The alarm spread by the Government of an impending attack on foreigners continued, though with the usual vagueness and uncertainty as to the true source and degree of danger.

In this unpleasant state of suspense the days passed on until the evening of the 14th instant, when I received a hasty note from Mr. Harris, requesting medical aid for Mr. Heuskin, his Interpreter and Acting Secretary, who had just been brought home wounded. At midnight, Mr. Juyburgh, whom I dispatched instantly, returned, with the news that he was dead. He had been waylaid on his return from the Prussian Legation by a band of six or seven men, who fell upon him with savage yells, as is the Japanese manner, and cut at him from both sides of the road, while he endeavoured to spur on his horse. He received several wounds, but rode through them, and proceeded 100 yards, when he called to his groom running a-head to stop his horse, and as he came up he fell to the ground. He had received a mortal wound in the abdomen, through which the bowels protruded. The yaconins, three in number, who accompanied him for his protection, fled instantly, as I had told the Ministers at my last interview I knew they would, if we were in any real danger. The protection they afforded has never been otherwise than a sham. A thousand facts proved it; and I repeatedly warned the Ministers that if there were any real danger, their means were miserably inadequate for security. But it was useless; and so the system went on without material change. Mr. Heuskin was left to his fate for half-an-hour, bleeding on the ground, before his brave protectors found their way back with assistance to carry him home.

On the fourth day after, all the Corps Diplomatique and the Consular body from Kanagawa assembled at the American Legation by invitation to render the last honours to the murdered man, when they received a warning from the Government that if they persevered in their intention of following the body to the grave, they were likely to lose their own lives. No one hesitated; but the fact of such a warning seemed to indicate either an odious policy of intimidation

on the part of the Government, or such deplorable timidity and weakness as took from the foreign Representatives all security, or hope of vigorous measures for their protection. Not only were none taken on this occasion—not a soldier called out—but there was a total absence of any precautions to prevent a surprise or sudden attack along the line of road, for more than a mile by the banks of a river, and offering great facilities of attack from cross-roads leading to it, and bridges which crossed at short intervals.

The whole of the foreign Ministers, strongly impressed with the significance of these events, and the sinister rumours which continually circulated of a general massacre, met, by common consent, the next day at this Legation to consider their position, and what course it behoved them to take, not merely for their own safety, but for the honour and dignity of their respective Sovereigns, and the interests and lives of every foreigner in the country.

The American Minister alone, of the five members present, was willing to let things take their course, and confident in the good faith of the Government. Neither the assassination of his own Secretary, nor the warning at the funeral and all that followed, seemed capable of shaking his faith in their honesty of purpose, and ability to afford protection. It was in vain that the rest of his colleagues, pointing to a long series of assassinations, the constant denial of justice, and a continued system of menace and intimidation, showed the impossibility of reconciling the views he entertained with the facts. A second Conference took place, after a few days' interval, at which Mr. Harris did not attend.

A *compte-rendu* of the two Conferences was drawn up, giving a full and detailed statement of the views entertained by the several Representatives present, with the grounds for a perfect unanimity as to the most fitting course to be followed to avert a great danger to Japan, no less than to the foreigners now in the country. This bears the signature of the Ministers of Great Britain and Prussia, the Chargé d'Affaires of France, and the Consul-General of Holland, and a copy shall be forwarded by the first opportunity.

In the meantime I inclose copy of an official communication I have addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, announcing the step determined upon by common accord with my colleagues; as also a circular to the Consuls of Her Majesty in Japan. These will, I trust, suffice to prevent unnecessary alarm from partial or exaggerated accounts of the actual situation which may reach England in the first instance.

I do not yet despair, not even with the disadvantage of Mr. Harris' secession, which will do much mischief in weakening the effect of our otherwise unanimous action. We may make head still, and by peaceable means, against a persistent policy of obstruction, menace, and assassination.

In a few hours I shall embark with M. de Bellecourt on board Her Majesty's ship "Encounter," and shall take up my residence temporarily at Yokohama.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Mr. Alcock to the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

Yeddo, January 26, 1861.

A LONG series of assassinations, both here and at Yokohama, in which foreigners have been the victims, preclude the possibility of the lately renewed menace of a general massacre being regarded as a mere idle demonstration of ill-will. The recent murder of Mr. Heuskin, and the shameful conduct of the yaconins expressly appointed by the Japanese Government to accompany him for his defence, prove alike the reality of the danger and utter inadequacy of the means of protection.

When to these circumstances must be added the grave fact that, of all the numerous cases of assassination and murderous assaults committed on foreigners during the last eighteen months, the offenders in no one instance have been seized, or justice done, it is evident to demonstration that no reliance can be placed on the measures hitherto taken by the Government to secure, either the prevention of similar crimes in future, or the punishment of the guilty.

The past is over, and nothing the Japanese Government can now do, will

bring back the dead to life, or repair the wrong done. But it is otherwise in regard to the future; and this assured immunity of crime is fatal to our security. It is equivalent to a Royal license to kill and slay, under which all who are capable of murder (and according to the Japanese authorities the number is large in this country), may attack and kill foreigners, wherever they find them, without fear or hesitation, so perfectly are they assured of escape without damage from the law.

This is in effect to outlaw every foreigner in the Empire, and to place the Representatives of Sovereign States, no less than the rest, at the mercy of whoever may find pleasure or advantage in killing them. Under such a régime life is only held at the will and pleasure of every ruffian in the Empire!

This may well seem too monstrous and too opprobious to be possible, in the least civilized of States. Yet I have only stated in plain terms the exact truth, susceptible of proof by facts which admit of no question, facts of monthly and weekly occurrence in the actual state of affairs. I need not ask the Japanese Government if this is a position which they think is fitting for the Diplomatic Agents of the Great Western Powers in Treaty with Japan. I will not do them the injury to assume for a moment that they consider it possible for the Representatives to accept such a position. I feel sure, on the contrary, that not only your Excellencies, but the Government of the Tycoon, and I would fain hope the great body of the Daimios and governing classes in this country, regard such acts of murder, and efforts to place the Ministers of foreign Powers under a régime of intimidation, with shame and indignation. But granting this, as I willingly do, whence, then, comes this perfect impunity to criminals guilty of these acts, this continued perseverance in the same odious and disgraceful policy? It is for the Government to answer, for they are responsible by the Law of Nations. In the eyes of all the world they are responsible for the maintenance of order, and that respect for the laws which protects life and property. If they fail in this, they cease to preserve the essential characters of a Government, and lose their best title to the respect of foreign Powers, who can only treat with those who govern *de facto*, and not merely in name. This is, indeed, the very condition of their permanence as a Government, and they cannot forget it without imminent peril.

The Government of Japan is menaced, therefore, in its own existence, in such a state of misrule; and in their own interest I must urge the actual situation upon their most serious attention.

It is, or should be, unnecessary for me to recapitulate here the leading facts which, during this eighteen months past (ever since, indeed, the ports were opened by Treaty), have, in continued sequence, tended to the same end, namely, to render the position of a foreign Representative intolerable and untenable, by continual menaces, restrictions to his free intercourse, and encroachments on his independence; by insults, unrepressed and unpunished; and finally, by insecurity to life.

And a like series of events has marked our relations at the ports, exposing the foreign residents to similar grievances, with a systematic disregard of all the rights and privileges guaranteed to them by Treaty; official interference with the free sale and purchase of produce; obstructions, restrictions, exactions; in a word, all the machinery that authorities and subordinate officials, with absolute powers of control over Japanese subjects could devise, for their own profit and the injury of foreigners.

The assassination of Mr. Heuskin, following close upon menaces of a general massacre, communicated to the foreign Ministers by orders of your Excellencies, followed up again by an intimation from the same quarter on the morning of the funeral, when the Representatives of the Five Powers were all assembled to render the last honours to the murdered, that they themselves were in danger of being attacked on the way to the cemetery, if they ventured to proceed, were more than sufficient to remove the last trace of doubt or hesitation in my mind, and I think in the minds of most of my colleagues, as to the necessity of instant and decided action on their part.

But lest they should not have been enough, it would seem as if it had been determined to furnish one more conclusive evidence how little the Government could be relied upon for our defence and protection, by leaving the whole line of road, more than a mile in length, to the cemetery, open to attack. There were no guards on the ground, or extraordinary measures of precaution and

protection—I do not say to resist the attack it had sent warning was to be feared, but to prevent the possibility of the most desperate men daring to attempt it. Here were the lives of all the foreign Ministers in Yeddo, together with the whole of their respective Legations, and the Consuls from Kanagawa, declared by the Government to be in immediate danger. They were all at one spot assembled, and yet it was not deemed worth while, apparently, to adopt a single measure for their defence and protection! This, indeed, was conclusive: that the Government should allow a member of one of the Legations to be murdered, while the whole Corps Diplomatique was under menace of a similar fate, and yet consider it unnecessary, even in courtesy, to make any communication to Her Majesty's Minister at this Court, whose own safety and that of the members of his Legation were in question, could no longer be subject of surprise. The two courses were perfectly consistent with each other.

Moved by these considerations, and perfectly convinced by all the experience of the past, of the hopelessness of any further effort, by mere remonstrance on the spot, to effect the changes which it was too plain could not be deferred without risk of the gravest complications, and, it might be, national calamity, if, unfortunately, further lives should be lost, I took immediate steps, after the funeral, to communicate with my colleagues, and announce my resolution, to avert, if possible, the dangers I foresaw in the continued supineness of the Government.

I determined, with this view, to withdraw temporarily from the Legation at Yeddo, and I now write to acquaint you that I have carried this resolution into effect. I shall take up my residence, for the present, at Kanagawa or Yokohama, where I can not only command means of protection, if required, from Her Majesty's ships, but also take such steps as may be needful for the security of my countrymen. There I shall wait with calmness the result of further communication with the Government of the Tycoon, free, for the first time for eighteen months, if not from the menace of assassination, at least from any anxiety as to such threats being immediately carried into execution to the peril and disgrace of Japan.

I trust your Excellencies and the Council of State, to whom I pray you to communicate this despatch, will see in this decisive step an earnest desire to avoid to the utmost, and as long as possible, a cause of rupture or more serious complications, but also a firm resolution to insist upon such total change in the policy hitherto pursued towards British subjects, in common with all other foreigners, as shall give that security to life and property, and full enjoyment of Treaty rights, which they are entitled to demand. My long-continued personal relations with one of your Excellencies, and their uniformly friendly character, lead me to hope that, sharing in the regret I feel for these untoward impediments to a good understanding, you will see the necessity for similar decided action with your colleagues in the Government, that this standing reproach may be removed. The faction of violent and unscrupulous advocates for a system of terrorism and assassination, whom I must suppose to be the real authors of such troubles, must be controlled, whatever may be the rank or numbers of those concerned, or nothing but grievous consequences, from which Japan will be the first and greatest sufferer, can follow, in spite of the sacrifices and efforts I am now making to prevent such a catastrophe. The Government, in a word, must show that it has both the will and the ability to impose respect on all the disaffected or violent spirits who would seek, for their own ends, to disturb the good relations hitherto existing between the Treaty Powers and Japan; and which, on the part of Great Britain, the Government of Her Majesty is most anxious to maintain for the mutual advantage of both countries. They must no longer be permitted to take life with assured impunity, and follow out a system of intimidation, in the vain hope of driving foreigners out of the country by murder and terrorism. Europe united would resist the attempt, render its success impossible, and punish the authors of such an outrage on the laws and right of nations. Could they even temporarily effect their object, and murder every foreigner, Japan would be the most grievous sufferer. Were such a flagitious policy ever to be carried out, the whole country would fall under the ban of civilized nations, and be dealt with as a common enemy. I trust, for the interests of humanity, such deplorable contingencies may be rendered impossible, and that both the Government and the people of Japan will be convinced that their best policy is faithfully to fulfil their engagements and

to maintain friendly relations with a Power which has at its disposal ample means for obtaining, in case of need, full redress for injuries done to its subjects.

I have only, in conclusion, to urge upon the Government the importance of putting a speedy end to the present exceptional state of affairs. I am anxious for a peaceable and satisfactory termination; and am ready to return to the Legation, and resume my duties in Yeddo, whenever I can see such material guarantee for redress in respect to past grievances, and security for the future, as may warrant this step. I have, in the meantime, left all my property undisturbed, under the charge of the officers in my house, and for the safety of which the Government will, of course, be responsible. Whether my return be prompt or tardy, therefore, depends entirely upon the Japanese Government. It is certain, sooner or later, that the Representative of Great Britain will return to Yeddo, the place of residence assigned by Treaty; but, if speedily, there will be the less time for new complications to arise, and affairs may be more easily arranged with mutual benefit (and on a better footing than hitherto, to my regret, has been found possible) if no time be lost.

With respect and consideration,

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Circular addressed by Mr. Alcock to Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan.

Sir, *"Encounter," Bay of Yeddo, January* 26, 1861.

I INCLOSE, for your information and guidance, copy of an official communication I have addressed to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Yeddo, in which the Japanese Government is informed of my resolution to withdraw temporarily from the capital, and made acquainted with my reasons for this step. This resolution has been taken in concert with my colleagues the Representatives of France and the Netherlands, between whom and myself there is the most perfect accord, as the best means of averting eventualities calculated to interrupt all friendly relations. I trust, in common with them, that it may yet be possible to put an end to a system of intimidation, enforced by frequent assassinations, which must otherwise inevitably lead to great calamities, and more serious complications than those which already exist in consequence of the long persistence in so fatal a course.

In furtherance of this object, it is my purpose to take up my residence, temporarily, at Kanagawa or Yokohama, and there await the communications of the Japanese Government. On the spot, to which any danger of violence will then be narrowed, and where all British subjects in this part of Japan are collected, I shall be enabled to take more effective steps for their security, with the assistance of Her Majesty's ships. My relations with the Japanese Government will not be interrupted, nor trade interfered with, while negotiations are proceeding for the more effective maintenance of Treaty rights than has hitherto been found possible.

In this way I trust much good may ultimately be effected with the least chance of injury to existing interests; and you will in nothing alter your demeanour, or usual course of action, at the port under your jurisdiction. The object of this movement, on my own part (as, I may add, on that of my colleagues), you will explain to the Governor of Kanagawa, is not to create a rupture; but, if possible, to avert any such calamity, and by every available means, while relieving the Government of Japan from a great danger, to induce them, without further delay, to take what steps may be necessary to place their relations with foreign Powers on a better and safer footing; and, above all, to give that security to life and property which has been greatly in default from the beginning, and, latterly, wholly wanting.

You are at liberty to make known the contents of this despatch, and its inclosure, for the information of British subjects at your port.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 5.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1861.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatch of the 26th of January, reporting the circumstances under which you had determined to take up for a time your residence at Kanagawa, and inclosing a copy of a letter which, previously to your departure, you had addressed to the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

I understand from your despatch that the Ministers of the other Powers represented in Japan, with the exception of the Minister of the United States, concurred in the necessity of such a temporary withdrawal from the Japanese capital, and have, with you, recorded their opinions to that effect in a memorandum which I may expect to receive from you by the next mail from Japan.

Till I have had an opportunity of considering the statements in that memorandum, it is obviously impossible for me to enter at length into the serious questions which the events which you briefly narrate in your despatch are calculated to suggest. In the meantime I can only observe that Her Majesty's Government place the fullest reliance on your judgment and discretion, and are satisfied that you had fully weighed all the momentous consequences which may ensue from the step which your colleagues and yourself have taken, and that you were convinced that it was the one most likely to produce a salutary influence on the Councils of the Japanese Government.

Her Majesty's Government are glad to perceive that although withdrawing for a time from the seat of Government, you have made it clear to the Japanese Government that in doing so you have not broken off relations with it; and further that while calling upon the Japanese Ministers to protect the Representatives of foreign Powers, you have not coupled your demand with an intimation that their omission to do so, from whatever cause arising, may be resented by acts of hostility on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

The step that you have taken, without committing either yourself or your Government to a positive interruption of friendly relations, or to any eventual course for asserting Treaty privileges, is still sufficiently indicative of your displeasure, and of the serious light in which what has occurred may be viewed by Her Majesty's Government, to cause the Japanese Government to feel anxious as to the result. If matters should not be settled when you receive this despatch, you will be careful to say nothing to moderate that anxiety, or to lead the Japanese Ministers to suppose that the state of insecurity in which Her Majesty's Representative and Her Majesty's subjects generally are left by the remissness of the Japanese Government, in controlling the evil propensities of disorderly Japanese, is not looked upon in this country in a very serious light.

But Her Majesty's Government, as you are well aware, have no desire to quarrel with Japan. They wish that both countries should reap the benefits which the late Treaty promises to confer upon them, and they would most deeply regret to be driven by the Government of Japan to the necessity of exacting by other measures the observance of the rights secured to this country by that Treaty.

At all events, however, you will always bear in mind that except in a case where immediate action is required to preserve the lives and properties of British subjects, or of the subjects of foreign Powers in amity with Her Majesty, it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the employment, or even the menace, of force should not be resorted to.

I understand from the Admiralty that Sir James Hope, on receiving intelligence of the events described in your despatch, took steps for increasing Her Majesty's naval forces in the waters of Japan, and that he was prepared, if on consideration such a course seemed to him necessary, himself to proceed to that quarter. Her Majesty's Government therefore feel assured that adequate protection will be at hand to provide against any emergency that may occur; but I need not say that they look with great anxiety for your further reports. The promise of a great development of British commerce in Japan, which the results of a single year's experience hold out, and the sympathy felt by Her Majesty's Government with Her Majesty's subjects in the perilous position in

which they appear to be placed, justify this anxiety, but they are in some degree reassured by the conviction that the British interests which are at stake could not be entrusted to better keeping than your own.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 6.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1861.

WITH reference to the considerations which have induced you temporarily to remove to Kanagawa, I think it advisable to caution you against appearing in any way to renounce the right of the British Minister to reside at Yeddo.

It may be more prudent for a time to abstain from exercising that right, which might bring on direct collision with the Japanese Government; but it may be hoped that the difficulties of the present time may pass away, and that Her Majesty's Minister may resume his residence at that capital. The sooner the barrier against free intercourse with the Japanese authorities and people is broken down, the more likely is it that a good understanding will be maintained, and prejudices on either side removed.

I should wish, however, to have your opinion, whether in the event of the mission being re-established at Yeddo at an early day, it is desirable to insist upon the provision of the Treaty which admits of the residence of British subjects generally in that capital after the 1st of January, 1862. In forming an opinion upon this point, the somewhat analogous case of Canton will naturally occur to your mind; and whatever course should be decided on, the expediency of guarding in Japan against similar irritating discussions on such a point as those which have prevailed in China must constantly be kept in view.

If you should decide in the negative, and time should not admit of your obtaining the judgment of the Government at home upon your decision, you would do well in the interval to pass a rule under the Order in Council, prohibiting, under penalty, any attempt on the part of British subjects to take up a residence in Yeddo under the provisions of the Treaty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 7.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 12.)

(Extract.) *Yokohama, January* 31, 1861.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 26th instant, I have now the honour to inclose copy of the note therein referred to, embodying a Minute of the two Conferences of foreign Representatives in Yeddo, bearing the signature of all, except Mr. Harris, the Minister of the United States; I forward copy of my letter transmitting the documents for his perusal, and such addition as he might see fit to make in the form of a note as to his own views.

I now have also to report my temporary withdrawal from the Legation at Yeddo in company with M. de Bellecourt, the French Chargé d'Affaires, who embarked with me in Her Majesty's ship "Encounter" on the 26th instant. M. de Wit, the head of the Dutch Mission, had already left, and the Count d'Eulenburg followed two days later for this place, preparatory to his departure for China.

We have each, since the Conferences, and in accord with the resolutions then taken, addressed an official note to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, announcing the step taken, and the motives for it. Translations of these are herewith inclosed for your Lordship's information. To these no answer has yet been received, nor has there been time. But we have evidence that the Government viewed the

departure of the foreign Representatives with some anxiety, and were very desirous to know its true significance. A Governor of Foreign Affairs (one who had been sent to America as Plenipotentiary) was at the United States' Legation at 11 o'clock P.M. on the day of our departure, to ask what it might mean: and the Governor of this place, shortly after our arrival, sought an interview with the Consuls of Her Majesty and of France respectively, with the same object, as will be seen by the inclosed *compte-rendu* of what passed with the French, which M. de Bellecourt has been good enough to communicate to me. To Captain Vyse the Governor merely said that he had been directed to ascertain why I had left Yeddo, to express the concern of the Ministers, and their desire to know how long I proposed to remain, adding that he had been enjoined to take every care of me. The warning at the end of the interview with M. de Bellecourt's deputies, which I confess has an unpleasant if not a sinister character, was not given to Captain Vyse, it appears.

A guard of a dozen Marines was landed for the protection of the Legation during the last few days of my stay in Yeddo, and has been continued here. I had in view as much the political influence of such a step as the material protection afforded, and see reason to conclude it has not missed its aim. The sight of a British guard created a great sensation among the officials, not so much from the actual appearance of a few soldiers, as the public declaration it conveyed of a want of confidence, either in the will or the power of the Government to perform its own part in the protection of the British Representative. One of them expressed to Mr. Eusden, in private, his feeling that it was a shame for the Japanese Government that I should have felt driven to such a measure, and an open reproach to the nation. If I could hope this feeling would be generally shared by some of the higher authorities, it will have had a beneficial influence.

As to the future I can add but little to the information already given until I see what attitude the Government take on receipt of my official note announcing my departure, and the motives for it. I would fain hope it will be one of earnest desire to remove my legitimate distrust of their disposition to take effective measures for the protection of the Legations, and of life, both at Yeddo and the ports; and that propositions will be made to work such changes as may afford at least a formal assurance on their part, that they not only recognize the obligation, but pledge themselves to do all that may be needful to honestly fulfil it. If such disposition be shown I shall not hesitate to make arrangements to return to the Legation at Yeddo. The demonstration will have been made from which a change of policy was to be hoped; and it would be neither wise nor expedient, I conceive, to insist too much on redress for the past, or enter into a large field of complaints. It is the future position of foreign nations and their Representatives in Japan which it is most important to regulate and improve. Any fair guarantee for this I should gladly welcome, and trust, after my return to Yeddo, to convert what may be merely promises of improvement now, into material results. Mr. Harris himself is not more impressed than I am with the consciousness that if satisfactory relations are ever to be established with this Government and people we must be content with improvement by slow degrees, and put up, in the meantime, with many shortcomings, and not a few wrongs. The difference between us lies not in this, but in the policy by which this moderate expectation of an ultimate good may be realized, and how best to avert a danger the existence of which even the American Minister does not deny. That those in Japan who have from the beginning been inimical to the commercial and political relations he initiated by the Treaty of 1858, may be deterred from any reaction by more or less violent means directed against either the persons or the interests of foreigners, is a necessity, whatever else be done or left undone.

I shall, no doubt, hear from the Ministers in reply within a few days; and I shall then be better able to judge what are the chances of a speedy and satisfactory termination to this species of interregnum, which it is every one's interest should cease as soon as possible.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Note on the political situation and state of affairs in Japan, giving a Minute of two Conferences held on the 19th and 21st of January, 1861, at Her Britannic Majesty's Legation, Yeddo, including Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Rutherford Alcock, Esquire; the Resident Minister of the United States of America, Townsend Harris, Esquire; the Chargé d'Affaires of France, M. Duchesne de Bellecourt; the Consul-General of the Netherlands, M. de Wit.

THE Representatives of all the Treaty Powers resident in Yeddo were present at the first Conference, and all with the exception of Mr. Harris at the second. To which number was added on each occasion, by the special invitation of the several members, M. le Comte d'Eulenburg, Envoy Extarordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the King of Prussia, charged with the negotiation of a Treaty with Japan, and now temporarily resident in Yeddo.

The British Envoy opened the proceedings of the first Conference by stating that the Representatives of foreign Powers at present in Yeddo had come together by common consent for the purpose of taking into consideration the political aspect of affairs; and he believed, with a common feeling, that their position in the capital was becoming untenable with security to life, or a due regard to the dignity and interests of the nations they represented.

In order the better to bring under consideration the actual situation, and the measures it might be most expedient to adopt to avert the menaced dangers, not to themselves only as Diplomatic Agents on the spot whose personal security was no doubt in question, but to Japan and all the countries in alliance with it, the Minister in the two Conferences took occasion to pass in review the series of events, with the inferences to be drawn from them, that these together might form some guide for their conduct in the present critical state of affairs. This was premised by a few observations explanatory of the position hitherto occupied in a personal point of view by the speaker, in relation to the Japanese authorities. His relations with the Ministers had usually been of the most friendly character, and were so at the present moment; more especially so, perhaps, during the last few weeks than at several antecedent periods when questions of a more or less irritating character were under discussion. During more than eighteen months he had steadily observed a policy of forbearance, and had been earnest in his endeavours, by patience and conciliatory effort (ever remembering how much they had to learn and to unlearn before everything could be satisfactory), to establish relations of mutual confidence and respect.

As regards the policy and reiterated instructions of his Government, nothing could be more opposed to the whole tenour or spirit of these, or less in harmony with his own sentiments and convictions, than a policy carried out by menace and measures of coercion. Any rupture of the relations established by Treaty would be regarded by Her Majesty's Government, and by the whole nation, with equal anxiety and regret, as a calamity which no effort should have been spared to prevent; and which scarcely any future advantage could compensate. How this end was best to be attained under the present circumstances of trial and difficulty, without compromising the rights and interests of nations, was precisely the question then to be considered; and before any satisfactory conclusion could be formed, it seemed essential that some definite idea should be obtained as to what constituted the Government of the country, and what were the conditions of subordination and responsibility in its several constituent parts. For this, he conceived, would be found to be the starting-point from whence must proceed any logical sequence in their ideas, as to recent events, the responsibility of the Government, and the policy it behoved the foreign Representatives to adopt. As a contribution to the general information possessed, the following observations were submitted by the British Envoy at the two Conferences—in outline at the first, and at the second in their present form with fuller detail.

It was known there was a Titular and Hereditary Sovereign in Japan; the Mikado, who had no voice or action whatever; and a second, the Tycoon, vested with what originally was an usurped authority, though since made hereditary with certain elective limitations. The Tycoon was nominally the head of the Executive; but he, like the Mikado, had been virtually set aside,

and only held a phantom sceptre. More especially must it be so now that the Tycoon was a mere boy, who could exercise, by reason of his youth, neither weight nor influence in the Councils of the nation. Behind these shadows the true Executive and governing Power must be sought. There were first the Ministers, with two of whom the Representatives of foreign Powers alone came in contact. Behind, but above them, the Gorogio or Council of Five; Daimios in their own right, and high officers of State by election, claiming to exercise a supreme executive power under certain responsibility and control, from those from whom their powers were derived. Beyond these, again, and probably, also, the effective source of any power the Gorogio exercised, was the Great Council of the Daimios, understood to be eighteen in number; these, again, representing the power and influence of the sixty-two principal vassal Princes of the Empire, who lastly formed a part only of the collective body of some 600 Daimios possessed of territorial rights and privileges, more or less considerable in the country, and a voice more or less direct and potent in its Councils, however formed or conducted. Although this left much to be desired, both as to detail and ascertainable accuracy of outline, yet in the way of positive information there was nothing more reliable to guide them. That the highest titular dignitaries in the land, the Mikado and Tycoon, had no governing power, at the present moment, might be accepted as certain. That the whole mass of the nation, consisting of unprivileged classes, had no part or voice in the Government, was also assured. There remained the class of Daimios between the two: Chiefs of Houses; vassal Princes once independent; cadet branches with their relations; officers, dependents, and retainers, in whose hands all power and administrative or executive functions appeared to be, to the exclusion of all others. But how that power was distributed and balanced, how exercised in relation to the responsibility of the several component parts to any smaller centre of concentrated action and power, there was no information attainable in the present state of foreign relations. In the injurious isolation and ignorance in which they were kept by the determined action of the Government to that end directed, no information from authentic sources was to be obtained. Anything of a reliable nature to be learned, must be sought by logical inference from isolated and often seemingly contradictory facts, reasoning up from effects to causes; of which latter they could in no other way form an idea or a valid opinion. Yet without some definite ideas on such a subject, to talk and reason of the acts of a Government, was but to cover total ignorance of the thing by a name, and grope through devious paths in utter darkness.

But taking such facts as had been observed since Mr. Harris first entered into negotiations for the Treaty he afterwards so happily and ably concluded, contrary to all expectation, might it not be possible to discover such a logical sequence and necessary relation of the one to the other, and to first causes, as should take foreign Representatives out of this disabling darkness in which it was the constant effort of the governing power to keep them, and give to those who must act, in faith or with knowledge, and that under the heaviest responsibility, a clear judgment as to the actual conditions of the present situation?

Such links of connection and logical sequence of causes and effects were, he thought, apparent, and in a great degree even susceptible of demonstration. They might be stated briefly in their order, and if, after that, the hypothesis suggested by them were found to admit whatever fact could be cited, or which from day to day might arise, giving to each and all a full and satisfactory if not exhaustive explanation, and a natural place, it could hardly be that the Ministers present would feel any hesitation in adopting it as a guide through all the dark and tortuous paths of Japanese policy.

When Mr. Harris had nearly conluded his negotiations, he found an insurmountable barrier to its final completion. What was this? He was told that serious opposition existed among the great body of Daimios to the policy such a Treaty would initiate; and that time must be allowed, and was essential, to get over this. So insuperable did this difficulty appear, that he had to acquiesce in delay, and actually returned to Simoda for a definite period, at the end of which time it was hoped the opposition might be diminished. In the meantime the allies captured the Taku forts, and from Tien-tsin dictated to the Emperor of China and his councillors their own terms. Instant news of this was brought over to Japan by an American frigate, and of the anticipated prompt

departure of British and French squadrons with Plenipotentiaries, to negotiate a Treaty with Japan.

Armed with this news, Mr. Harris suddenly returned to Yeddo, and induced the then existing Government to conclude the Treaty, which wanted only the final act to complete it.

Within one month from that date, and before either Lord Elgin or Baron Gros could arrive, the reigning Tycoon had disappeared from the scene; a youth of fourteen or fifteen (not his son) had been elected from the Royal stock, under a Regency, and the whole of those concerned in the negotiations were disgraced and removed, even down to the subordinates; and in disgrace to this day they had remained. These were all facts of sufficient notoriety to admit of no question as to their general accuracy. What did they reveal?

1. That the governing class, consisting of the whole body of Daimios in the Empire, was divided, and that there were parties and political divisions among them.

2. That one of these was favourable to the great innovation of establishing foreign relations, either, because more advanced than the rest, they saw advantage to their country in such a course, or that the time had arrived when it was no longer possible to refuse; or possibly, moved by more personal considerations, connected with internal struggles between different parties for ascendancy, and in view of an impending or existing struggle, it may have seemed to them that by introducing a new element into the field of Japanese politics by alliances with foreign Powers, they might find strength in these allies and assistance.

3. That another, and as it proved in the end the most powerful, section were as evidently hostile to this policy, either from patriotic convictions, or an insight into the game of their opponents for strengthening themselves, and by a sort of palace revolution drove them from their posts into disgrace and exile. Here, then, is gained a first starting-point.

The governing body, those who exercised more or less direct action on the State, and among them the whole power, whether the whole of the hereditary Daimios, or a lesser number, were divided among themselves, and represented, in respect to foreign intercourse, two antagonistic sections.

Passing on to the next series in the chain, there was an order of facts which for a long time bore an appearance of puzzling, if not irreconcileable, contradiction. The Government, that is, the official organs of the governing body in contact with foreign Ministers, and speaking in their name, professed the greatest amity, were full of assurances of good faith, and an earnest desire honestly to give execution to the Treaties in every particular. Nothing could be more pleasant or satisfactory, as far as professions went, had their acts in any way borne out their promises. But when the ports were opened in July 1859, an extemporised Settlement was found in an advanced state of preparation, in an isolated site, away from the main road and population of Kanagawa, contrary to the most express and determined opposition of Mr. Harris, and to his long-antecedent objections made on the spot. This was persisted in, with the aid of foreigners themselves, but contrary to the opinion of both British and American Ministers; the British Envoy entirely concurring with his colleague in the impolicy and inexpediency of the adoption of this site. Simultaneously, an attempt was made to depreciate the dollar by two-thirds, and to prevent all transit along the high road between the Legations at Yeddo and the Consulates at Kanagawa, for any members of either.

Months were spent in harassing efforts to persevere in these tactics, before even the two latter were finally abandoned; in the midst of which news was received of the assassination, or butchery rather, of a Russian officer and two sailors in the streets of the new Settlement of Yokohama, one reason alleged for the occupation of which, had been the assumed greater security of foreigners away from centres of population. This took place while Count Mouravief, Governor-General of Siberia, with a larger squadron than had ever been seen in the Japanese waters, was here. In this case, though brutally mutilated and nearly hacked to pieces (as no mere robbers take the trouble to mangle their prey), there was some pretext of robbery, for a bag or box containing money was taken from the murdered men. Nevertheless, the popular explanation of the motives for this first of a long series of equally barbarous onslaughts on individual foreigners, stretching through the whole intervening interval, between the

25th of August, 1859, to the murder of the Secretary of the United States' Legation but a few days ago, was, not that mercenary, but political inducements had been in operation. It was said to be the work of the Prince of Meto, one of the Royal brothers, the deposed head of the party in power when Mr. Harris' Treaty was concluded, and the object, to bring on a collision with a foreign Power, by which to embarrass and ruin the existing Government, to the advantage of the party in exile and disgrace.

A series of similar assassinations followed quick. On the 6th of November, the Chinese servant of the French Consular Agent (dressed like an European, and probably mistaken for one) was slashed across the body with wounds and pursued some distance in the foreigners' quarter at Yokohama in open day. On the 29th of January, 1860, the linguist of the British Legation was run through the body on a Sunday afternoon while standing at the gate. On the 26th of the following month two inoffensive Dutch captains early in the evening were butchered like the Russians, in the main street of Yokohama, and not robbed.

This for a time closed the catalogue of attacks on foreigners, and the same unrelenting purpose seemed to take another direction. On the 24th of the succeeding month of March the Regent of the Kingdom was set upon in the midst of his retinue by a band of some twenty determined men, who cut their way to him as he sat in his norimon, and struck his head off. This was done on the road to the palace, at 10 o'clock in the morning, in a great thoroughfare. near the Tycoon's entrance, almost touching a guard-house, and within sight of his own residence, where probably he had armed retainers counted by thousands. The extreme audacity of this act of vengeance and political warfare seemed to have thoroughly alarmed the governing powers. It showed that they had enemies, equal to any enterprise, however hazardous or desperate.

In this case both official information and public report indicated the Prince of Meto as the author and instigator of the act, and he became a refugee in open insurrection. Assuming that this party, large or small, but counting among their number a Prince of the blood, and no doubt other Daimios commanding retainers and resources, had something to say to all the murders of foreigners up to that date; it was quite evident they had bravos in their pay, or adherents, who were ready to sacrifice their own lives in taking that of others, if necessary—thoroughly desperate and unscrupulous instruments of policy or vengeance.

Assuming also the party in power, and holding the government of the country in their hands, saw in these murders the desperate and dangerous game of political adversaries, they might very naturally fear lest they should proceed to further extremities against foreigners; and even attempt the lives of foreign Ministers, and, without any regard or interest for them, conceive great alarm, and take measures of unusual precaution for their protection. Such alarm was expressed, and certain measures were adopted, but, taking it for granted that the danger here indicated was, in their opinion, real and great, their measures furnished a means of estimating their capacity for dealing with such contingencies and dangers, when there was less reason than usual to doubt their good faith in the matter. What were these? Under the plea of zeal for the safety of the Diplomatic Agents they filled the courtyards and grounds of the Legations with watch-houses and guard-houses, and surrounded them with squads of yaconins, spies, and police of every kind, to the total abolition (always under the most specious forms) of what little shadow of free action and liberty had been left to them in the beginning.

But there was no night in which a band, either large or small, of determined men might not have penetrated at the back of the Legations and murdered every inmate; and no day that the members went out when they were not exposed to the risk of being cut down in the streets and murdered, not by such a band as effected their purpose on the person of the Regent, but by any one, two, or three men, so cowardly and utterly inefficient the yaconins appointed to accompany them proved to be. What was the inference, then, but that all this was principally to carry out a system they had much more at heart than the safety of Ministers' lives—a system of isolation, restriction, and petty tracasserie, to make the residence of Diplomatic Agents as disagreeable and hateful as possible, and as idle for any purpose of obtaining knowledge that might aid them in forming a true estimate of the condition of the country and its government. So they

took care the residence of the Ministers should alone take place under such condition.

At first it had been attempted to prevent their free circulation through the city by mobbing and pelting every member of the only two Legations then established, and no attempt whatever was made by the authorities or by the ward constables stationed at every sixty paces, either to disperse the mob or arrest the ringleaders. The Government pleaded inability to control the popular will, until an energetic protest was received from the British Envoy, warning them in very plain terms of the danger they were incurring, when within eight days—it might be twenty-four hours—all signs of turbulence disappeared as if by magic, in the very quarter where previously the entrance of a foreigner was a sure signal of mob violence.

It might by some be supposed that between the protest, with its plain warning of consequences, and the sudden cessation of these popular outrages, there was no connection; that the governing Powers, wholly foreign to such demonstrations of enmity, were, as they said, unable to prevent its offensive exhibition, but the least suspicious must confess there was (in that supposition) something equally unintelligible in the unprovoked violence and its sudden cessation: whereas, if we believe we see in the series of events proof that this was a simulated popular movement, factitious in its origin, and got up by some influence known to the Government, and not beyond its control, and for purposes of intimidation, in carrying out an odious and unprincipled policy to deter the members of the Legations from moving freely about, and make them virtual prisoners within their residence, but failing in its object, and threatening to bring some immediate complication upon the heads of the Government, it had been simply countermanded, and ceased accordingly as any movement by authority naturally ceases, when the power which sets it in motion wills that it should stop,—this, indeed, supplied an adequate and reasonable explanation, whereas the other supposition left all the facts perfectly unintelligible.

Under the new system, with its accumulated restrictions and surveillance, things were allowed to take their course during the rest of the year. Foreign Representatives saw plainly enough the tactics of the Government, and winced a little under all the petty, incessant, and only half-dissembled impertinences and vexations which a swarm of low officials were placed in a position to inflict; but the struggle to get free must evidently involve a recourse to strong, if not extreme, measures, which all were reluctant to the last degree to adopt.

Except occasional menace from retainers of Daimios, drunk and sober, with invariable inertness and manifest indisposition on the part of the yaconins, said to be for their protection, to interpose, nothing very material occurred.

Some were sanguine that all would be well with time and patience; others doubted, but waited, anxious to carry out a policy of forbearance and good-will to the last point compatible with the exigencies of their position. There was, doubtless, much to be desired, much it was difficult to reconcile with any conviction of good faith or amity on the part of those who held the reins of government, unless with such belief were coupled the further conviction of their inaptitude and total inability to perform the functions of a Government. Between want of will, or of power and ability, lay the whole question: there really could be no third postulate in the matter. Without alluding to many minor grounds of complaint,—the arbitrary detention of goods at the Custom-house, with vexatious delays and obstructions; the undoubted and continued acts of official interference with the operations of merchants and the exchange of produce, with incessant extortions on those allowed to have any intercourse; the absence of all effective measures for securing the circulation of dollars at their value, weight for weight; for the recovery of debts, or punishment of frauds and breaches of contract; the absence of all real protection from insult or violence, which continued from month to month, despite all warnings and remonstrances, under a whole system of shams, covering a real surveillance for purposes of vexation and restriction, entirely contrary both to the letter and the spirit of the Treaties;—without taking these up in detail, and allowing a large margin for misunderstandings, want of experience of European usages and feelings, good intentions ill-carried out by subordinates, and any other excuses they may be able to make with a show of plausibility, they stand as a Government condemned by the one fact beyond all question, that in all these violences,

menaces, and assassinations (and all have not been enumerated even where wounds only were received), in no one case has any the slightest redress been afforded or justice done on the assassins; even in the only case where the assailant was seized, because Englishmen coming to the rescue of their countrymen, after he was cut down and thus preventing his murder, pursued and disarmed him. It is now nine months ago and no judgment has yet been given, or no pretence of justice done, though the man was caught red-handed in the act. Is it possible to overlook what this perfect, known, and assured immunity carries with it? A premium to crime, a letter of license to every ruffian and ill-disposed assassin in Japan, of which there are, by their own showing, so many, to attack and slay every foreigner in it, could not more effectually outlaw and rob them of all protection. This, above all other injuries knowingly inflicted upon foreigners, was the most serious and the most unpardonable. It had continued as an integral part of their system from the beginning, and without change or improvement during eighteen months. To all remonstrances, warnings, and protests renewed at frequent intervals by the several foreign Representatives, they have, in effect, turned a deaf ear, while professing the greatest concern and goodwill. To every remonstrance of more urgent character, backed by any demonstrative proof in the murder or assault of a foreigner, the only practical reply has been more vexatious cumbering of yaconins, more interference with domestics and matters which in no way concern them or the safety of foreigners, and any other device for showing zeal at the expense of the foreigners, but of real effective protection none, as those who are in the habit of moving much about know too well.

Under this system of restrictions and petty molestations, on a plea of anxiety for the safety of the Legations, coupled with perfect immunity to crime and total absence of all effective protection, living under a perpetual menace, from time to time renewed, of a general massacre, a system of terrorism and intimidation, so far as it depended on Japanese to make it so, ever and anon enforced by the assassination of some foreigner, eighteen months had passed to the end of last year, without any appearance of change or improvement; the Ministers very courteous, full of assurances of anxiety to observe the Treaty, at the same time that they had shown by acts a more undoubted anxiety, for many months, to induce the foreign Representatives to obtain the consent of their respective Governments to defer the opening of all the remaining ports and places enumerated in the Treaty, on the declared ground of public opinion being so hostile and strongly opposed to any further extension of trade, and of the prevalence of general discontent, that the Government could not, and dared not, give effect to the Treaties. Nor have they hesitated in official communications, both written and verbal, to hint, in terms not to be misunderstood, that if they were finally refused consequences might ensue which the Government could not prevent and we might regret—in a word, some sort of outbreak or revolution, in which foreigners' lives would be sacrificed, their property destroyed, and the Treaties trampled under foot by those who were opposed to their execution. The non-execution, in many important particulars, of Treaties at the three ports which had been opened; this persevering and determined effort, backed by a scarcely-veiled argument of intimidation addressed to the foreign Ministers personally, to deter them from the opening of others at the time stipulated; the absence of effective protection against the designs of the ill-disposed, whether by incendiarism, of which there have been many cases, or by violence and murder, the utter denial of justice in all matters civil and criminal,—that, in so many words, was a summary of the past policy and system of the Government of this country, up to the close of last year; and it had already anxiously engaged the serious attention of more than one of the Foreign Representatives, whether, in the absence of all reliable sign of improvement, or of any change for the better, it was consistent with the dignity of a Sovereign Power, or compatible with the true interests of any nation, to continue diplomatic relations on a footing at once so derogatory, so useless, and so demonstrably unsafe to the lives and property of all foreigners in the country, from the Ministers in Yeddo to the merchants at the ports. While yet in suspense, anxious as to the future, yet unwilling to despair, "hoping against hope" almost, above all, desiring to avoid precipitation, the new year opened, and brought its greeting from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the shape of an intimation that they had intelligence of an alarming character, of gatherings of

"loonins," for the purpose of attacking all the foreigners at Yokohama, Kanagawa, and Yeddo; and followed by a proposal that all the Consuls should leave their residences at Kanagawa, and go over to Yokohama, where they could be more easily guarded, and the several Ministers should in like manner leave the Legations, and take up their residence together within the circle of the Moats, with the same view of better providing for their security.

These propositions were both, for reasons deemed conclusive by the Ministers in question, declined; and immediately the most extensive preparations were made, apparently for the defence of the Legations against a large force. Guards were doubled, and Daimios' men, to the number of some 100 or 200, were brought into the several places, with field-pieces to support them.

Still things took their course; the Government continued to give signs of anxiety and alarm; but so far as carrying out the plan of dislodging both Ministers and Consuls (long a favourite project of theirs, it cannot be forgotten), the menace of massacre failed in its effect.

Like so many other not dissimilar alarms and menaces, many had begun to hope that the Government had, designedly or otherwise, exaggerated the real grounds of alarm and danger, whatever those might be, and matters would assume their usual course, when every one was startled out of this fancied security by the intelligence that Mr. Heusken, on his way from the Prussian Legation, had been waylaid and murdered, his yaconins running away and leaving him to his fate (as it had been so often said to the Government it was known they would, in the face of any real danger).

Why did this, one only of many equally atrocious assassinations, suddenly create in the minds of many, if not all, of the foreign Representatives, so strong and abiding an impression that the time for hesitation, for doubt and inaction, was past, and that the hour had come for some decisive policy to arrest, if possible, the Japanese in the fatal course on which they seemed to be fully launched, and to do so before the murder in detail of individuals, or a more general massacre, to which it was impossible to see any impediment, if resolved upon by the same parties who decreed those already perpetrated, had still further deteriorated and complicated the position? It might be asserted that this was no political assassination, but a mere fortuitous rencontre with a band of bravos, such as are known to haunt the streets of Yeddo, especially at night, and who took the opportunity, pluming themselves on the murder of a foreigner, of committing the crime, as anybody might have foreseen they would, for the mere pleasure of the thing and without other motive. But there were some of the members there present who were profoundly convinced of the contrary, and who saw in it such a clear connection with the inauguration of this most recent course of terrorism and intimidation, that they could arrive at no other conclusion.

Having thus passed in review all the leading features of foreign intercourse since the opening of the ports, the British Envoy begged their patience yet a few moments, while he traced in succession the results at which he had arrived by the process of inferential reasoning, and the putting together of scattered facts bearing on their position. He thought it might be demonstrated that there was no one of these facts that did not find its place and natural explanation in perfect harmony with the conclusions he had drawn.

The first of the results on which he deemed it important the attention of his colleagues should be fixed, tended to define the constituent elements of the Government of the country, limiting it in its largest acceptation to the whole body of the Daimios and privileged classes, privileged by birth, or office and position, and further subject to eliminations and selections imperfectly known, save that of the whole 600 and odd Daimios, 62 were men of great comparative weight and influence; that of these again, some 18 formed a Great Council of State apparently exercising the highest powers; within which again the Gorogio of five, were constituted as their nominees, resembling in some degree a Ministry in Europe, in their functions.

The second result served to establish several positions. First, that this larger governing body, as it might be termed, from whence were drawn the material constituents of any Government, were divided into two parties on the question of foreign relations especially, if not on others. Secondly, that the one hostile to any such departure from the ancient policy defeated the party which concluded the first Treaty, and have ever since remained in power. And,

thirdly, that it was with this party, avowedly hostile to the whole policy of Treaty relations, with whom the foreign Representatives had been called upon to treat, in seeing the Treaties carried into execution.

The next order of facts led to the further conclusion that, while these two parties still continued to struggle, the one it was alleged to the peril of foreigners, in the endeavour to embroil the existing Government with foreign Powers (and the manner and time of many of the murders went far to bear this out), there were, even among the ascendant party, whose nominees and representatives the Gorogio and Ministers, forming the ostensible Government, must be regarded, men of strong views and violent opinions, who advocated a more decided retrograde policy, and the adoption of measures which, at whatever cost, should relieve the country at once of a source of internal danger and revolution, by removing the foreigners altogether. That this should be done by intimidation, if that might suffice, by decimation or general massacre if the first failed, and then by closing all the ports, on the plea that public opinion would not tolerate either foreign trade or intrusion. And, lastly, that there were some among these (they might be many or few) who, with or without the consent of those who actually held the Executive power, had for some time been carrying out their extreme views, by creating the dangers with which the whole foreign community were then menaced. That this was more or less clearly known to the governing members and others, who saw with anxiety and regret such violent and hazardous proceedings, but felt powerless, either from timidity or the conscious futility of measuring their strength against antagonists who were too strong to cope with, and be successful. With as little regard for foreigners as their colleagues, it might be (there was little evidence on this head) they would prefer a more temporizing policy, and milder, though not less effective, methods of rendering null all the Treaties, null to any practical purpose, biding their time to sweep them away altogether, if ever safe occasion should arise. What else could be expected from men so avowedly hostile to the policy, and who came into power on that cry?

Let it then be examined and seen whether all the known facts of the past eighteen months' intercourse did not fully support that view, and receive from it a clear and satisfactory explanation; facts which otherwise lay scattered and unintelligible?

The British Envoy stated that such were his views of the policy of those who now governed Japan, and the actual position of foreigners in respect to them. He was profoundly convinced that measures were being taken which had for their object the removal of foreigners out of the Empire, either by intimidation or by murder. That how far those who more ostensibly held the reins of government were parties to this atrocious system, or only reluctant witnesses, conclusive facts were wanting to show; but that they were cognisant of some one or more of their body who had means at command, even if they did not know who the individuals were, actually engaged in carrying out this vendetta against foreigners, it was impossible for him to doubt. And with this conviction it was equally impossible he could reconcile it to his duty to stand by with folded arms and wait until so foul a conspiracy should be carried on still further to its termination; and equally impossible, therefore, to waste further time, which might cost valuable lives, in addressing mere remonstrances to the Ministers, who, as he firmly believed upon a large experience, would give him only the stereotyped assurances, which would end in nothing. He believed the Ministers had not, in truth, the power, if they had ten times the will or courage he was disposed to attribute to them, to take effective and summary steps. He believed it was only by the Representatives of all the Treaty Powers showing a resolute determination, then and there, to stop this course of terrorism and decimation; and that by some action so decided and significant that it would not only thoroughly rouse the Ministers to a sense of their danger (which he thought of minor importance), but all their colleagues, great and small, throughout the Daimio class, and possibly reach with effect those very Daimios who he believed held in hire the assassins who killed Mr. Heusken, who possibly had been the instigators of many more such atrocities, and who assuredly would not stop if by some means or other they were not alarmed for their own safety, or pressure was brought upon them; and this might come through the alarm of other less adventurous and violent spirits, who, collectively, might find both strength and courage to control—united by a common danger—even those of

their own body who were hurrying the country into conflict with all the chief Powers of Europe, in danger of being outraged by odious breach of national faith and the deliberate murder and assassination of their subjects.

The British Minister concluded by saying that to effect this he believed it essential for the foreign Representatives to withdraw at once from Yeddo, take up a position at Yokohama, where they would be protected by the foreign ships, and provide for the security of their countrymen and themselves. There, free from menace and in the independent position which alone befitted their diplomatic character, they could call upon the Government to reconsider their policy, give them such satisfaction as might be required for past disregard of Treaty obligations, and guarantees for the future, especially as to security of life and person, in which they had hitherto so completely failed. He then read the draft of a letter to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which he had it in contemplation to send—in his own individual capacity, if necessary, as the British Envoy—still further explaining the course he believed the best calculated so to produce the desired effect: not to provoke a rupture but to avert the interruption of friendly relations, and calamities which, he firmly believed, must follow a longer persistence in a course of mere remonstrance. They had to meet by diplomatic resources a system where the assassin was called in to aid the Minister, and influence was sought to be obtained by terrorism and intimidation, perpetually addressed to them as foreign Ministers, and to every foreigner residing within the Empire on the faith of Treaties.

The Chargé d'Affaires of France stated his general concurrence with what had fallen from the British Envoy, and observed that in all essential points there was a perfect accordance in their views, both as to the policy which had been pursued by the Japanese Government and the present situation. This could not be better shown than by the communication of the paper he held in his hand, being a note prepared for the Conference, and giving, in some detail, the considerations which he deemed it most important at the present conjuncture to be borne in mind. The note was then read and left to be appended to the Minute of Conference, and will accordingly be found attached hereto, together with a supplementary note produced at the second Conference.

M. de Bellecourt further insisted upon some of the leading points in subsequent remarks, after hearing the observations of his other colleagues. He particularly dwelt upon his conviction that if the foreign Representatives hesitated at that time, and were induced by any considerations to forego the expressed intention of all the Diplomatic Agents, except the Minister of the United States, it was impossible that their position should not be still further deteriorated, and the foreign Ministers lowered in the eyes of the Japanese. He regretted that Mr. Harris should determine to isolate himself. He did not believe, any more than his colleagues, in a general danger of massacre, but in a Machiavellic combination for purposes of general intimidation, supported by partial danger, in aid of a policy wholly contrary to the spirit of the Treaties which had been entered into with Japan. In this view he could only consider that to allow the Japanese to impose a law of restrictions and intimidations was to encourage them in a crime of "lèse nation" and signal bad faith. He did not conceive that a foreign Representative was justified in submitting to this régime of terrorism and menace for the sterile honour of dying at his post. For himself he had only one fear, which he was ready to confess, and that was seeing the flag that had been confided to his hands dishonoured, if he continued to accept proofs of bad faith, and to subject himself to treatment designed to humiliate and degrade; and to this he now found himself exposed in his daily relations with the Japanese Government. He could only, therefore, persevere in his determination not to quit Yeddo permanently, but temporarily to withdraw, in order to bring the Japanese Government to some terms for improving a position he felt to be no longer tenable, and leave them the plain alternative either to do this, or accept the risk of such measures as his Government, alone or in concert with others, might at a later period deem it needful to adopt for the maintenance of Treaty rights in view of the equivocal position they would, in that case, have deliberately chosen to take up.

M. de Bellecourt concluded by observing, that although he believed Mr. Harris's isolation from his colleagues would have the effect of confirming the Japanese in their present evil course, and otherwise weaken the united action of himself and colleagues, yet he saw nothing in that act which compro-

mised the principle on which they were prepared to act, or otherwise justified any change; on the contrary, he saw reason to conclude that Mr. Harris might find his best chance of safety in the determined course of his colleagues, to which he stood opposed. As regarded the propositions which terminated his note, he was quite prepared to modify them in any way that might seem advisable in Conference, with those of his colleagues who were agreed upon the general principle which should guide their course of action.

The Consul-General of the Netherlands observed that he had listened attentively while the Minister of Great Britain had reviewed the present political state of Japan, expressing his conviction that, under existing circumstances, the Diplomatic Agents were no longer justified in residing at Yeddo.

The danger attendant on a residence in Yeddo, as explained to the United States' Minister when in making his Treaty he stipulated for the right, the insults and indignities offered to the first-comers in the public streets in Yeddo, the succession of murders since perpetrated, and especially the fact of the perpetrators remaining unpunished, all this had produced upon him the conviction that there existed a strong hostile party against foreigners in Japan, which the Government lacked force or energy to repress. After the occurrence of these events had led him to this conclusion, he was informed officially, by order of the Government, that it was dangerous for the Diplomatic Agents to remain in their residences in Yeddo, and that it was advisable for them to take refuge inside the limits of the Imperial castle. Twelve days after this warning, the Secretary of the Minister of the United States was murdered by an armed band in one of the streets of Yeddo; and three days after this another official warning was given that the Diplomatic Agents would endanger their lives if they carried out their intention of attending the funeral of the victim.

Subsequently, he had seen at the funeral, which was attended by all the Representatives of the foreign Powers at Yeddo, no precautionary measures whatever had been taken by the Japanese Government along the road to avert the danger, the real existence of which was pointed out by its own Ministers. These facts led him irresistibly to the conclusion that the Government had no power to prevent the murder of the Secretary of one of the Legations at Yeddo, and had taken no measures to insure even the lives of the Ministers. Either they had not the will or the power to take satisfactory measures for that purpose, unless their condition were complied with, that all should take refuge within the limits of the Imperial castle.

He, as Consul-General of the Netherlands, could not accept that condition, because he deemed it inconsistent with the dignity of his Government, which had not entrusted the protection of its Representative to the Japanese Government in such a manner.

He would not accept it, moreover, because no decided intimation was given from whom the danger was to be feared, and no information that any proceedings had been instituted which could lead to the apprehension and punishment of the criminals. And, lastly, because neither such communication nor such result was to be expected, as the latter was still wanting in all the former successful attempts on life. It would be impossible to know, therefore, at what distant period he might venture out of his place of security, and deem himself safe.

For these several reasons, he concluded by observing that he should not consider himself justified in remaining in his present residence, knowing that there he could not rely upon the protection of the Japanese Government in difficulties, if the danger were to be realised which, by the admission of the Japanese Government, threatened him.

As long as this state of affairs should last, therefore, he should feel bound to withdraw from Yeddo, and bring the circumstances to the knowledge of his Government, with whom a final decision would rest.

The Minister of the United States regretted that he was unable to concur in the view entertained by his colleagues, from whom, indeed, he differed on many essential points. He was the oldest foreign resident in Japan; he had enjoyed long and intimate relations with the Japanese authorities and Government, and he still retained his faith in their goodwill and desire to carry out honestly the Treaties they had entered into. But they had many difficulties to contend with, and the foreign Representatives could not desire them to do impossibilities. They had shown no backwardness in taking measures of precaution for the protection of all; but it was out of their power to prevent

such murders as that of Mr. Heusken, who had exposed himself by going out at night, contrary to the repeated counsels and remonstrances received both from the Government and himself. He, for his part, felt perfectly safe, so long as he complied with the conditions which circumstances imposed, and could not agree in the policy of leaving Yeddo. On the contrary, he thought such a step fraught with danger, that if they once left it they would never return, and that an attempt to occupy any portion of Yokohama with foreign troops would create such an alarm and outburst of national feeling that conflict and war would be inevitable. He recommended that they should unite in urging upon the Government more vigorous measures, and trust to their good faith to give effect to these.

M. le Comte d'Eulenburg observed that the opinions of the Representatives of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, on the one side, and the Minister of the United States of America, on the other, were divided. The first three regarded the danger menacing the members of the Legations as imminent. Taking their departure from this point of view, they considered that in the interests of the Governments they represented, they were not permitted to incur this danger, because the assassination of a Minister or any member of the several Legations might oblige their respective Governments to demand a serious satisfaction, which could not fail to create the most grave complications with the Japanese Government. In order, therefore, to spare, if possible, their Governments such embarrassment, but also to prove to the Japanese Government at the same time that the actual situation was untenable, they proposed to withdraw temporarily to Yokohama, and to address them a note in which the motives for this proceeding should be fully explained, and in which the Ministers would insist upon the Government adopting immediate and efficacious measures to change such a state of things.

On the other hand, the Minister of the United States did not concur in these views. Notwithstanding that he did not deny Mr. Heusken had been assassinated for a political object, he was of opinion that if the deceased had followed the advice that had been given him very frequently, both by the Government and by Mr Harris himself, not to go out at night, he need not have met his death in the way he did. The Minister of the United States declared that he did not believe in any danger to the members of the Legations, provided they conformed to the measures and precautions commanded by the circumstances; and he believed it his duty, therefore, to remain in Yeddo, and from that resolution nothing would turn him. Mr. Harris had further stated that he greatly feared if the foreign Ministers once withdrew from Yeddo, they would never return, and foresaw that the disembarkation of any troops for the protection of the Legations at Yokohama would lead the Japanese to believe that there was a design for the occupation of Japanese territory, and it would create such an outbreak of national feeling as to render a conflict, if not war, inevitable. Mr. Harris gave it as his final opinion, that all the Representatives should remain in Yeddo, and confine themselves to energetic representations on the actual situation, which he himself considered anything but satisfactory.

The Minister of Prussia, after this résumé of the respective opinions of the Members of the Conference, expressed a hope that they would perceive his position was altogether exceptional. He had just concluded the negotiation of a Treaty with Japan, which he hoped would within a very few days be signed. For him to retire either to Yokohama or on board one of his ships; would be to defer the signature of the Treaty indefinitely, and to compromise the success of his mission, which had already encountered so many difficulties. To which also must be added, that he had at his house a guard of Marines sufficient to protect him from attack. Upon these grounds he was determined to remain in Yeddo until he had obtained the signature of the Treaty. But he had no hesitation in declaring that if he were in the place of the Ministers of England, France, and Holland, he would act as they proposed to act, that is, he would temporarily withdraw from Yeddo. Only as regarded the note to be addressed to the Japanese Government explaining the motives for such a step, he would be careful to express himself with great calmness. Persuaded as he was that the Japanese Government had no part in the assassinations during the last two years, but that it was too weak to take any effective steps against those who might be the real culpables, he believed that what was above all things needful, was to rouse the Government from its torpor. The time to declare war upon them

was not yet arrived, but the time had come for representing to them in terms at once calm and energetic, the danger they ran if they did not rouse themselves to a vigorous effort, and prove by conclusive acts that they had both the power and the firm determination to make respected in Japan the first principles of the rights of nations. If three foreign Representatives withdrew temporarily and simultaneously, that would better serve than any other action to impress upon the Japanese Government the necessity for reflection, without in any way provoking a rupture. The disembarkation of a guard sufficient for the protection of the foreign Ministers at Yokohama could not give any umbrage either to the Government or the people, for he himself as the Minister of Prussia had latterly caused a guard of thirty men to be disembarked for his protection without any objection being taken. The resolution which the Minister of the United States of America had announced, of remaining at Yeddo, need not be conceived to weaken the action of his colleagues. Mr. Harris had somewhat of an exceptional position also in his relations with the Japanese Government. He was the oldest resident among the foreign Ministers, and had negotiated the first Treaty. The Japanese Government would assuredly make every effort to protect him, and so much the more if his colleagues withdrew. The Minister of Prussia then summed up, by observing that he thought the divergence of opinion as to the measures to be adopted did not constitute a dissension between the Ministers then present at the Conference, but rather that the steps which both the one and the other conceived necessary could very well be carried out, without either being compromised by antagonism, provided on each side they were fully penetrated with the sentiment that each and all were acting in the sole view of bringing about such a change as would render the position tenable, and not to provoke a rupture.

The Minister of Prussia finally declared his intention to address to the Japanese Government a note, in which he should state his perfect accord with the Ministers of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands; at the same time that he justified a different course of action by his exceptional position.

The Conference having been adjourned to the 21st of January, the same Ministers and Representatives of foreign Powers being present as on the previous occasion, with the exception of Mr. Harris, the Minister of the United States, M. de Bellecourt read an additional note on the political situation, which he desired to add to that he had already left to be annexed to the *compte-rendu* of the Conferences.

The British Minister read to his colleagues the revised note prepared in the interval (already inserted), giving a general *aperçu* of the position they had been called upon to consider, with fuller details as to the course of events, and the inferences that he had brought under their notice, in the general outline given at the first Conference.

And after a further interchange of opinions on many of the subjects discussed at length in the *aperçu* above referred to, it was agreed that a summary of the proceedings and opinions should be prepared for the signature of the several Representatives, as an authentic document, which each might forward to their respective Governments, as embodying not only their opinions on the spot, but all the information bearing upon the actual situation which it was possible to obtain.

The British Envoy, after hearing the opinions of his colleagues, begged to offer one or two concluding remarks; and first, as regarded the exposition of the Count d'Eulenburg's views of the actual situation, as well as the course of action to be followed. He could not but feel it a subject of congratulation that these so entirely coincided with his own in every point, because the Prussian Minister, while he had been quite long enough in the country to form a correct judgment upon Japanese affairs and the position of foreigners, had the great advantage of arriving fresh from Europe, and free from the disadvantage that besets all old residents in Eastern countries, of constantly revolving the same ideas and the same impressions, until they became fixed, and could not be got out of an accustomed rut. With a fresh mind, large European experience, and a judgment warped by no foregone conclusions, a temporary resident also, and, in a certain sense, an impartial observer, without personal interests, he, of all present, perhaps, was in the best position to arrive at a right conclusion. For this reason especially it was gratifying to him, and he thought it would be to his colleagues the Representatives of France and the Netherlands, that the judgment formed by

the Minister of Prussia so entirely accorded with those which they had each and all expressed.

There was, in fact, no difference whatever in any essential particular in these several expressions of opinion; for if the Count d'Eulenburg seemed to lay more stress upon the importance (while carrying out the resolution of withdrawing from Yeddo) of carefully avoiding, in the note to be addressed to the Government explaining the motives for such a step, anything calculated to give the impression of a desire to provoke a rupture, and, on the contrary, of clearly conveying to them the truth, that it was to prevent such a calamity, if possible, and save them from so great a danger, that they temporarily withdrew from the capital to give them time to amend what was amiss, and cause the law to be respected, in their own interest, not less than that of foreign Powers,—he had merely more fully developed the prevailing sentiment of all. The Prussian Minister might feel perfectly assured that he, and he thought he could as certainly answer for his two colleagues, had solely in view, in any steps they were now prepared to take to bring about "such change as would render the position tenable," and avert the calamity of a rupture, to which things were otherwise tending with an increasing impetus.

As regarded the Prussian Envoy's view of the effect and tendency of the isolation of the American Minister in this otherwise unanimous movement, there might, indeed, be some difference of opinion; but this was comparatively unimportant.

The British Minister still thought that this separation of the Representative of the United States from his colleagues in so grave and important a crisis was a misfortune, and would tend, to a certain extent, to compromise their action, as it would undoubtedly be construed by the Japanese Government into an antagonism, from which they were likely to draw encouragement to resist the pressure about to be brought upon them; and so far as it had this effect, it would be an injury to all; to the country Mr. Harris represented, no less than to Japan. But in regard to their colleague's safety in remaining, the Japanese Government would naturally look to him as an ally, and take every possible care of so valuable an accession of force.

He must repeat, then, what he had already stated in part, that he had no anxiety for Mr. Harris' personal safety, which would be secured by their withdrawal and attitude, giving to the Government many additional motives to take care no harm befell him.

The danger would be in all remaining, and the absence of such a check upon this course of assassination and intimidation which, if allowed to continue, could only end, according to all appearance, and he would add probability, in the murder of one or all of those now in Yeddo; the signal, in all likelihood, of a still larger loss of life and destruction of property elsewhere among their countrymen. He felt it was his duty, as the British Minister, to avert this at all risks and all costs, and if he believed that could be better done, or done at all, by remaining in Yeddo, most assuredly he would not leave it. But believing, and being profoundly convinced that this course would leave the sinister influences which had been so long, so manifestly, and deplorably in action without check or hindrance, to consummate their work of decimation and murder, no fear of being supposed capable of flying from a post of danger for his own personal security should deter him from carrying out the only policy which seemed to him calculated to prevent great national calamities.

The Minister of the United States had other convictions, and undoubtedly was bound in like manner to act upon them. And as, to their common regret, Mr. Harris had not been present at this last Conference, he should propose that the note now to be prepared, should be forwarded to him for his approval and signature in common with all the Ministers, and that he should be invited, if he deemed it desirable, to furnish a note, giving more fully his own opinions and views, in order that the same might be attached, and form a part of the record of their proceedings on this occasion.

The Minister of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, then having agreed to prepare each an official communication to be made to the Japanese Government, to be delivered only when they had effected their withdrawal from Yeddo, and sent in simultaneously, the Conference broke up.

We, the Undersigned Ministers and Representatives of foreign Powers now resident in Yeddo, having perused the note, with supplementary documents

hereto attached, accept it as a true and satisfactory *compte-rendu* of the opinions exchanged at the two Conferences held at the British Legation on the 19th and 21st of January, 1861.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, *Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.*
COMTE D'EULENBURG, *Ministre de Prusse.*

Approuvé le présent *compte-rendu* des deux Conférences tenues à la Légation de Sa Majesté Britannique les 19 et 21 Janvier, 1861.

(Signé) DU CHESNE DE BELLECOURT, *Chargé d'Affaires de France.*
J. K. DE WIT, *Consul-Général des Pays Bas.*

Annex 1.

Note submitted by M. de Bellecourt at the Conference held January 19, 1861.

Yédo, le 18 *Janvier,* 1861.

DANS les premiers jours de ce mois, le Ministère Japonais a fait part aux Représentants étrangers accrédités à Yédo, des dangers qui les menacent eux et leurs nationaux, tant dans la capitale qu'à Kanagawa ; il les a même engagés à venir habiter dans l'enceinte du Palais et à faire retirer les Consuls de Kanagawa à Yokohama ou à bord des batiments de guerre de leurs nations respectives ou des vapeurs Japonais.

Les délégués du Gouvernement Japonais, interrogés sur les causes et l'étendue du danger, ont évité de se prononcer catégoriquement ; ils se sont contenté de dire qu'une grande quantité d'officiers déclassés (vulgairement appelés "Lônines") parcouraient Yédo et les environs, avec l'intention de mettre à mort les étrangers, d'attaquer les Légations et les Consulats, et de brûler les établissements formés par les Occidentaux à Yokohama.

Ils ont ajouté que leur Gouvernement se préoccupant vivement de cette situation avait fait appel à plusieurs Daïmios sur lesquels il croit pouvoir compter, et que ces Princes s'étaient chargés du soin de défendre, les uns les Légations étrangères, les autres les établissements de Yokohama.

On a remarqué avec étonnement que parmi les noms de ces Daïmios ne figure celui d'aucun des Princes puissants qui semblent avoir une grande part d'influence dans les affaires du pays, tels que les Princes de Kanga, Satsuma, Mito, Owari, Xendaï, &c., &c., qui sont cependant représentés à Yédo par de nombreuses cohortes d'officiers.

On a remarqué aussi que les forces militaires particulières du Taïcoun n'ont point été dénommées, ce qui donne à supposer que le Gouvernement de ce Prince ne disposerait d'aucune force militaire spéciale, à l'aide de laquelle il pourrait assurer la protection des étrangers au Japon.

Les Représentants étrangers ont néanmoins persévéré à rester à leur poste, ainsi que les Consuls que le Gouvernement Japonais avait fait prier de se retirer à Yokohama.

Le Gouvernement Japonais n'a donc pas encore réussi dans les tentatives d'intimidation qu'il a fait donner aux étrangers, par tant d'avertissements sinistres, et tant de fois, depuis les mois d'Août et Septembre, en vue, sans doute, de faire renoncer les Puissances Occidentales, soit à certains bénéfices des Traités conclus, soit à la conclusion de nouvelles Conventions.

D'autre part, la mollesse du Gouvernement Japonais à assurer la sécurité des étrangers autrement que par des semblants de mesures, le peu d'énergie des défenseurs auxquels il prétend avoir confié l'existence des Représentants des Puissances Occidentales, avaient été déjà manifestes, à la fin du mois d'Octobre dernier, lors de l'assassinat du gardien de pavillon de la Légation de France, qui n'a dû qu'à son sangfroid et au secours de l'arme-à-feu dont il était porteur, d'échapper à une mort certaine et de ne reçevoir qu'une blessure heureusement peu grave. Dans cette circonstance, le Gouvernement Japonais n'a pas craint de témoigner plus d'empressement à embarrasser l'action de la justice, qu'à lui donner tout concours et lumières. Une correspondance écrite sur ce triste procès, met complétement à jour la timidité du Gouvernement Japonais, pour ne pas dire sa connivence, forcée ou non, avec les auteurs de ce crime. En effet le nom

du Prince auquel appartient l'assassin du Sieur Natal a été dans toutes les bouches parmi le peuple de la capitale, et des preuves suffisantes, dans tout autre pays, démontreraient que l'opinion publique ne s'est pas trompée, si le Gouvernement n'avait pris soin d'étouffer sa voix par les moyens machiavéliques qui lui sont familières et qui nous ont été dévoilés.

Il fallait qu'un nouveau crime vint donner une captieuse raison d'être à ce système d'intimidation mis en avant par un Gouvernement pusillanime, sans force par lui-même, et dominé évidemment par une faction hostile à toute fusion avec les étrangers.

Ce n'est plus un officier subalterne des Légations qui vient d'être immolé hier par ce fanatisme, que bien des Princes Japonais réprouvent sans aucun doute dans leur foi intérieur, sans oser témoigner des sentiments que la saine raison inspire toujours à quelques hommes, même dans les sociétés à l'état le plus complet de barbarie ! C'est un Secrétaire de Légation aimé des indigènes comme de tous les siens, qui vient de tomber victime de ce brutal aveuglement de quelques retardataires orgueilleux qui regrettent que le Japon soit sorti de l'état d'isolément dont l'énergie plus encore que les représentations des Puissances Occidentales l'ont fait sortir en 1854 et 1858.

Cette politique aveugle ne doit pas être celle de la majorité des Daimios Japonais ! Le Gouvernement en a fait l'aveu récemment en déclarant que la moïtié d'entre eux est favorable aux étrangers. Un haut fonctionnaire Japonais, intelligent et éclairé, vient de mourir il y a quelques jours, d'une mort toute mystérieuse. A coup sûr, cet esprit élevé avait probablement compris quelle devait être la véritable politique du Japon, bien qu'il servit la cause même des influences actuellement régnantes. Qui sait même s'il ne s'en expliquait pas avec trop de franchise dans les conseils de son Gouvernement ?

La victime qu'on vient d'égorger sans défense ces jours derniers, était-elle d'avance désignée au fer de spadassins politiques, ou bien n'est-elle tombée toute pleine de verdeur et de jeunesse que sous les coups nocturnes de quelques furieux avinés comme il s'en rencontre malheureusement parfois sur le chemin des casernes de Daimios Japonais ?

Pour ma part, je ne puis croire à cette dernière hypothèse ! Toutes les circonstances de ce meurtre exécrable prouvent à l'évidence qu'il y a eu préméditation et guet-à-pens froidement combinés et exécutés en pleine conscience !

Quels sont les coupables ? Qui l'avouera jamais ? Qui rendra jamais compte de ce sang innocent, comme de celui qui a été versé si souvent depuis dix-huit mois, tant que durera l'état actuel des relations équivoques du Gouvernement Japonais avec les étrangers ?

Les auteurs du dernier crime, que nous déplorons, étaient nombreux, préparés et déterminés, et plus encore, la voix populaire affirme qu'il ne s'en trouvait pas seulement sur la place où le meurtre a été commis, mais qu'un autre chemin conduisant également à la demeure de la victime était occupé aussi par des malfaiteurs armés ! Qu'il en fut ainsi ou non, on attendait évidemment dans une rue étroite et sombre le Secrétaire de la Légation Américaine, l'interprête intelligent des Traités conclus avec les Puissances Occidentales !

Quelle a été l'attitude de ceux qui représentent le Gouvernement Japonais dans cette circonstance ? Au moment du crime, un seul officier d'escorte a-t-il degainé son arme pour défendre le malheureux étranger qui lui était confié ?

Ils l'ont laissé lâchement mourir seul ! ou du moins ils l'ont abandonné le laissant seul sous le prétexte d'aller chercher du secours !

Ces gens ont eu peur. Le Gouvernement Japonais tel qu'il est actuellement organisé a peur lui aussi. Si on ne peut en vouloir à des cœurs timides lorsqu'il s'agit de leurs personnes, il ne peut en être ainsi envers ceux qui ont accepté un mandat public, car tout mandataire doit compte de sa gestion ; or en fait de sécurité diplomatique, le Gouvernement Japonais est le mandataire des Gouvernements étrangers qui lui confient en dépôt leurs pavillons, leurs Représentants, et leurs nationaux.

Mais le Gouvernement Japonais fait plus que d'avoir peur ! il cherche à faire peur ! En ce cas du moins il est coupable !

Convient-il à des Gouvernements tels que les nôtres de se laisser traiter en timorés par ceux-là qui tremblant aujourd'hui devant quelques-uns de leurs Princes, trembleront aussi devant nous, si nous leur demandons de quel droit ils prétendent diriger nos impressions, modifier à leur gré leurs obligations envers nos Gouvernements, et nous laisser égorger impunément un à un.

L'essai d'intimidation qui a été tenté sur la tombe du Secrétaire de Légation Heusken, est une nouvelle injure dont le Gouvernement Japonais nous doit compte.

Au lieu de faciliter à la douloureuse cérémonie que nous accomplissons, son caractère de calme, de regrets et de dignité, il l'a troublée par ses ridicules communications. Ce dernier essai d'une politique inacceptable rend une leçon sévère indispensable ; car il constitue une insulte sérieuse aux pavillons réunis, autour de la tombe de la victime.

En conséquence je formulerai la proposition suivante sauf autre avis résultant de la Conférence:—

Le Gouvernement Japonais s'étant déclaré lui-même incapable d'assurer la sécurité des Légations étrangères à Yédo, autrement qu'en les confinant dans l'intérieur du Palais, les Représentants étrangers ne peuvent accepter cette proposition, qui aurait pour résultat de les priver de toute communication avec les nationaux qu'ils ont à protéger.

Les Légations étrangères accepteront temporairement la résidence à Yokohama, où elles transféreront leurs pavillons jusqu'à ce que la réinstallation de ces pavillons puisse avoir lieu à Yédo de la manière jugée convenable, et sous les conditions qui seront posées ultérieurement au Gouvernement Japonais.

Yokohama devenant la résidence temporairement des Représentants étrangers, sera déclaré point commun ou neutre et défendu par des forces mi-partie Japonaise mi-partie Européenne. La ligne de défense par terre s'étendra du pont du Tokaido, qui gagne la route de Yokohama jusqu'à "Treaty-point" et aux collines environnantes.

Le Commandant des forces navales Européennes assurera la ligne de défense sur mer, et prendra toutes mesures jugées nécessaires à l'égard des bâtiments de guerre Japonais.

Les rapports avec le Gouvernement Japonais et les relations commerciales ne seront point interrompues ; le Gouverneur pourra résider à Yokohama, mais ses officiers seuls porteront les deux sabres et des marques distinctives apparentes.

Leur nombre sera réduit au strict nécessaire.

Nul homme armé ne pourra franchir la ligne de défense. Tous les armes saisies seront mises sous scellés.

La garde Japonaise portera un costume spécial.

A la première alerte tous les négociants occidentaux seront embarqués.

Une indemnité proportionnée aux pertes matérielles qu'ils éprouveraient comme aux bénéfices auxquels ils devaient s'attendre leur sera assurée en ce cas.

Le Gouvernement Japonais sera responsable de toute incendie dans les maisons des étrangers, tant à Yédo qu'à Kanagawa, Yokohama, et autres ports.

Le dollar devra être reçu partout à 3 itzebous.

Les droits de douane seront garantis au Gouvernement Japonais, mais une Commission Européenne en dirigera les opérations.

(Signé) DU CHESNE DE BELLECOURT,
Chargé d'Affaires de France.

Annex 2.

Note submitted by M. de Bellecourt at the Conference held January 21, 1861.

Yédo, le 20 *Janvier,* 1861.

LES dangers qui, d'après l'aveu même du Gouvernement Japonais, menacent les étrangers dans la capitale, ne sont peut-être pas aussi généraux ou permanents qu'on pourrait le supposer par l'exemple frappant des deux assassinats qui ont atteint nos Légations à si peu de distance l'un de l'autre ; on ne saurait dire, il est vrai, avec raison, que tout étranger doit s'attendre inévitablement à une attaque, lorsqu'il franchit le seuil de sa demeure.

Toutefois l'attitude actuelle et les démarches du Gouvernement Japonais ne tendent-elles pas à nous persuader, même malgré nous, de la permanence de certains dangers ? Ce Gouvernement nous en avertit lui-même par l'organe de

délégués spéciaux; il nous entoure de renforts considérables, de gardiens, de canons, de cavaliérs ; il invite nos Consuls à se retirer sur les bâtiments de guerre de leur nation ou sur les siens propres. D'autre part, malgré tout ce luxe apparent de précautions, nos protecteurs officiels sont notoirement incapables d'assurer notre sécurité lorsqu'elle est compromise. Ainsi la mollesse de nos défenseurs constitue un danger,

N'est-ce pas avec un profond sentiment de notre responsabilité que nous nous resoudrons désormais à laisser sortir, de nos demeurs diplomatiques, nos employés ou nos courriers Européens, même sous l'escorte des yakounines Japonais ?

Il y a donc danger pour notre liberté d'action, et si ces deux meurtres récents, sans parler des autres démonstrations hostiles dont quelques uns d'entre nous ont été plusieurs fois l'objet dans les rues de Yédo, ne prouvaient qu'il y a réellement parfois insécurité pour les existences, le peu de confiance que nous avons en l'efficacité de la protection officielle que nous doit le Gouvernement Japonais, serait un danger moral permanent, qui joint au système d'intimidation mis en avant par les autorités indigènes, aurait pour conséquence inévitable l'affaiblissement de l'action diplomatique, tant dans la forme qu'au fond même, si l'état des choses n'était modifié.

Sans doute, il n'y a pas à redouter à Yédo un massacre général des étrangers, bien que le Gouvernement ait eu la coupable pensée de présenter ce fantôme à l'esprit des Représentants étrangers, dans la communication qu'il a faite à son Excellence le Ministre des Etats Unis au moment où le Corps Diplomatique se disposait à rendre les derniers devoirs au Secrétaire de Légation, Hesuken, assassiné au milieu de ceux qui devaient le protéger !

Mais si un massacre général n'est pas à redouter, grâce au respect qu'inspirent encore les pavillons des Puissances Occidentales flottant à Yédo, des attaques partielles toujours impunies pourraient décimer un à un, et par intermittence de temps, ceux que nos Gouvernements confient à notre protection.

On n'oserait sans doute pas attaquer un Représentant étranger. Toutes précautions doivent être prises à cet égard par le Gouvernement dirigeant, tant est grande la responsabilité qu'il encourerait ; mais on croira peut-être pouvoir laisser atteindre impunément, comme jusqu'à ce jour, ceux qui ne sont pas des Ministres, dans la supposition que de telles atteintes ne font à nos Gouvernements que des blessures trop légères pour qu'ils les ressentent !

Il y a donc un double danger, et matériel et moral.

Le danger matériel est prouvé tant par les aveux du Gouvernement que par deux crimes successifs ! Que dire donc de l'attitude passive de ce Gouvernement et du défaut de précautions prises aux funérailles de M. Heusken, alors qu'on nous menaçait d'une attaque si nous persistions à accompagner la victime à sa dernière demeure ?

Devons-nous attendre un nouvel assassinat de ce genre, pour demander compte au Gouvernement Japonais des meurtres commis sous les pavillons de presque toutes les Puissances représentées à Yédo, meurtres toujours impunis comme le sera sans doute encore celui qui vient d'être commis sous le pavillon des Etats Unis.

Le danger moral réside dans le défaut de liberté que laisse à notre esprit ces continuelles perturbations qui nuisent à l'accomplissement de nos devoirs !

Le Gouvernement Japonais est en ce moment en crise. Il flotte entre deux courants contraires. Malheureusement il est impuissant à remonter celui qui représente la partie la plus ardente de la réaction contre les étrangers.

La faiblesse du Gouvernement Japonais est un danger ! Nous lui avons laissé le temps nécessaire pour se fortifier. Comment a-t-il employé ce temps ? Les relations commerciales témoignent autant que les relations politiques d'une stagnation décrétée, pour ainsi dire, par des manœuvres occultes. Cette situation ne peut être modifiée que par d'énergiques représentations, par une démonstration de nature à faire impression sur les ennemis des Puissances Occidentales et à raviver la foi que met vraisemblablement en elles la partie éclairée, et peut-être plus nombreuse que nous ne supposons, de la nation Japonaise !

(Signé) DU CHESNE DE BELLECOURT,

Chargé d'Affaires de France.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Mr. Alcock to Mr. Harris.

Sir, *Yeddo, January* 22, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a note, embodying a complete *compte-rendu* of the Conferences which took place on the 19th and 21st January, at Her Britannic Majesty's Legation, according to previous arrangement, between the Representatives of foreign Powers now here.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my regret, in common with that of all the other Representatives taking part in the last Conference, that we had not the advantage of your presence on that occasion.

This note having been approved and accepted by the Diplomatic Agents of the four Powers who were actually present, as a true and satisfactory account of the opinions and views expressed at the Conferences, it is proposed that it should be made an authentic document by the signature of the several Representatives attached to the Protocol, in the form of a declaration, which you will find annexed; and I am charged with the communication of the desire, also expressed in the closing paragraph of the aforesaid *compte-rendu*, that you will attach such further statement of your own views and opinions on the subjects discussed at the Conferences as may seem to you necessary or desirable.

I have only further to invite you to attach your signature to the inclosed note, with its annexes, after which it will be forwarded to each of the other members of the Conference in succession, for their signature in like manner, and certified copies can be made for communication to their respective Governments. As, however, it is needful that it should first be completed by the signatures, I beg that it may be returned as soon as it has been signed by yourself, that the same form may be accomplished by the rest; after which it will again be forwarded to you, for a copy to be made in your Chancellerie.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Mr. Alcock to the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

Yeddo, January 26, 1861.

A LONG series of assassinations, both here and at Yokohama, in which foreigners have been the victims, preclude the possibility of the lately renewed menace of a general massacre being regarded as a mere idle demonstration of ill-will. The recent murder of Mr. Heusken, and the shameful conduct of the yaconins expressly appointed by the Japanese Government for his defence, alike prove the reality of the danger, and utter inadequacy of the means of protection.

When to these circumstances must be added the grave fact, that of all the numerous cases of assassination and murderous assaults committed on foreigners during the last eighteen months, the offenders in no one instance have been seized, or justice done, it is evident to demonstration that no reliance can be placed on the measures hitherto taken by the Government to secure either the prevention of similar crimes in future, or the punishment of the guilty.

The past is over, and nothing the Japanese Government can now do will bring back the dead to life, or repair the wrong done. But it is otherwise in regard to the future, and this assured immunity of crime is fatal to our security. It is equivalent to a Royal license to kill and slay, under which all who are capable of murder (and according to the Japanese authorities the number is large in this country) may attack and kill foreigners wherever they find them, without fear or hesitation, so perfectly are they assured of escape without damage from the law. This is in effect to outlaw every foreigner in the Empire, and to place the Representatives of Sovereign States, no less than the rest, at the mercy of whoever may find pleasure or advantage in killing them. Under such a régime, life is only held at the will and pleasure of every ruffian in the Empire.

This may well seem too monstrous and too opprobrious to be possible, in the least civilized of States. Yet I have only stated in plain terms the exact truth, susceptible of proof by facts which admit of no question; facts of monthly

and weekly occurrence in the actual state of affairs. I need not ask the Japanese Government if this is a position which they think fitting for the Diplomatic Agents of the Great Western Powers in Treaty with Japan. I will not do them the injury to assume for a moment that they can consider it possible for the Representatives to accept such a position. I feel sure, on the contrary, that not only your Excellencies, but the Government of the Tycoon, and I would fain hope the great body of the Daimios, and governing classes in the country, regard such acts of murder, and efforts to place the Ministers of foreign Powers under a régime of intimidation, with shame and indignation. But granting this, as I willingly do, whence then comes this perfect impunity to criminals guilty of these acts, this continued perseverance in the same odious and disgraceful policy? It is for the Government to answer, for they are responsible by the Law of Nations. In the eyes of all the world they are responsible for the maintenance of order, and that respect for the laws which protect life and property; if they fail in this, they cease to preserve the essential character of a Government, and lose their best title to the respect of foreign Powers, who can only treat with those who govern *de facto*, and not merely in name. This is, indeed, the very condition of their permanence as a Government, and they cannot forget it without imminent peril. The Government of Japan is menaced, therefore, in its own existence, in such a state of misrule; and, in their own interest, I must urge the actual situation upon their most serious attention.

It is, or should be, unnecessary for me to recapitulate here the leading facts which, during this eighteen months past—ever since, indeed, the ports were opened by Treaty—have, in continued sequence, tended to the same end, namely, to render the position of a foreign Representative intolerable and untenable, by continual menaces, restrictions to his free intercourse, and encroachments on his independence; by insults unrepressed and unpunished; and, finally, insecurity to life. And a like series of events has marked our relations at the ports, exposing the foreign residents to similar grievances, with a systematic disregard of all the rights and privileges solemnly guaranteed to them by Treaty: official interference with the free sale and purchase of produce; obstructions, restrictions, exactions; in a word, all the machinery that authorities and subordinate officials, with absolute power of control over Japanese subjects could devise, for their own profit and the injury of foreigners.

The assassination of Mr. Heusken, following close upon menaces of a general massacre, communicated to the foreign Ministers by orders of your Excellency, followed up again by an intimation from the same quarter on the morning of the funeral, when the Representatives of the Five Powers were all assembled to render the last honours to the murdered, that they themselves were in danger of being attacked on the way to the cemetery, if they ventured to proceed, were more than sufficient to remove the last trace of doubt or hesitation in my mind, and I think in the minds of most of my colleagues, as to the necessity of instant and decisive action on their part. But lest this should not have been enough, it would seem as if it had been determined to furnish one more conclusive evidence how little the Government could be relied upon for our defence and protection, by leaving the whole line of road, more than a mile in length, to the cemetery, open to attack. There were no guards on the ground, or extraordinary measures of caution and protection, I do not say to resist the attack it had sent warning was to be feared, but to prevent the possibility of the most desperate men daring to attempt it. Here were the lives of all the Foreign Ministers in Yeddo, together with the whole of their respective Legations, and the Consuls from Kanagawa, declared by the Government to be in immediate danger; they were all at one spot assembled, and yet it was not deemed worth while apparently to adopt a single measure for their defence and protection! This, indeed, was conclusive. That the Government should allow a member of one of the Legations to be murdered while the whole Corps Diplomatique was under menace of a similar fate, and yet consider it unnecessary, even in courtesy, to make any communication to Her Majesty's Minister at this Court, whose own safety, and that of the members of his Legation were in question, could no longer be subject of surprise. The two courses were perfectly consistent with each other.

Moved by these considerations, and perfectly convinced, by all the experience of the past, of the hopelessness of any further effort by mere remonstrance on the spot to effect the changes which it was too plain could not be deferred without risk of the gravest complications, and, it might be, national calamity, if unfor-

tunately further lives should be lost, I took immediate steps, after the funeral, to communicate with my colleagues and announce my resolution to avert, if possible, the dangers I foresaw in the continued supineness of the Government.

I determined, with this view, to withdraw temporarily from the Legation at Yeddo; and I now write to acquaint you that I have carried this resolution into effect, and I shall take up my residence, for the present, at Kanagawa or Yokohama, where I can not only command means of protection, if required, from Her Majesty's ships, but also take such steps as may be needful for the security of my countrymen. There I shall wait, with calmness, the result of further communication with the Government of the Tycoon, free, for the first time for eighteen months, if not from the menace of assassination, at least from any anxiety as to such threats being immediately carried into execution, to the peril and disgrace of Japan.

I trust your Excellencies and the Council of State, to whom I pray you to communicate this despatch, will see in this decisive step an earnest desire to avoid to the utmost, and as long as possible, a cause of rupture, or more serious complication, but also a firm resolution to insist upon such total change in the policy hitherto pursued towards British subjects, in common with all other foreigners, as shall give that security to life and property, and full enjoyment of Treaty rights, which they are entitled to demand. My long-continued personal relations with one of your Excellencies, and their uniformly friendly character, lead me to hope that, sharing in the regret I feel for these untoward impediments to a good understanding, you will see the necessity for similar decided action with your colleagues in the Government that this standing reproach may be removed. The faction of violent and unscrupulous advocates for a system of terrorism and assassination whom I must suppose to be the real authors of such troubles, must be controlled, whatever may be the rank or number of those concerned, or nothing but grievous consequences, from which Japan will be the first and greatest sufferer, can follow, in spite of the sacrifices and efforts I am now making to prevent such a catastrophe. The Government, in a word, must show that it has both the will and the ability to impose respect on all the disaffected or violent spirits who would seek, for their own ends, to disturb the good relations hitherto existing between the Treaty Powers and Japan, and which, on the part of Great Britain, the Government of Her Majesty is most anxious to maintain, for the mutual advantage of both countries. They must no longer be permitted to take life with assured impunity, and follow out a system of intimidation, in the vain hope of driving foreigners out of the country by murder and terrorism. Europe, united, would resist the attempt, render its success impossible, and punish the authors of such an outrage on the laws and rights of nations. Could they even temporarily effect their object, and murder every foreigner, Japan would be the most grievous sufferer. Were such a flagitious policy ever to be carried out, the whole country would fall under the ban of civilized nations, and be dealt with as a common enemy. I trust, for the interests of humanity, such deplorable contingencies may be rendered impossible, and that both the Government and people of Japan will be convinced that their best policy is, faithfully to fulfil their engagements, and to maintain friendly relations with a Power which has at its disposal ample means for obtaining, in case of need, full redress for injuries done to its subjects.

I have only, in conclusion, to urge upon the Government the importance of putting a speedy end to the present exceptional state of affairs. I am anxious for a peaceable and satisfactory termination, and am ready to return to the Legation and resume my duties in Yeddo whenever I can see such material guarantee for redress in respect to past grievances, and security for the future, as may warrant this step. I have, in the meantime, left all my property undisturbed, under the charge of the officers in my house, and for the safety of which the Government will, of course, be responsible. Whether my return be prompt or tardy, therefore, depends entirely upon the Japanese Government. Sooner or later it is certain that the Representatives of Great Britain will return to Yeddo, the place of residence assigned by Treaty; but, if speedily, there will be the less time for new complications to arise, and affairs may be more easily arranged, with mutual benefit, and on a better footing than hitherto, to my regret, has been found possible, if no time be lost.

With respect and consideration,

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

M. de Bellecourt to the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

Excellences, *Yédo, le 26 Janvier*, 1861.

LES relations diplomatiques, ce gage certain de la bonne entente des nations que de sérieuses et solennelles Conventions unissent entr'elles par des obligations réciproques, exigent, vu leur importance pour ceux qui sont appelés à les suivre, des conditions d'indépendance, de sécurité, et de liberté d'esprit comme de considération personnelle bien assurées.

Ces conditions ne me paraissent pas garanties en ce moment assez complètement à la Légation de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français à Yédo pour qu'il me soit possible de poursuivre avec tout le calme nécessaire les travaux que le Gouvernement de mon auguste Souverain m'a chargé d'accomplir de concert avec le Gouvernement Japonais en vue de la bonne entente que la France a toujours eu le sincère désir d'entretenir avec le Japon.

Je m'expliquerai. Vos Excellences m'ont fait entrevoir plusieurs fois que les tendances de l'opinion publique au Japon sont opposées aux rapports amicaux que le Traité de 1858 a eu en vue d'établir entre nos deux Empires. Vos Excellences avaient promis, sur ma demande, de tout mettre en œuvre pour triompher de ces tendances. Où en sommes nous ? et peut-on constater avec raison une amélioration quelconque dans une situation qui atteint à mon sens les Représentants étrangers et par conséquent leurs Gouvernements dans leur considération et leur dignité.

J'ai invoqué plusieurs fois et en plusieurs circonstances la justice du haut Gouvernement Japonais à l'occasion de diverses attaques contre la sécurité de ceux que les pavillons de la France et du Japon doivent protéger contre toute atteinte. J'attends encore depuis plus d'une année les réparations qui m'avaient été promises solennellement.

Dans ces derniers temps une tentative d'assassinat a mis le trouble dans le service de la Légation de l'Empereur à Yédo ; j'avais espéré une satisfaction d'autant plus prompte qu'elle était toute facile à obtenir.

Dans le courant du mois de Septembre vos Excellences ont demandé aux Représentants étrangers qu'il fut fait, à l'exécution des Traités, des concessions d'une haute portée, à peine de voir surgir de grands dangers autour de leurs nationaux. J'ai demandé à cette occasion à vos Excellences des explications, qui m'ont été promises mais non fournies. J'ai dû dès lors considérer la démarche de vos Excellences comme le résultat d'un plan d'intimidation gouvernemental peu conforme aux relations courtoises et de bonne harmonie que je me suis toujours efforcé de maintenir entre nos deux Empires.

J'ai eu bien des fois l'occasion de faire remarquer à vos Excellences, indépendamment des différentes matières formant l'objet de nos travaux, que la dignité et la considération des Représentants officiels de mon Gouvernement avaient à souffrir trop souvent des restrictions sans nombre apportées à leur liberté d'action par les tracasseries habilement déguisées d'agents subalternes indigènes placés auprès des Légations sous le prétexte de veiller à leur sécurité, mais bien plutôt pour exercer sur leurs membres une surveillance trop étroite pour être acceptable.

Mes observations n'ont pas porté de fruit, et le système de protection adopté pour la sécurité des Missions Diplomatiques n'a cessé jusqu'à ce jour de présenter toutes les apparences d'une contrainte de nature à déconsidérer les agents étrangers aux yeux des indigènes, au lieu d'inspirer à ceux-ci le respect dû aux hôtes du Taïcoun, aux Représentants des plus grandes Puissances du monde.

Bien plus, j'ai eu plusieurs fois l'occasion de signaler à vos Excellences l'inefficacité complète des mesures prises pour la protection des étrangers et la mollesse que montraient leurs défenseurs officiels en présence des attaques de certains adversaires ! Les circonstances de l'attentat commis le 30 Octobre, contre mon gardien de pavillon, ont ajonté une preuve de plus aux constatations nombreuses recueillies dans plusieurs autres Légations.

Cet état de choses appelait d'urgence un remède ; mais dans mon désir de me montrer patient et de ne point froisser le haut Gouvernement Japonais autant de fois que j'avais lieu de l'être moi-même, j'avais pris le parti de lui éviter ces plaintes dont la fréquence aurait dû donner la mesure de mes légitimes susceptibilités tant aussi bien que mon attitude personnelle, lorsque des agents subal-

ternes se laissaient entrainer à méconnaître ou mes droits ou les égards dûs soit aux miens soit à moi-même.

C'est pourquoi je me suis borné, dans la question de l'attentat commis contre mon gardien de pavillon, à une correspondance écrite où tous les points saillants de ce mystérieux procès ont pû être établis avec beaucoup plus de netteté que dans une série de conférences semblables à celles qui avaient eu lieu plusieurs fois déjà sur des sujets analogues sans produire aucun résultat satisfaisant.

Dans la plus récente de nos conférences où l'un des hauts Représentants du Gouvernement Français a eu l'occasion de renouveler à vos Excellences les assurances de sympathie sincère et de désir de bonne entente qui animent le Gouvernement de la France envers celui du Japon, quelques allusions du caractère le plus amical ont été faites sur la nécessité de cimenter les bons rapports par d'utiles concessions sur lesquelles il est d'ailleurs aussi facile que désirable de s'entendre.

Vos Excellences ont paru dans cette séance apprécier le langage amical et digne de M. l'Amiral Page. Elles ont paru réprouver le mauvais accueil fait à Osacca par les autorités indigènes au Général-en-chef de l'armée Française en Chine visitant en touriste une des villes d'un pays ami.

Vos Excellences ont donc ainsi témoigné ce jour-là du plus sincère désir d'entretenir avec la France de bonnes et sincères relations. Quelques jours plus tard, j'ai crû un moment trouver une preuve de ces sentiments dans l'avertissement que le Gouvernement Japonais fit donner aux Représentants étrangers sur les graves dangers qui menacaient au Japon leur sécurité et celle de leurs nationaux. Cependant en allant au fond des choses je ne me trouvai pas satisfait, je l'avoue, des réponses qui furent faites aux demandes que je formulai en cette circonstance au nom de mon droit et de mon devoir sur l'étendue, la cause, aussi bien que sur le foyer de ces dangers. Il me parût que ces explications, toutes vagues d'ailleurs, m'avaient été données plusieurs fois déjà en diverses circonstances, et que ces nouveaux avertissements n'étaient autre chose qu'une répétition des tentatives d'intimidation politique dont j'ai donné plus haut les motifs probables.

Mais je ne puis cependant pas m'empêcher de faire la part du vraisemblable dans ces sinistres tableaux à l'aide desquels on cherchait à nous effrayer!

En effet ces fréquents assassinats, ces insultes et ces provocations grossières qui atteignent ici constamment les étrangers, acquièrent par l'impunité qui les couvre toujours ou par la mollesse de la protection officielle qui devrait les prévenir les proportions de véritables dangers publics et de sérieux attentats contre le droit des gens.

J'ai déjà dit à vos Excellences, et verbalement et dans ma volumineuse correspondance avec elles, qu'il était de leur devoir de maintenir partout le respect dû à la législation nouvelle que le Japon s'est créée en contractant un pacte avec l'Occident. Si certains personnages indigènes invoquant leurs privilèges d'indépendance et de juridictions spéciales, croient encore pouvoir trouver dans le anciens errements des coûtumes Japonaises de plausibles raisons pour absoudre les coupables et cruels égarements de leur domesticité militaire, ceux qui se donnent comme les représentants de l'autorité centrale doivent tenir une toute autre ligne de conduite et prouver que le Gouvernement qui a contracté avec les Puissances étrangères a la force suffisante pour tenir ses engagements; sinon ce Gouvernement signerait lui-même son abdication, à moins que son but ne fût de servir aveuglement une politique astucieuse et consistant à se soustraire par la ruse ou par la violence aux engagements souscrits au nom de tous les membres de l'Empire, et par conséquent d'attirer par sa propre faute des malheurs incalculables sur un pays avec lequel les Puissances étrangères n'ont voulu établir que de cordiales et durables relations.

J'étais dominé par ces impressions lorsque les circonstances incroyables de l'assassinat du Secrétaire de la Légation des Etats Unis est venu les raviver bien douloureusement. Non seulement un des membres du Corps Diplomatique a été attaqué et mis à mort au milieu de ceux qui devaient le défendre et qui l'ont abandonné pour le laisser mourir sans secours, mais encore des communications officielles ont cherché, jusque sur sa tombe, à dégrader le caractère des Représentants étrangers réunis sous leur pavillons pour rendre les derniers devoirs à cette victime d'un fanatisme occulte. Il a fallu qu'à ce moment solennel on essayât d'ébranler le moral de ces quelques hommes qui ont été confiés par leurs Gouvernements à la loyauté du Gouvernement Japonais!

Vos Excellences savent comment les Agents Diplomatiques des Puissances Occidentales ont accueilli cette nouvelle tentative d'intimidation; ils ont accompli le devoir que leur dictait le sentiment de leur honneur personnel et de celui des nations puissantes qu'ils représentent.

Vos Excellences ne trouveront pas surprenant maintenant qu'on leur demande aujourd'hui quelles peuvent être les raisons de ces procédés, et qu'on réclame d'elles le redressement des griefs qui se sont accumulés depuis dix-huit mois, ainsi que de solides garanties pour l'avenir des relations avec le Gouvernement du Japon. Pour arriver à ce résultat sans compromettre les bons rapports établis entre les deux Empires, il est nécessaire de s'entendre sur les moyens d'assurer les positions établies par les Traités. Ce travail ne pouvait avoir lieu sous la pression continuelle du système de politique extérieur qui prédomine à Yédo et que les nations Européennes condamneront comme complètement contraire à leur dignité; c'est pourquoi j'ai pris la détermination de me retirer temporairement à Yokohama et de confier la sécurité de la Légation de l'Empereur et de mes nationaux à la courtoisie des Représentants des Puissances amies de la France. Son Excellence M. le Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu, en l'absence de bâtiments de guerre de ma nation, donner au pavillon de mon Souverain la protection qui lui est nécessaire.

Je trouverai dans cette retraite temporaire le calme qui m'est indispensable pour accomplir l'œuvre qui m'est confiée par Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, c'est-à-dire, de maintenir avec le Japon des rapports de bonne et sincère intelligence, sans oublier jamais que le rang que la France occupe dans le monde fait à son Représentant, en quelque circonstance qu'il se trouve, un devoir de lutter avec énergie contre tout ce qui tendrait à placer son Gouvernement dans des conditions inacceptables et indignes d'une nation forte et puissante.

Cette retraite momentanée n'est pas une rupture de relations j'espère; qu'elle ne sera que de courte durée si vos Excellences parviennent à faire comprendre à ceux qui dirigent les Conseils du Gouvernement de l'Empire Japonais que la marche suivie jusqu'à présent est incompatible avec des engagements solennellement conclus, et dont aucune Puissance humaine ne peut se faire un jeu sans encourir une responsabilité des plus graves.

Je m'efforcerai donc encore comme par le passé de concourir autant qu'il dépendra de moi à une solution pacifique de l'état actuel des choses, et je n'ai plus qu'un désir à exprimer à vos Excellences, c'est que le Représentant de la France, allégé des pénibles préoccupations qui l'ont éloigné de Yédo, puisse y revenir bientôt dans la capitale du Japon, poste que lui assigne le Traité, pour occuper la position qui convient et à son caractère et au rang de sa nation dans le monde civilisé.

Vos Excellences me trouveront donc tout prêt à entrer avec elles en matière sur les points qui peuvent faire l'objet de nos divergences de vues et dont le réglement sera facile, si elles sont disposées, comme moi, à apporter dans ce travail la plus grande loyauté et le plus sincère esprit de conciliation.

Avec une respectueuse considération,

(Signé) DU CHESNE DE BELLECOURT,
Chargé d'Affaires de France au Japon.

Inclosure 5 in No. 7.

M. de Wit to the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

(Translation.) *Kanagawa, January* 26, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellencies that, under the present circumstances, I felt myself bound to leave Yeddo for some time, rather than take up my residence within the walls of the Imperial Palace, as was proposed by your Excellencies.

I considered it beneath the dignity of my Government, which did not entrust the protection of its Representatives to the Japanese Government on such a condition, to accept that place of refuge; I also considered that the Japanese Government ought to have the means, and to use them, in order to secure me in my dwelling from the dangers of which I was warned by your Excellencies.

The murder, however, committed on the Secretary of the American Legation, without an attempt being made to defend him by the officers furnished by the Japanese Government for his protection, convinced me that I could not depend for protection upon such persons, placed for that purpose in my residence.

Three days after the murder, another warning was given by your Excellencies, that the Diplomatic Agents would be in danger of their lives if they carried out their intention of attending the funeral of the victim.

The danger was, therefore, according to your Excellencies' statement, permanent; and as I could not consider myself safe in my dwelling, and as it was impossible to accept the proffered place of refuge, the only course left open to me was to quit Yeddo for a time.

The Vice-Consul of the Netherlands will also leave Kanagawa temporarily, and take up his residence at Yokohama, while I report the circumstances to my Government, with whom the further decision of this matter will rest.

Further, I trust that the property which has been left behind by me at Yeddo, and by the Vice-Consul at Kanagawa, will remain there in safety until demand is made for it.

The Consul-General for the Netherlands,
(Signed) J. K. DE WIT.

Inclosure 6 in No. 7.

The Comte d'Eulenburg to the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

(Translation.) *Yeddo, January* 26, 1861.

IN consequence of the events which have taken place during the last three weeks I send you the following communication.

When I was sent, at the beginning of last year, by His Royal Highness the Prince of Prussia to Japan, it was already known in Europe that several times already foreigners had been murdered at Yokohama, and that the Japanese Government had declared that they had found it impossible to discover the murderers.

Shortly after I arrived here, the captain of one of the Prussian men-of-war was insulted in the street by one of the Daimios' retainers; and, on my complaining about this, I received for answer that the yaconins who accompanied him would be punished for not protecting him properly; but no mention was made of reprimanding the Daimios' retainer.

A few weeks later an official attached to the French Embassy was attacked in the gateway of the Legation, and wounded. Hitherto the Japanese Government has neither punished nor discovered the criminal.

On the 1st of January of this year the Governors for Foreign Affairs were sent to all the Ministers in Yeddo, to inform them that 500 loonins had conspired to attack the Legations, and to kill the Ministers. The Governors begged of me to take up my abode in the castle, or to retire to a man-of-war, because the Government found it impossible to protect me in the house I was staying in. After this avowal I was compelled, for my own safety and that of my staff, to send for an efficient guard from my ships, and to station it in my house.

On the 15th instant the Secretary of the American Legation, Mr. Heuskin, in returning home from me, was attacked in the street, and foully murdered. Although he was accompanied by three yaconins they did not exert themselves to protect him, neither did they arrest one of the assailants.

On the morning of the 18th instant, when we wished to attend the funeral of the said Mr. Heuskin, the Governors for Foreign Affairs waited on the American Minister and said that the Government feared that the funeral procession would be attacked, and that for this reason they thought it better if the Ministers did not attend the funeral.

As it was our duty to accompany the victim to his last resting-place, we did not allow anything to deter us from doing so. But how surprised we were to perceive that the Government had not taken the least precaution to protect us against an attack! Had we been attacked we should have been compelled to defend ourselves.

Many Europeans in Japan begin to think that the Government does not wish to protect the foreigner; and when the news of these occurrences reaches

Europe the European Governments will suppose that their Embassies, and their subjects in Japan, are not in safety. What effect this will have, if the European Governments come to this conclusion, I need not explain to your Excellencies. With regard to myself I believe that the Japanese Government is desirous to protect the Ministers and subjects of those States with whom she has made Treaties, and that she deplores the crimes that have been committed, and wishes to punish them. But as I perceive that these crimes remain unpunished, and that even when it is known to the Government an attack is contemplated, that she does not take efficient precaution to prevent it, I must come to the conclusion that the Government lacks strength to execute her wish.

If this be so, namely, if the Government be unable to protect foreigners, it is quite as bad for her as if she did not wish to protect them.

Your Excellencies have no doubt heard that the English and French Ministers, and the Dutch Consul-General, intend to leave Yeddo, and are temporarily going to Yokohama, because they no longer consider themselves in safety here.

I have determined to stay in Yeddo until my mission is accomplished, but I am bound to tell your Excellencies that if I were in the same position as the English and French Ministers, and had not sufficient power to protect myself and my staff, I would have acted just as they have done, and would have absented myself temporarily from Yeddo, not to break off relations with the Japanese Government, but to give her time to take vigorous measures for the protection of the Ministers and all foreigners.

Your Excellencies have lately perceived that the foreign Governments have the will and the power severely to punish their subjects if they transgress the laws. In like manner, foreigners have a right to expect from the Japanese Government similar justice and severity against her own subjects. In Europe the indignation will be great when the number of crimes committed against foreigners within the last eighteen months is known, and that not in one single instance the culprit was punished; and it will be considered unpardonable that on the day when all the Ministers wished to pay the last honour to the murdered Mr. Heuskin, and that the Government considered their lives in danger, it did not take the least precaution to protect them. I can only urgently request your Excellencies, and advise you to put a stop to this state of affairs. Extraordinary circumstances demand extraordinary measures, and it is necessary that the Government of His Majesty the Tycoon give a distinct proof that it is strong enough to carry this desire into execution. The Ministers will not return to Yeddo before this proof has been given. Should they have to leave Japan altogether, the consequences would be incalculable.

I am about to leave Yeddo, and a long time will elapse before another Diplomatic Agent will come here; consequently I am quite impartial, but for this very reason I beg of your Excellencies to believe me and to follow my advice.

With respect and consideration,

(Signed) GRAF. ZU EULENBURG.

Inclosure 7 in No. 7.

Report of a Conference between the French Consul, &c., and the Governor of Yokohama.

Kanagawa, Yokohama, le 28 *Janvier*, 1861.

NOUS Soussignés, &c., après avoir donné communication au Gouverneur du document du Chargé d'Affaires de France, nous avons été interrogés par le Gouverneur, qui nous a demandé pourquoi les Ministres étaient venus à Yokohama, puisqu'il n'y a pas de danger pour les Légations à Yédo, attendu qu'elles sont maintenant gardées par des Daïmios et qu'un Gouverneur y séjourne, à demeure, pour leur protection.

Réponse.—Il ne peut être encore donné d'explications sur ce point.

Le Gouverneur.—Le Chargé d'Affaires de France compte-t-il résider à Yokohama ou à Kanagawa ?

Réponse.—La question de résience sera résolue de concert avec les autres Ministres.

Le Gouverneur.—Il serait préférable que le Chargé d'Affaires de France habitât Yokohama, où il y a moins de dangers qu'à Kanagawa, qui se trouve sur une grande route très fréquentée ?

Réponse.—Cet avis sera communiquée.

Le Gouverneur.—Veuillez bien aussi prier M. le Chargé d'Affaires de France d'engager ses nationaux résidant à Yokohama à ne pas sortir le soir de leurs demeures parcequ'il peut y avoir du danger. Vous avez entendu parler de la déplorable affaire de M. Heuskin ? Il pourrait arriver de semblables malheurs à Yokohama aussi bien qu'à Yédo.

Réponse.—Cet avis sera communiqué au Chargé d'Affaires.

Certifié le présent compte-rendu, exact et conforme à ce qui a été dit dans la séance de ce jour, avec le Gouverneur de Kanagawa.

Yokohama (Kanagawa), ce 28 Janvier, 1861.

Le Chancelier Provisoire de la Légation de France,
(Signé) A. MONORY.

L'Agent Consulaire de France à Kanagawa,
J. LOUREIRO.

Le Secrétaire Particulier et Interprète,
H. WEUVE.

(Le sceau de l'Agence Consulaire de France à Kanagawa.)

Le Chargé d'Affaires de France au Japon,
(Signé) DU CHESNE DE BELLECOURT.

(Le sceau du Consulat-Général.)

No. 8.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 18.)

(Extract.) *Yokohama, February* 4, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch which I have deemed it expedient to address to Her Majesty's Acting Consul at this port, and of a Circular he has issued in consequence.

There are doubtless many wrongs to be redressed in regard to official interference and obstructions of all kinds, devised by the Japanese authorities, partly for their own advantage, and partly as the means of carrying out a system opposed to the free development of trade and extended intercourse in any shape. This is the more to be regretted, as each day's experience tends to prove the correctness of my former anticipations, of a large and profitable trade being rapidly developed, if only the Japanese Government could be induced to act up to the letter and spirit of existing Treaties. More than 1,000,000*l.* sterling of export trade has been done this last year at this port alone; and there is promise of a large import trade in Chinese raw cotton to supply means of barter, tending to render the foreign merchant more independent of currency. Even this is an impediment to trade less real than apparent. The dollar is now current at $2\frac{1}{2}$ itzeboos; whereas, by weight, it should be equivalent to 3 and a small fraction (311 per 100 dollars); but still the merchant, of course, only buys and sells produce at such rate in dollars, whatever be the nominal value in itzeboos, as will repay him in the final out-turn. He might buy more, if the exchange were in his favour, but that is all. Whether the dollar exchanges for one itzeboo or three, he will not give more for his silk in dollars than the chances of profit in its export will justify. In the meantime when he has to sell, the advantage is the other way; and, doubtless, the nominal cheapness to the Japanese of our manufactured goods, estimating the dollar at $2\frac{1}{3}$ or $2\frac{1}{2}$ itzeboos, tends to force their sale.

Something may perhaps be effected in various directions, however, to improve the position of the merchants and our trade, in the desire to induce the foreign Representatives to return to the capital, and relinquish their present attitude of distrust and protest.

Since the date of my last despatch, I have only to report the arrival of two Governors of Foreign Affairs, sent to communicate with my colleagues and myself, to express generally the concern of the Gorogio at our withdrawal, and

tell me they had read and understood my official communication, but waited to have a written translation before they answered. The object was evidently to see me, if possible, and ascertain what I required. I declined receiving them; and on my own part and that of M. de Bellecourt, who happened to be with me at the moment, they were informed by Mr. Eusden, in our joint names, that we could enter into no personal communication until a written answer had been received from the Ministers, and then only with one or more members of the Second Council of State, who must be sent down for that purpose. Mr. Eusden was further instructed to tell them, as from himself, that what it behoved the Government to do, was to put an end, as quickly as possible, to this exceptional state of affairs which was not without its dangers; and that the first step towards this end would be the Ministers placing before the foreign Representatives distinct propositions as to the measures they were prepared to take for the better security of life, and at the same time to put an end to the system of alternate assassination and intimidation, which could no longer be tolerated. They intimated the impossibility of giving any greater security; but I trust they will be better advised. Mr. Eusden reports that they seemed evidently uneasy, and not free from anxiety at the position taken up by the foreign Representatives. I hear from Yeddo that the Legation is guarded with the greatest display of vigilance in respect to the property left in the house.

From Mr. Harris I have received nothing; but I hear he wrote yesterday to his Consul stating he was well and undisturbed.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Mr. Alcock to Acting Consul Vyse.

Sir, *Yokohama, February* 4, 1861.

IN my circular No. 1 of the 25th ultimo, I informed you of my resolution, in concert with my colleagues the Representatives of France and the Netherlands, to withdraw temporarily from the capital, and take up my residence at Yokohama, pending further communication with the Japanese Government, for the better security of life and property, and the improvement of our position generally in Japan. I have reason to hope that these objects may at no distant period be more or less completely attained; and, in order that advantage may be taken of the circumstances to remedy whatever may be most prejudicial to the position of the merchants at this port more especially, I have to instruct you to take such steps as you may deem most fitting to obtain from British subjects, resident at Yokohama, a fair statement of grievances in regard to the action of the Government authorities. I am, of course, aware, from your frequent communications on this subject, that there is something very like a general system of obstruction and interference on the part of the Japanese officials, which is both prejudicial to our trade by restricting its development, and vexatious in its application to the merchants. But it is also known to you that any such authorized and systematic action is unvaryingly and emphatically denied by the Foreign Ministers as often as the subject is brought under their notice.

On one occasion, in your presence, you will remember they professed, as they had often done before, the most earnest desire to carry out all the stipulations of existing Treaties in good faith. Any obstruction encountered, therefore, is covert, not avowed; and, if these impediments are ever to be removed, it can only be by aid of distinct and definitive statements on the subject from those who are the actual sufferers. They, only, are in a position, from actual experience day by day, to indicate in the clearest manner what the principal grievances are; how they are practically made to bear upon them; and, in some instances at least, by what special agencies.

It is not enough to say (with a view at least to practical measures of improvement) that in everything, whether in the currency, the occupation of land, or the buying and selling, or landing and shipment of goods, there is a general system of restriction, extortion, and obstruction. This may be perfectly true, and yet the general assertion will be of little service in pressing the subject upon the Government in such a manner as to obtain effective measures of redress. This has already been tried long enough to prove the hopelessness of further effort, unless backed by specific facts, clearly stated and well-authenticated.

Looking forward to the possibility, in the negotiations now pending with the Government, of stipulating for some decided improvement, it is above all-important that any efforts should be directed to certain definite ends. It may then be possible to exact specific pledges of change, the fulfilment of which, within a limited period, will admit of verification by tangible results.

I would recommend, therefore, in view of the present circumstances, that you should either call together the British community at a public meeting to furnish a statement of their principal grievances and subjects of complaint in precise terms, or otherwise require them collectively to furnish you with such a statement in writing. And in order that you may be furnished in one form or other with the practical data essential, avoiding mere vague generalities or discursive complaints of minor annoyances, it is desirable that the facts produced should be carefully classed under a few heads, referring only to objects more especially important, and specifically provided for by Treaty stipulations. Such, for instance, as:—

The currency, and obligation to facilitate the exchange of foreign coins, weight for weight, with Japanese coins of similar description;

The free exchange of produce, without arbitrary restrictions or official interference;

Facilities for the occupation of land and houses, in sites agreed upon by the Japanese and foreign authorities.

These, together with security to life and property, and a Custom-house system calculated to facilitate and not to obstruct trade, will be found, I think, to embrace all that is most essential to discuss, in reference to Treaty rights or privileges and the interests of commerce. And if it were possible to obtain from the British community a clear and temperate statement of the chief grievances under each of these heads, together with practical suggestions as to the precise measures which their daily experience and local knowledge might well enable them to make for the diminution, if not the total removal, of these impediments to the free development of trade and the security of the merchants, something might be effected at this particular moment of permanent advantage to all. Whatever may be the result, I am ready and anxious to make the attempt, and the opportunity is more favourable than any which may again occur for a long time.

I leave it in your hands to make this known to the community under your jurisdiction, and to promote the object desired as you may deem best.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Notification.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul at Yokohama, has received a despatch from Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan, copy of which is annexed for general information.

The Undersigned will be glad to receive from the British community either a statement of the kind indicated by Her Majesty's Envoy, or to call a public meeting for the purpose of considering the subjects referred to in the despatch, if this course should be preferred.

(Signed) F. HOWARD VYSE,
Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul.

British Consulate, Yokohama, February 4, 1861.

No. 9.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 26.)

My Lord, *Yokohama, February* 19, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, at the request of Mr. Harris, the Resident Minister of the United States of America in Japan, copy of a letter he has

addressed to me on the subject of two Conferences of the foreign Representatives at Yeddo, and their subsequent action in retiring to Yokohama, and which he begs may be added to the *compte-rendu* transmitted with my despatch of the 31st ultimo.

As Mr. Harris' letter contains much that is erroneous in the facts referred to, and he attributes conclusions and grounds of action to his colleagues which they felt called upon to repudiate, I have replied to his letter, and forward a copy, together with copies of letters from the French Chargé d'Affaires and the Consul-General of the Netherlands, trusting that, should the documents connected with these transactions in Japan be laid before Parliament, the one will not be produced without the other.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have received a second letter from Mr. Harris on the Conferences, and I now have the honour to inclose to your Lordship copy of the same, with my reply thereto.

R. A.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Mr. Harris to Mr. Alcock.

Legation of the United States in Japan,
Yeddo, February 12, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated the 22nd ultimo, transmitting a *compte-rendu* of the Conferences held on the 19th and 21st January, at Her Britannic Majesty's Legation in this city, by the Representatives of the foreign Powers then here.

The *compte-rendu* correctly states that the American Minister was not present at the Conference of the 21st January, but it fails to state that he was not invited to assist at that meeting.

You request me to sign a Protocol to the effect that the *compte-rendu* is a correct record of the Conferences above referred to.

You must be aware that it is not in my power to certify to the correctness of the report of the Conference held on the 21st January, as the only knowledge I have of that Conference is derived from the *compte-rendu* itself.

The conclusions at which you and my other colleagues arrived may be stated as follows:—

That no confidence can be placed in the good faith of the Japanese Government;

That the members of the different Legations are exposed to assassination by remaining in this city, and that for the double purpose of securing personal safety, and to produce a sensible effect on the Government, it is advisable that the Legations should retire to Yokohama.

It is my misfortune to be of a different opinion, and I will briefly state my reasons for that difference.

The Japanese Government has continually warned the Diplomatic Representatives of existing dangers from the first day of their arrival in this city, and shown its anxiety to secure their protection.

It was only desired that the foreigners should use the same means of protection and precaution which the Japanese invariably use among themselves; it is well known that those of a rank corresponding to that of foreign Ministers have their houses surrounded by large numbers of guards, and that they never go out without being accompanied by a numerous train of armed attendants.

Is it just, therefore, to require the Japanese to protect us with other appliances than those used for their own security?

If the Japanese were acting in bad faith, if they really desired the assassination of foreign Representatives, a simple expression of such a wish would be sufficient, and the work would be done in a single hour.

We have lived in Yeddo about nineteen months in safety, and this fact is

proof of the desire and ability of the Government to give us efficient protection. The murder of Mr. Heuskin, the able and faithful interpreter of this Legation, which all lament and I deplore, was owing to his disregard of the reiterated warnings of the Japanese Government against his constant exposure of himself at night, and his death was the consummation of the fears that I have felt ever since my first arrival in Yeddo.

In judging of the acts of this Government it is of importance that the political antecedents be taken into consideration. For more than two centuries this country was hermetically closed against foreigners; this barrier, so rigidly maintained, is suddenly removed, and the country opened to foreign intercourse. It is well known that a large party of men of high rank are opposed to the new order of things, and that in this city, that opposition is concentrated and felt in its greatest intensity.

The manifestations of ill-will are principally confined to the followers of the Daimios, who present a reflex of the opinions of their Chiefs.

It is unquestionable in my mind, that the enormous enhancement of prices on articles of general consumption, consequent upon the admission of foreign commerce, has intensified their feelings of opposition.

A Government may make Treaties and observe their stipulations, but it is beyond the power of any Government to control public opinion.

It strikes me that all the arguments at the Conferences referred to, are based upon the assumption that the Japanese Government represented a civilization on a par with that of the Western world; this is a grave error. The Japanese are not a civilized, but a semi-civilized people, and the condition of affairs in this country is quite analogous to that of Europe during the middle ages.

To demand, therefore, of the Japanese Government the same observances, the same prompt administration of justice, as is found in civilized lands, is simply to demand an impossibility; and to hold that Government responsible for the isolated acts of private individuals, I believe to be wholly unsustained by any international law.

This principle is not acted on in the Western world.

Not long ago a London jury exultingly acquitted a conspirator against the life of the Emperor of the French. I did not learn that the French Legation retired to Dover in consequence of this failure of justice.

Again, in one of the greatest thoroughfares of Naples the French Minister was savagely assaulted at midday, and although hundreds of people witnessed the assault, the would-be assassins effected their escape, and to this day they have not been arrested.

Did the French Legation retire from Naples in consequence of the failure to arrest the criminals?

In March last the Regent of Japan was assassinated; only part of the murderers have thus far been arrested, and of those not one has been punished yet.

This delay in inflicting punishment on the assassins of one so exalted in rank as the Regent shows that the Japanese mode of procedure is different from that of the Western world.

I desire to put on record my firm belief that so long as I observe the precautions recommended by the Japanese Government and used by the Japanese themselves, my residence in this city is a perfectly safe one.

To retire to Yokohama with the intention of producing an effect upon the Japanese Government, will, I think, prove a mistake; there was not one Article of the American Treaty more difficult to obtain than the one securing a residence in Yeddo of the Diplomatic Representative of the United States. The Japanese Commissioners on that occasion warned me of the grave difficulties which a residence of foreign Ministers was sure to create in Yeddo; and they were very solicitous that I would accept a permanent residence in Kanagawa or Kawasaki, with the right to come to Yeddo whenever my duty required.

This retirement of the Foreign Legations to Yokohama is exactly what the Government desire, as it relieves them from great anxiety, responsibility, and expense; and they state that the Legations can be more conveniently protected at Yokohama than in Yeddo.

Instead, therefore, of the retirement giving a *secousse* to the Japanese Government, it will be held by them as a very desirable result, and I apprehend that a residence there will lead the Japanese mind to confound the foreign

Representative with the foreign trader, an effect which cannot fail to injure both his prestige and his influence.

For the reasons thus briefly set forth, I deprecate the action of my colleagues, believing, as I do, that it will not produce any beneficial effect, and that it is an important step towards a war with this country.

The people of Japan cannot be raised to our standard of civilization by the stroke of a diplomatic pen, nor even if they have 50,000 soldiers for their schoolmasters. It is only time, patience, and forbearance, that can produce this most desirable result.

I had hoped that the page of future history might record the great fact that in one spot in the Eastern world the advent of Christian civilization did not bring with it its usual attendants of rapine and bloodshed; this fond hope, I fear, is to be disappointed.

I would sooner see all the Treaties with this country torn up, and Japan return to its old state of isolation, than witness the horrors of war inflicted on this peaceful people and happy land.

Permit me to request you to transmit a copy of this note to your Government to be annexed to the *compte-rendu* of the Conferences held on the 19th and 21st of January.

I have, &c.
(Signed) TOWNSEND HARRIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Mr. Alcock to Mr. Harris.

Sir, *Yokokama, February* 16, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, which reached me on the 14th, in reply to my letter of the 22nd ultimo, transmitting a note embodying a *compte-rendu* of the Conferences which took place on the 19th and 21st of January, at Her Britannic Majesty's Legation in Yeddo.

I have perused with attention the various remarks on the subject of these Conferences, and your views on the policy you conceive to be most fitting, in the present conjuncture, on the part of foreign Representatives in Japan; and I have weighed them the more carefully, that receiving them three weeks subsequent to the Conferences, I conclude they must be the result of mature deliberation on your part, and entitled to corresponding consideration on the part of your colleagues, to whom you have forwarded copies.

Conceiving it could answer no useful purpose now to discuss with you all the arguments advanced in support of your views, I should simply acknowledge receipt of your letter, were there not certain statements contained in it erroneous, I believe, as to the facts; and various inferences which, besides being incorrect, tend to cast unmerited aspersions on myself and the colleagues acting with me, and to misrepresent alike their motives and grounds of action. As I am unwilling to believe such could have been your intention, it seems but fair to both parties to point out the passages referred to as sources of error. But in addition to this very sufficient motive, you have supplied another, still more imperative, in requesting that the letter containing them should be forwarded to my Government, and be appended to the *compte-rendu* of the Conferences. It is likely, therefore, to come under the notice of many besides the members of the Government, too far removed from Japan and authentic sources of information, as to the actual circumstances, to avoid being misled, and by such statements, if left uncontradicted. I am thus compelled to go over so much of the ground you traverse as may be essential to refute what I conceive to be erroneous and injurious, either in the facts or the inferences, and with the same explicitness and unhesitating frankness you have yourself shown in dealing with these questions:

You state that you were not invited to the second Conference. This allegation is so completely at variance with my impression, and a very clear recollection of all the circumstances, that I deemed it only fitting to obtain the evidence of those of my colleagues yet on the spot, as to the facts. I inclose

my letter to the French Chargé d'Affaires, and its counterpart sent to the Consul General of the Netherlands, together with their answers, which I think must suffice to set all questions at rest in your own mind, and prove to any third party that this statement was made under a total misapprehension as to the facts. It is clear that you had precisely the same invitation that every other Representative had, only enforced by arguments not required to secure the attendance of the rest. You had, moreover, a private note from me the intervening day, which may probably have escaped your recollection, inviting you to furnish me with a Memorandum or Minute of the views you might especially desire to see correctly embodied in the *compte-rendu*, having reference, therefore, to the second Conference, for which it was being prepared. This note you neither acknowledged nor answered. In common with the rest of my colleagues, I was left in doubt, therefore, to the last moment, whether you would attend or not; so much so, that we waited nearly an hour beyond that fixed for the meeting. If any want of courtesy, consideration, or due notice could be shown to have existed, it could not certainly, under these circumstances, be laid to the charge of your colleagues.

In reference to the reason giving for not signing the note embodying the *compte-rendu*, I will merely remark, to prevent a further misconception which the tenour of your remarks might otherwise create, that the document was sent to you with an invitation from all your colleagues to make any addition you might see fit, explanatory of your part in the first Conference and of your own views, to be appended in the form of a note; and thus completed, you were further invited to add your signature, not with a view, as you incorrectly assume, of pledging you to the accuracy of a *compte-rendu* of the Conference at which you did not assist, but in token of your cognizance of all the views of your colleagues, and as a correct statement of these and your own on a subject of deep importance, and of interest to all in common. The Protocol did not preclude your limiting attestation of your signature to this much and no more, if you felt any scruples as to endorsing the declaration of the Representatives of four Treaty Powers, that the *compte-rendu* was, in effect, a faithful and satisfactory account of the views put forward in the Conferences by all the parties assisting.

It was considered an act of loyalty and courtesy on the part of your colleagues, due to your position as Resident Minister of one of the Treaty Powers who had joined the first Conference, and which could not fitly have been omitted, to send the document to you; while it remained perfectly open to you to decline adding your signature, as you have finally decided, or, signing, to refuse in any way to identify yourself with their subsequent proceedings and general policy. Having seen fit, in the legitimate exercise of your discretion, not to sign, I should have deemed it quite unnecessary to make any remark on the subject, had not your mode of accounting for this decision seemed to imply that your colleagues had the absurd pretension of making you responsible for the accuracy of a report of what passed when you were not present.

These two misconceptions as to matters of fact cleared away, I may proceed to the remarks, in which a series of conclusions are attributed to your colleagues, as matters of inference, which I must utterly disclaim as erroneous, and especially calculated to mislead any one not thoroughly conversant with the circumstances and the political situation—to mislead, both as regards the conclusions at which I and my colleagues did actually arrive, and the grounds of action which have been put on record. Those conclusions you state were, first, that no trust could be placed in the good faith of the Government; secondly, that the members of the different Legations were exposed to assassination by remaining in the city; thirdly, that, for the double purpose of securing personal safety and to produce a sensible effect on the Government, it was desirable that the Legation should retire to Yokohama. And having framed these premises for the foreign Representatives from whom you differ, you proceed to point out, at some length, all the arguments and objections which preclude your accepting them as grounds of action. But these conclusions are not those of your colleagues, although there is such a curious admixture of truth and error in the propositions they involve, that, short as they are, some analysis is required satisfactorily to separate the two, and show the total fallacy of all that rests upon their combination. This is the more essential, because there can be no doubt they are better calculated to mislead in this form than if the proportions of either element were larger.

I believe, in respect to the first, that no foreign Representative present

shared in your declared reliance and perfect trust in the good faith of the Japanese Government. But there were various shades of divergence; and probably the Representatives who doubted the most, rather distrusted the effective action of those who might be regarded as the Government than their good faith, and this distinction is broadly marked on the face of the record.

In regard to the second proposition or conclusion, that the members of the Legations were exposed to assassination by remaining in the city, if nothing were attempted or done by the Representatives calculated to arrest the action of those who were carrying out a system of intimidation and murder, they were unanimously of opinion that a policy characterized by passive endurance, unlimited forbearance, and a blind trust in professions constantly belied by events, if longer persevered in, would lead to the most fatal result. This was the conclusion at which all your colleagues arrived; something very different, as you will observe, from the conclusion you have attributed to them, divested of the additional clause essential to its completeness. You state, in connection with this part of the subject, that you have lived more than nineteen months in Yeddo in safety; and add, that you firmly believe, as long as you observe the precautions recommended by the Japanese Government, and used by themselves, your residence in the city is a perfectly safe one. And as this appears to involve many grave errors, both of fact and inference, to which may be attributed not a little of the divergence of opinion between you and your colleagues, I trust you will permit me, without offence, to state what I conceive those errors to be, and the grounds of my conviction.

In my humble opinion, you cannot, in any ordinary use of the terms, be said "to have lived in safety," for you have lived under a continued menace of violence and assassination. Granting to the fullest extent your argument that, had the Government wished it, we might all have been swept off in an hour, and the proof this may be taken to afford that they never had wished, or, in other words, decreed it, it leaves the conclusion of a real and *bonâ fide* danger existing untouched. How many powerful Daimios are there, resident in the city of Yeddo, with hundreds, not to say thousands, of devoted retainers at their back, who are known to be hostile to foreigners, and the whole policy initiated by the Treaties? Are there no grounds for believing that even the party which these have displaced seek, by the murder of foreigners, to create a danger to their triumphant adversaries? Does it admit of question, that if any one of these rulers of the land (for such they are in effect, but call them Daimios and feudal Chiefs only if you will) had, any time in those nineteen months, given the signal for your murder, or that of any other Representative, to his own followers, or other bravos always available, that he could not have secured it, as certainly as that of your Secretary (all measures, or shams of protection, by whichever name most fitly characterized, to the contrary notwithstanding), and that, too, either in the streets, by daylight, or in your own residence; or is it at all doubtful that it would have been accomplished with perfect immunity from punishment or pursuit on the part of the Government? I, too, have lived nineteen months in Yeddo; and the only difference between us is, that I have gone much more abroad in the city and surrounding country—more exposed, perhaps, but also with larger means of observation—and I have seen enough to satisfy me that neither you nor any member of the several Legations ever left their residence, in all that period, without risk of being insulted by these same Daimios' retainers, and other two-sworded gentry—insulted, cut down, or murdered, in the public thoroughfares and in the light of the sun, without let or hindrance from the Government or the laws. Is this matter of question? How stand the facts in support? I will not speak of a series of assassinations, by daylight or by night, at Yeddo and at Yokohama during the nineteen months of safety, up to the end of last year, and preceding this last combination of murder and intimidation, inaugurated on the 1st of January by a formal announcement of the fact by the Government to you while at Kanagawa, and subsequently to your colleagues; but in that interval had your unfortunate Interpreter and Acting Secretary not often been the subject of insult and assault in the streets, and by day? Have not you, yourself, been assaulted by one of these two-sworded retainers in your own courtyard, and placed in bodily fear of your life; compelled to cry aloud, and cry in vain, for assistance from the yaconins attached to the Legation for your protection, though several were close at hand? Were you not warned by the Government that, if you prosecuted your assailant, you would be in danger

of a vendetta from him or his companions which would very likely cost you your life? Can this be rightly called living in safety? and may I not say, with truth, that this conviction of perfect safety is scarcely consistent, or indeed to be reconciled, with facts in your own experience?

And again, when you admit that this safety (such as it is) must be contingent upon the adoption of all the precautions recommended by the Japanese Government, can you have forgotten what these have, at various times, amounted to? After the Gotiro's death, were not the Legations requested, "while danger lasted" (a particularly indefinite term in Japan), to confine themselves within the walls of their residences? More recently still, that we should all take refuge in one building, within the Castle precincts? Where their precautions and restrictions would stop, could any one say? Such as had already been proposed were deemed inadmissible by you, in common with your colleagues. And can a residence under such multiplied and increasing restrictions, obviously destructive of all free intercourse with the people, and liberty of circulation, be reconciled with the conditions of freedom and independence, not only due by the common law of nations to a Diplomatic Agent, but essential to any influence of the Representative, or respect for the nation he represents? I think not; nay, I am sure of it, and so are all your colleagues, upon very sufficient experience of the past.

Let us pass on to the third of the propositions you attribute to the foreign Representatives not in accord with you.

You state that for the double purpose of securing personal safety, and to produce a sensible impression on the Government, it was deemed advisable that the Legations should withdraw to Yokohama. This is true, as far as it goes; but totally misrepresents the truth, if other essential particulars are omitted.

Certainly, in any measures to be adopted, greater security to life was contemplated as a necessary result; and if security generally, the Ministers must of necessity share in the benefit. But it is strangely to misrepresent the objects of your colleagues, as these were declared and made known to you, and as they stand distinctly recorded in the Note, which, if you did not sign, it is at least to be presumed you must have read, to state or imply that it was their own personal safety, either mainly or exclusively, that was the object of any proposed course. The withdrawal from a false and derogatory position as Diplomatic Agents—one rendered untenable with due regard to the interests and dignity of their respective nations; the improvement of this position, and among the first conditions of such improvement, the greater security of all whose lives and property were threatened at the ports, not less than in Yeddo, and more especially at the neighbouring port of Yokohama, where an attack was menaced,—these were the real, the principal, and the declared objects of the foreign Representatives; and I protest, in their name and my own, against your assuming and attributing to them, as a leading, if not the sole motive, a regard for their own personal safety. I deny your right to draw such inference, in contradiction to the views stated at the conferences, and recorded in the *compte-rendu*. I say, for myself, it is unfounded in fact; and I firmly believe it is equally untrue as regards my colleagues. The life of a public servant is not, I conceive, altogether at his own disposal. He is bound either to risk or secure it, according as his line of duty and the interests confided to his charge may demand; and assuredly the life of a foreign Minister and Representative in Japan becomes a serious charge, and a responsibility not to be lightly dealt with in either direction. If his presence at a particular post is required to vindicate the rights secured by Treaty, or affirm a principle, and this can only at best be done by risk to his own life, and more especially if the abandonment of such rights or principle must be the consequence of retiring from the port assigned him by Treaty, there he must be found: his retirement under such circumstances would be an indelible disgrace. Yet assuming the premises you do, this is what you lay to the charge of your colleagues, so far as your opinion goes, though I cannot think this was your intention. On the other hand, if loss of life threatened a greater danger to the national interests at stake, than the temporary change of position of a Minister, it is very evident that the same sense of duty which would retain him in the one case would compel him to withdraw in the other; not for the sake of his personal security, but as a means to the defence or advancement of the interests confided to him. And it was in this position that your colleagues conceived themselves placed, and

bound to withdraw. To attribute this step to a regard for their own personal safety, I think you must see is to take it from its proper ground and shift it to one infinitely lower, if not wholly unworthy, and an act of which they may very reasonably complain.

In conclusion, then, your colleagues were of opinion that life was insecure, their own and everybody else's, both in Yeddo and at the ports; that this insecurity could only be expected to increase unless measures were taken by the foreign Representatives calculated to arrest the course of assassination, and rouse the Executive to a sense of the danger which menaced the country in the persons of those who were menaced with massacre; and that safety was not to be secured by complying with the restrictive measures sought to be imposed by the Japanese Government as its condition; because, while ignorant of what the extent of these might be, those already proposed were inadmissible, consistent with a due regard for the interests and dignity of the nations they represented, and incompatible with any influence or usefulness on the part of Diplomatic Agents thus circumstanced.

When you state, as the second part of this proposition, that it was deemed necessary to produce some sensible effect upon the Government—a Government which so far had proved insensible alike to remonstrance, protest, and persuasion —it should also have been stated that it was very emphatically and distinctly declared, as one of the conclusions arrived at in connection with this view, that the means adopted for the specified end should be such as should involve neither menace nor violence; and above all, that the whole object and policy of the Representatives, then agreed upon, was to avert the chances of a collision or war, by every means in their power.

How is it possible, with these opinions, objects, and views, all distinctly enumerated by your colleagues, that you could proceed to characterize them and their proceedings as promoters of "war, and its attendant rapine and bloodshed?"

There may be a difference of opinion as to the means best adapted to avert such calamities, or to attain any specified end; but such difference can, in this instance, afford no justification for your attributing to them something directly the reverse of what they declared to be their object. And this, in effect, you do; for although it may be true you merely speak of war and its attendant calamities as the results of the action taken, yet you speak of them as so obvious and certain that colleagues with any degree of intelligence cannot be supposed so utterly blind as not to see such very manifest consequences. So far as I myself am concerned, however, I yield to no one in the earnestness of my desire to prevent the infliction of war on a peaceful people and a happy land, and I agree with you in so regarding Japan as a whole. I am possibly more ready than you yourself to advise a renunciation of all Treaties and intercourse with this country, and probably see more reason to doubt the wisdom, and question the policy, which dictated measures for opening it to foreign nations, ill prepared as it is for such changes and sacrifices as this necessarily and obviously must entail.

If, then, there were but two alternatives, war or withdrawal—one or the other being inevitable—I repeat there is much that would recommend the latter to my conscience and my judgment as the lesser of two evils. But while I question your right to any monopoly of such feelings and opinions, I do not feel at liberty to charge you with being animated by their contraries, even though you are following out a policy and a course of action which is, of all others, in my humble opinion, most calculated to bring matters to that pass where foreign Powers, one or several, must make their election, and either fight or retire altogether.

I believe firmly, after more than eighteen months' trial of what patience, a large consideration for inherent difficulties, something that may even have been mistaken for a tame submission to wrong (or, at all events, a policy of endurance and non-resistance which had no limit), that we have abundant evidence of such persistent encroachments on the rights of nations, in the person of their Diplomatic Agents in the country, such systematic resort to intimidation and violence, and general tendency to grave deterioration, in the position of foreigners, and the policy pursued towards them, either by the Government or with its cognizance—above all, as regards the one condition on which all others hang—of security to life and property, that nothing but further loss of life, and destruction to all the interests at stake, and at no distant date, can be reasonably anticipated, unless

means are found to modify that policy, and improve our position in Japan, that of merchants and Representatives alike.

I believe no less firmly, that a longer perseverance in fruitless protests, unheeded remonstrances, and claims for redress, to which no attention is ever paid—redress and protection always demanded with more or less of unanimity and urgency after each outrage and assassination, and always in vain, to be met only with hollow professions and empty promises, or by such shams as the whole system of yaconins has proved, in all that concerns effective protection, though sufficiently real as a means of interference and espionage—I say continued perseverance in this course, which, as I understood you at the Conference, was all you had to recommend, would, in my conviction, directly tend to precipitate the catastrophe you, and not you more than others, so earnestly deprecate.

And this is the conclusion at which all your colleagues arrived, with a perfect unanimity and accord as to the result, the more convincing that it was the result of independent processes of deduction and argument, drawn from facts in their own experience. Who may be right, you or your colleagues, is not exactly the question here, but the obligation on all between whom there is a difference of opinion not to attribute views or conclusions which are not theirs, or to deny to them the same earnest desire to promote peace and the best interests and well-being of the people of Japan which you claim for yourself.

In truth, I feel constrained to say, this sort of sweeping charge against your colleagues of a tendency to provoke war comes the less happily from the Minister of the United States, that I believe he is the only foreign Representative who, during the past eighteen months, has ever directly menaced this Government—not only with war, but a war that should strike at the root of all existing institutions and relations of society, by attacking the Daimios, and calling in the people, or restoring the Mikado to a real supremacy. I have it from yourself, as had one other, at least, of your colleagues, that, in an interview with the Foreign Minister, not so many months ago, and in the presence of all his officers, you declared to him, with every emphasis of word and gesture, that unless their policy were altered, they would provoke such a war on the part of the United States.

You evidently saw reason then, to be exceedingly dissatisfied with the progress of affairs, and the execution of the Treaties, in which I entirely agreed; and I confess I am at a loss to conceive in what matters can be held to have materially improved. I have certainly never gone so far myself; though about the same time I gave them plainly enough to understand that a continued and systematic violation of Treaty-rights, and especially a denial of justice, and protection to life and property, must inevitably lead, sooner or later, to war. I merely cite this to prove that when you were not so thoroughly satisfied as you appear to be now with the march of events, and the conduct of the Government, you contemplated war as a justifiable means to the end—war *à l'outrance*—a war of a servile and revolutionary character, superadded to the horrors of a foreign war; and therefore, though far from questioning the perfect sincerity of your present declaration, that you would "sooner see all the Treaties with this country torn up, than witness the horrors of war inflicted on this peaceful people and happy land," I cannot help remarking that you have not always entertained these views, or acted quite in accordance with them.

If you see reason to be quite satisfied with your position, together with that of foreigners generally in Japan, and of the relations of the Government towards them at the present moment, as your letter would seem to indicate, you must nevertheless admit there was a time, not very remote, when your views much more nearly accorded with those now held by your colleagues, and you were prepared to invoke those very horrors you now so feelingly deprecate and denounce.

I think I am entitled to conclude, therefore, that if we have the misfortune to differ on the present occasion, it is rather you who have changed views previously entertained and acted upon; not I or your colleagues. I can see no change in the circumstances, except for the worse.

There has been more of that patience and forbearance you so earnestly recommended; and, also, more intimidation, assassination, and incendiarism; more attempts at restrictions, official interference with the trade of the merchants and the independence of foreign Representatives; more promises and profes-

sions; and, also, more emphatic evidences of their hollowness in the passing events.

There are many other points in which you, either directly or by implication—no doubt unintentionally, but not the less plainly and essentially—misrepresent the views or misconstrue the action of the foreign Representatives from whom you differ; while, even in matters of fact bearing upon these, I cannot help concluding your information is at fault, and has greatly misled you.

You state, for instance, that it strikes you all the arguments used at the Conferences are based upon the assumption "that the Japanese Government presented a civilization on a par with that of the Western World," which would be, as you observe, "a grave error." An utterly unaccountable error, I will add, in Representatives having daily before them the evidences of a very different state, and scarcely less absurd than the demand for "the same observances and prompt administration of justice as in other more civilized lands," which you also attribute to my colleagues and myself; or the pretension to hold them responsible, in a way utterly unsanctioned by Western international law, for isolated acts of private individuals. I feel strangely at a loss to conceive from whence you have drawn these conclusions. They are certainly not to be found in the official "Note" to which you are referring.

So far as my own arguments or line of conduct are concerned, I have simply to assure you they are founded on none of these hypothetical assumptions. But that the rulers of Japan should be made to respect the stipulations of Treaties, and not deliberately or systematically violate them; that they should cause life and property to be respected, and secure both by means not less prompt and effective than they adopt when they themselves are concerned, may reasonably, I think, be required; nay, must be required, if any relations, diplomatic or commercial, are to be maintained. I think they may reasonably be required, because whatever may be our respective opinions on the kind or degree of civilization, it is impossible to doubt that it is such as to furnish the means of meeting these equitable requirements.

But you think they have done all that is necessary, or otherwise possible, to shield them from reproach or further pressure; and instance the escape of the assassins of the Gotiro to prove that they are as powerless to insure the apprehension of murderers, when they themselves, the rulers of the land, fall victims, as when foreigners are selected. I read this statement with great surprise.

I have it from officers, high in the service of the Government, that not one escaped; and I believe within six weeks of the crime, all not killed on the spot, had been seized, judged, and executed. Such, also, is the popular belief, universally spread so far as we can judge.

As to the responsibility of the Government, therefore, in regard to the isolated acts of individuals, I deny, in the first place, that the murders and outrages against foreigners are the isolated acts of individuals, or can be so regarded in the face of the evidence of a political bearing, and a sequence in these various crimes which link them together. I do not deny that you may be right in your view; I merely speak of what is the conviction under which I and my colleagues are acting. So, in reference to their powers of repression and punishment, I think the case you instance is one in point to prove the opposite conclusion.

As to the responsibility of the Government for these acts of murder and successive outrages, be they isolated or a part of a series perpetrated in furtherance of a policy, and the application of international law, I think you are mistaken in assuming that a principle has been invoked, not recognized in the comity of Western nations, nor habitually acted upon in the most normal state of society, there is a generally recognized doctrine that people ought to guarantee to each other the enjoyment of life and property, against the attacks to which private passions usually expose them. And although there is a considerable difference between the morality of different ages and nations, there is a sufficient degree of resemblance in these broad principles to justify an appeal to them in Japan. Let us see then, how this bears upon the present argument: first, as to what I and my colleagues contend for; and secondly, as to the application of the two examples you cite as instances in point. I claim, on the part of the Japanese Government, all the efforts in their power to repress and

to punish crime directed against the life or property of foreigners. And as the lowest estimate of what this should be, I take their action, when Japanese are the parties menaced or injured; I say the lowest, for I am by no means prepared to admit that they may not be rightfully compelled to make greater efforts, should these prove habitually inadequate. And when I find, that in no one instance, out of more than a dozen cases of assassination, or murderous assault and incendiarism, they have taken effective steps for tracing the criminals, and bringing them to justice, I doubt their having, in good faith, employed all the means at their command; or if they have, I see the necessity for improvement, and do not see its impossibility.

In any case, I presume you will admit they are responsible in some sense and in some degree, both for repression and punishment. When you instance the case of a Frenchman in England, tried on a charge of plotting against the life of a Sovereign, whose residence was in another country (cited to prove that Western Governments do not hold each other responsible for isolated acts of individuals), I cannot help observing, you seem to me to have been singularly infelicitous in the choice of your example. When you say, a London jury "exultingly acquitted a conspirator" against the life of the Emperor of the French, you beg the question, and assume the very fact which was before the jury; who acquitted him, permit me to remark, not as a proved conspirator in the evidence brought before them, but as an individual against whom no sufficient evidence of his having violated the law of the land had been adduced. To make the case in the slightest degree parallel, or bearing upon the present argument, the Frenchman should in the first place have been a native, and at all events the personage whose life was menaced should have been in the country, and living under the protection of its laws (for laws are not usually made to reach offences contemplated by aliens against the lives or property of those who do not live within the territorial limits to which such municipal laws apply), and the Government should have taken no step, in so far as the laws would sanction, either for repression or punishment. But so far from this, they not only prosecuted, but, subsequent to the trial, brought into Parliament a new law, of wider reach, and the Ministers of the day went out of power in consequence. Again, in the case of an assault on the French Minister at Naples, true the assailant escaped; but you forget to add that so far from the Government being held irresponsible, or denying its responsibility, it immediately declared its readiness to give whatever satisfaction France might deem it right to require.

Again, as to the degree of civilization and the observances to be expected or exacted, I cannot but feel surprised at the reproach your letter would affix in others of an overstrained estimate of what is due or could reasonably be asked of the Japanese. This might surely have been more naturally attributed to the only foreign Minister who has ever felt called upon, since the Treaties came into operation, to enter into long and irritating discussions (prolonged through several months indeed) with this Government about etiquette and observances omitted or violated at an audience of the Representative of the United States with the Tycoon, and the only Representative who, in an interview with the Foreign Ministers at Yeddo, has had to complain of what he deemed an insult offered to him in their presence by one of the Governors; so grievous that he felt compelled, in vindication of his position and the respect due to his nation, to threaten to withdraw, if the officer was not made to retire. These are all facts I have from yourself, some formally and officially communicated, and none under any seal of secresy. There is, I conceive, no indiscretion or breach of confidence therefore in my appealing to them as proofs that some kind of civilized usage and attention to observances you have insisted upon, as due to your position and needful to its maintenance. You are certainly more open than your colleagues, then, to whom such painful experiences have never occurred, to a charge of exacting observances out of keeping with the civilization of the people; which I am very far from bringing, let me add, for I believe you were perfectly justified in all you did, in both cases, and that thanks, not reproaches, were due to you from your colleagues. I merely refer to the circumstances to show that the facts ill suit with your theory that your colleagues, instead of yourself, entertain such notions as are attributed to them in respect to the observances to be expected or required from the Japanese. Other points yet remain, to which I might advert, as being, in my opinion, more or less erroneous; but I prefer closing a discussion the prolongation of which is

unnecessary for the purpose I had in view, and which was simply to vindicate myself and the colleagues with whom I am acting from charges and misconstructions of an injurious character. You and I unfortunately, as I conceive, for the general interests, hold different, and, to all appearance, irreconcileable opinions. But facts generally admit of being tested and proved by something in the way of evidence, while conclusions, based upon them, can be satisfactorily dealt with as borne out or otherwise fallacious; and it has been my wish to refer to both, merely so far as might be essential, to show where error or injustice existed, and not to call in question your intention or motives, or to expose your action to misconstruction. Having done this, I have only to add that your letter, as you request, shall be forwarded by an early opportunity to Her Majesty's Government, that it may be attached to the *compte-rendu*, together with a copy of this, my reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

Mr. Alcock to Messrs. De Bellecourt and De Wit.

Sir, *Yokohama, February* 14, 1861.

I HAVE received to-day an official communication from Mr. Harris, the Resident Minister of the United States of America at Yeddo, in which he states that "he was not invited to assist" at the second Conference of the Representatives of foreign Powers, held at Her Britannic Majesty's Legation on the 21st ultimo.

This is so strangely in contradiction to my own clear impression of the facts that I cannot even understand how Mr. Harris should have fallen into such an error. I think it due, however, to all my colleagues who acted with me on that occasion, as well as myself, to obtain their evidence on the subject. I shall be obliged, therefore, by your informing me whether it is or is not in your recollection :—

1st. That it was agreed at the first Conference, in the presence of all—Mr. Harris of course included—that a second Conference should take place at the same place and hour on the 21st ultimo.

2ndly. That Mr. Harris said he feared he might be unable to attend, as he hoped on that day to succeed in inducing the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to call upon him; but that in any case he begged his absence need be no impediment, as he had already heard the opinions of his colleagues, and expressed his own, from which nothing should (or could) move him.

3rdly. Whether on my own part, and that of others, an earnest desire was at once expressed that he would favour us with his presence.

4thly. Whether upon this clear understanding that a second Conference would take place on the day mentioned the Conference broke up, and without further communication with you on the subject, you attended, and met all the parties to the first Conference, except Mr. Harris.

5thly. Whether the whole of the members were left in doubt whether it was Mr. Harris' intention to be present or not; and in consequence the Conference was deferred for the space of nearly one hour waiting for his appearance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

M. de Bellecourt to Mr. Alcock.

Légation et Consulat-Général de France,
M. le Ministre, *Yokohama, le* 15 *Février*, 1861.

J'Ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date d'hier, et je dois à la vérité de dire que les cinq points posés dans cette lettre

concordent parfaitement avec les souvenirs exacts que je conserve de la Conférence tenue à Yédo le 19 Janvier, à la Légation de Sa Majesté Britannique, et à laquelle ont pris part avec votre Excellence et moi, MM. les Représentants des Etats-Unis, de Prusse, et de Hollande.

Ainsi, toutes les opinions ayant été exprimées dans cette conférence (M. le Ministre des Etats-Unis ayant également donné la sienne), il s'est agi d'en rédiger un procès-verbal, et après diverses propositions il a été convenu que l'exposé présenté avec tant de lucidité par votre Excellence sur l'état anormal des choses au Japon serait consigné dans un compte-rendu dressé par vos soins, M. le Ministre, et où vous reproduisiez les propositions émises par les cinq Représentants ; il a été en outre convenu que ce compte-rendu serait présenté à notre adoption dans une nouvelle réunion qui aurait lieu le 21 à la même heure. Lorsque vous avez demandé à son Excellence le Ministre des Etats-Unis si ce jour et cette heure lui convenaient, Mr. Harris a répondu qu'il ne voyait pas que sa présence fut nécessaire à cette conférence, son opinion ayant été nettement émise dans la séance du jour ; et que d'ailleurs, comme il avait l'espoir d'amener les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères Japonais à lui faire une visite officielle ce jour-là même, il ne lui serait peut-être pas possible d'assister à la séance projetée, mais qu'il recevrait volontiers communication du compte-rendu s'il ne pouvait se rendre lui-même à l'invitation de ses collègues.

Je me suis retiré avec la conviction que chacun de nous était dûment convoqué à la réunion indiquée, et c'est dans cette pensée que j'ai préparé une note pour la seconde Conférence, note ayant pour objet, non pas de renouveler une discussion épuisée, mais d'établir que les quatre Représentants qui s'étaient trouvés d'accord sur l'opportunité de quitter momentanément Yédo, n'agissaient pas sous une impression produite par la crainte de dangers personnels, mais bien dans l'intention de faire sentir qu'ils redoutaient à la fois et de dangers matériels pour les leurs et un certain danger moral pour la dignité de leurs Gouvernements, tant que le Gouvernement de Yédo ne se montrerait pas disposé à se départir de ce système d'intimidation continuel qu'il a mis en pratique jusque sur la tombe du Secrétaire de la Légation des Etats-Unis.

Il était donc bien entendu que la seconde Conférence aurait lieu sans autre convocation, non pour discuter de nouveau mais pour entendre la lecture du compte-rendu de votre Excellence et y apposer nos signatures.

C'est ainsi que nous nous sommes réunis chez votre Excellence, MM. les Représentants de Hollande et de Prusse, et que nous avons en effet attendu inutilement pendant une heure l'arrivée de Mr. Harris avant de commencer la lecture du procès-verbal de la séance du 19, dont nous n'avons eu qu'à approuver l'exactitude parfaite.

Tel est, M. le Ministre, le résumé de mes souvenirs, et M. de Wit, que je viens de voir, m'a déclaré qu'ils sont entièrement conformes aux siens.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) DU CHESNE DE BELLECOURT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 9.

M. de Wit to Mr. Alcock.

Consulate-General of the Netherlands in Japan,
Yokohama, February 15, 1861.

Sir,

IN answer to your letter of the 14th February instant, I have the honour to state :—

1st. That at the first Conference all the Diplomatic Agents, Mr. Harris included, were invited by you to meet again at the British Legation, on Saturday, January 21, at 1 o'clock P.M.

2ndly. That all agreed to come, except Mr. Harris, who said he expected that on that day the Ministers of Foreign Affairs would call upon him, adding that, moreover, his resolution was fixed, from which nothing could move him.

3rdly. That when, by all present, a doubt was expressed as to the realisation of this expected visit, and an earnest desire was shown for his being present, Mr. Harris replied that he firmly believed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs would

really call upon him; and that, therefore, if he did not come, the reason was known why.

4thly. That, without any further communication, I came at the appointed time and place, and met all the parties to the first Conference, except Mr. Harris.

5thly. That the Conference was deferred till near 2 o'clock (when there was no sufficient reason to wait any longer for Mr. Harris), when it could not be reasonably expected that Mr. Harris would come.

With these statements I hope to have given satisfactorily the asked-for evidence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. K. DE WIT.

Inclosure 6 in No. 9.

Mr. Harris to Mr. Alcock.

Legation of the United States in Japan,
Sir, *Yeddo, February* 23, 1861.

I HAD the honour to inform you, in my note of the 20th, of the receipt by me, on the night of the 18th, of your letter of the 16th instant.

I have given it that long and careful consideration which its great length required and its importance demanded.

I do not see that any good can arise from a prolonged discussion of the grounds of the difference of opinion which unfortunately exists between us, and I, therefore, with all due respect to you, leave that part of your letter unanswered.

There remains, however, one point of fact and various references to my personal action, to which I feel constrained to reply; but before entering on these I desire to disclaim, in the broadest manner, any intention to reflect on the action of my colleagues, or to cast any aspersion on their motives. Differing widely from them, it was incumbent on me not only to state my opinion, but also to point out the inconveniences that I believed would attend their course of action, and I had no thought of reflecting on their motives or their action.

In my note to you of the 12th instant I stated that the *compte-rendu* of the Conferences held in this city on the 19th and 21st of January failed to state that the American Minister was not invited to attend the latter Conference.

In answer to this statement you reply, that an invitation was given, and in proof of the correctness of your recollection you transmit copies of letters from M. de Bellecourt, the French Chargé d'Affaires, and M. de Wit, the Netherlands Consul-General.

At the close of the Conference of January 19 you suggested the propriety of drawing up a *compte-rendu* of the Conference, and kindly undertook the labour; you further suggested that a meeting be held on the 21st of January to consider the *compte-rendu*, and to verify it by a Protocol to be signed by the foreign Representatives. Not one word was said in my hearing of an intention to reopen the discussions at the next meeting; had any such intimation been given to me I should have deferred a meeting with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs which had been appointed for that day, and would have attended the new Conference.

That my view of the nature of the intended meeting was correct is fully borne out by M. de Bellecourt in the following extracts from his note to you, dated the 15th instant:—

"Il s'est agi d'en rédiger un procès-verbal, et après diverses propositions il a été convenu que l'exposé présenté avec tant de lucidité par votre Excellence sur l'état anormal des choses au Japon, serait consigné dans un compte-rendu dressé par vos soins, M. le Ministre, et où vous reproduisiez les propositions émises par les cinq Représentants; il a été en outre convenu que ce compte rendu serait présenté à notre adoption dans une nouvelle réunion qui aurait lieu le 21, à la même heure."

And, further:

"Il était donc bien entendu que la seconde Conférence aurait lieu sans autre convocation, non pour discuter de nouveau, mais pour entendre la lecture du compte-rendu de votre Excellence, et y apposer nos signatures."

No reference is made to anything to be considered at the meeting to be held on the 21st, beyond the adoption of a *compte-rendu* to be presented for approval.

The note of M. de Wit states the admitted fact that a meeting was to be held on the 21st January, but, less explicit than M. de Bellecourt, he does not state the declared object of the meeting.

I am willing to believe that the reopening of the Conference was an afterthought, and that there was no original intention of excluding the Minister of the United States from the discussions then held.

Had I been informed of the intention of continuing the discussions, I should have felt it my duty to attend, and my presence might have prevented the utterance of the peevish remark recorded in the *compte-rendu* to the effect that the action of the American Minister would lead the Japanese Government to resist the pressure about to be brought upon them by his colleagues.

On folios 39 to 41 of your letter, you state that I threatened the Japanese with war on the part of the United States, "a war that should strike at all existing institutions of society." You add that "I contemplated a war *à l'outrance*, a war of servile and revolutionary character, superadded to the horrors of a foreign war."

A very few words will be sufficient to ventilate this absurd charge.

Up to the month of December 1859 the clauses of the Treaties granting freedom of trade were virtually in abeyance. Finding our written remonstrances did not produce any effect on the Japanese Government, it was agreed by you, M. de Bellecourt, and myself, that we should have interviews with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, at which we should point out to them the inevitable consequences that must follow the policy they were then pursuing. You had the first interview, but nothing was accomplished. On the 13th December, I had an interview with the Ministers. On that occasion I pointed out to them their infractions of their Treaty stipulations, and I concluded by warning them that the various Treaty Powers would not permit them to trample on their Treaty obligations; that war would be the inevitable consequence of their present policy. I also warned them that if a war did take place, the Representatives of the foreign Powers would only negotiate with the Representatives of the Mikado, and that this would overthrow the governing power then exercised by the Daimios, with the Tycoon as their Representative.

I aver that I never used any of the expressions you attribute to me, and I also declare that I never, either in writing or orally, either officially or privately, informed you, or any one else, that I had used threats such as you attribute to me, or anything analogous to them.

I beg to add, for your information, that the Representatives of the United States have not the power of making war (that is wisely placed in the hands of the President and Congress), nor can they so embroil their country that it must either prosecute an unjust war, or submit to a loss of honour.

From folio 57 of your letter, I make the following extract:—

"You are certainly more open than your colleagues to a charge—which I am very far from bringing, let me add—of exacting observances out of keeping with the civilization of the people."

In this you refer to the discussions which were had on and after the 7th December, 1859, on the subject of the ceremonial observed at my second audience.

My first audience of His Majesty the Tycoon took place on the 7th December, 1857. All the ceremonial then observed, save one point, the manner in which I should salute His Majesty, was settled by the Japanese themselves.

At my second audience, which took place on the 5th November, 1859, there was so marked a difference in the ceremonial, and so wide a departure from that observed at my first audience, that I had no doubt of its being intentional on the part of the Government, and that they meant to place the Representative of the United States in a humiliating position in the eyes of the Japanese people.

Acting on this belief, I demanded as a redress for the slight put upon me that I should have a new audience, at which the same ceremonial should be observed as that used at my audience of the 7th December, 1857. This was all I ever demanded, and it was conceded to me.

Your insinuation that I endeavoured to "exact observances out of keeping

with the civilization of the people," being without any foundation, it falls to the ground.

I am the more surprised at your failure of memory in relation to this matter, when I call to mind the fact that you were consulted by me in every step which I took in this behalf.

You endeavour to impugn my statement "that we have lived in Yeddo about nineteen months in safety," by asking the following questions:—

"Have not you yourself been assaulted by one of those two-sworded retainers in your own courtyard, and placed in bodily fear of your life? Were you not warned by the Government that if you prosecuted your assailant, you would be in danger of a vendetta from him or his companions, which would very likely cost you your life?"

A drunken yaconin did jostle me as I was proceeding to my house on the 29th December, 1859, and it was, no doubt, a technical assault, for which a jury in my country would have awarded me a farthing damages, had I applied for redress.

To admit that a man in the last stage of intoxication put me "in bodily fear of my life," would be to impeach my own manhood.

The "warning of the Government" finds a ludicrous answer in the fact that the "warning" was simply the volunteer advice of an interpreter. My assailant was promptly arrested, and speedily punished.

In my answers to the personal attacks on me, I have not been compelled to trust to my unaided memory, as all the material facts I have used are contained in the archives of this Legation.

I have read with great surprise and deep regret your declaration that you feel authorised to make use of my private conversation with you, because you were not placed under the seal of secresy.

I must decline following your example, believing, as I do, that it is calculated to destroy all confidence between man and man, and to make social intercourse impossible.

I am fain to believe that the expression escaped you in a moment of excitement, and that cool reflection will cause you not only to regret but to retract it.

I have transmitted a copy of the *compte-rendu* to my Government, and I shall also transmit a copy of your letter of the 16th instant.

Permit me to request you to forward a copy of this note to your Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) TOWNSEND HARRIS.

Inclosure 7 in No. 9.

Mr. Alcock to Mr. Harris.

Sir, *Yokohama, February* 24, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant.

Further discussion on the points which are at issue between us would, I conceive, be both endless and profitless. Were the language in which you have seen fit to couch your answer not such as to justify my declining all further correspondence with you on the subject, I have simply to inform you that I adhere to the statements already made, and formally deny the correctness of your allegation that I have made use of any conversation that could fairly be considered private between us—referred to any acts not more or less officially communicated to me as the British Minister and your colleague.

As you desire the whole correspondence to be transmitted to Her Majesty's Government, and have already sent my letter of the 16th to your own, I have to request this may be added.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 10.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 26.)

My Lord, *Yokohama, February* 21, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to inclose some correspondence which has taken place between the Acting Consul here and the British residents, together with the Minutes of two meetings to consider the grievances of the latter, as to the interference of Japanese officials in the trade of the place, contrary to Treaty, and to the manifest injury of foreigners generally. A statement of the grievances was, at the invitation of the Consul, who acted upon my suggestions, conveyed, in the first instance, by a letter to his address. The report of the Committee of the British residents, their grievances, and the subsequent review of the grounds of complaints and the action of the British authorities for their removal (which Captain Vyse, as Chairman, took occasion to make), will be found in the printed Minute of proceedings at the public meeting. These documents give a full and fair view of the whole state of the case on both sides, and the present position of affairs.

I am actively engaged in the endeavour to effect some amelioration, thus fully informed; and if I succeed in removing the existing obstacles to my resuming residence at Yeddo, I do not despair, on my return, of success in this direction also.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

[See Inclosure 1 and 2 in No. 8.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Extract from the Supplement to the "Overland China Mail" of March 16, 1861.

Public Meeting of Foreigners at Yokohama.

Minutes of a Meeting held at Mr. W. Keswick's on the 7th of February, 1861.

Present:

F. H. Bell, *in the Chair.*

H. E. Bush, *Secretary.*

W. G. Aspinall.	F. Moffat.
T. Tatham.	J. Loureiro.
W. Keswick.	H. J. Hooper.
J. B. Ross.	A. J. Macpherson.
G. Henderson.	C. T. Elmstone.
W. Marshall.	W. Macdonald.
J. Birdseye.	S. Maine.

THE Chairman stated that the meeting had been called to take into consideration a despatch from Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy respecting irregularities in the transaction of business at the Custom-house, and official interference with native merchants, contrary to Treaty, and other restrictions and obstructions to trade on the part of Government.

Moved by Mr. Keswick, and seconded by Mr. Marshall,—That, viewing the present state of the currency as assisting, in a very marked degree, the growth of an import trade, and not as an arrangement in its effects altogether one-sided and prejudicial to foreigners, we are of opinion that, in the interests of trade generally, the dollar had better be left, as decided upon by our Minister some

time since, to find its own value; and in furtherance of this we beg that Her Majesty's Minister will use his best endeavours to secure for the dollar unrestricted circulation, not only in Yeddo and Yokohama, but throughout the Empire. (Carried, 9 to 5.)

Proposed by Mr. Elmstone, and seconded by Mr. J. Loureiro,—That Her Majesty's Minister be requested to secure, if practicable, the exchange of our coin by the Government at weight for weight, we paying a fair per-centage for recoining; as, from the well-known duplicity of the Government, and with the example of the stamped dollar before us, it appears foreign coin cannot be made current as provided for by Treaty.

Mr. Keswick moved, and Mr. Marshall seconded,—That Mr. Elmstone's motion be not put to the meeting. (Carried, 9 to 5.)

Moved by Mr. Tatham, and seconded by Mr. Macpherson,—That with respect to the non-fulfilment of contracts entered into between foreign and Japanese merchants, instances be obtained, and embodied by the Committee in their report. (Carried *nem. con.*)

Moved by Mr. Macpherson, and seconded by Mr. Aspinall,—That any member of the community who is acquainted with the fact of Japanese officials having in any way interfered with native merchants in buying and selling, be requested to furnish particulars of same. (Carried unanimously.)

Moved by Mr. Macpherson, and seconded by Mr. Macdonald,—That there are at present many restrictions to business arising from the manner in which the Custom-house is managed, viz., from want of sufficient interpreters, the frequent change of these and other officers, the insufficient accommodation afforded by the present cargo-boats and landing-place, and the high charges made for boat and coolie-hire. That to remedy these grievances jetties be established at the new concession, and other places when requisite, the supplying of coolies and cargo-boats thrown open to competition, or increased facilities given by the Government for hiring of them, and that a fixed and equitable tariff be established instead of the present exorbitant rates. (Carried unanimously.)

Moved by Mr. Keswick, and seconded by Mr. Hooper,—That there be recorded in the Minutes the thanks of this meeting to Her Majesty's Minister and Consul for the opportunity afforded of expressing an opinion on the restrictions and obstructions under which trade labours at this port, and of suggesting how, in some measure at least, they may be removed. (Carried unanimously.)

Moved by Mr. Marshall, and seconded by Mr. J. B. Ross,—That a Committee be appointed, and be composed of Messrs. Bell, Keswick, Bush, and Marshall, to draw up a statement in accordance with the Resolution of this meeting, and wait upon Her Majesty's Consul with the same. (Carried unanimously.)

Moved by Mr. Keswick, and seconded by Mr. Macpherson,—That the thanks of this meeting be given to the Chairman and Secretary. (Carried unanimously.)

Sir, *Kanagawa, February* 9, 1861.

We have the honour to wait upon you with Minutes of a meeting held to take into consideration a reply to the despatch of Her Majesty's Minister and Envoy Extraordinary, requesting to be placed in possession of particulars of restrictions to trade, contrary to Treaty, and we trust the following statements will be of use to Her Majesty's Envoy in freeing the trade of this port from many of the obstructions commerce has hitherto laboured under.

1. *The Currency.*

It is beyond all question that restrictions are put upon the circulation of the dollar, but it does not appear that in any direct way is its current value now controlled by officials. The Government is not anxious that foreign coin should be introduced into the country, and therefore prohibits its circulation elsewhere than in Yeddo and at the open ports, and the consequent demand for itzebues with which to purchase the products of the country suitable for export has raised the value of the native coin to a premium of about 30½ per cent. In September the premium was nearly 50 per cent., but the large purchases made by Government to supply the Mint, and a rapid development of an import trade, brought about a considerable decline. Since this improvement in the dollar

took place, Government has confined its purchases of silver more to the product of its own mines, the proprietors of these being obliged to dispose of the metal at an arbitrary rate.

The revenue derived from the Mint is very large, and it is clearly the desire of Government to protect it by prohibiting a foreign coin from becoming current, and displacing in a great measure the native.

It is certainly not to the prejudices of the people the depreciation is attributable, for the experience of the last nineteen months shows that the natives approve of the dollar as a coin.

We are therefore of opinion that the unrestricted circulation of foreign coins throughout the Empire, if it can be secured (and it is stipulated for in our Treaty), would gradually restore the dollar to its legitimate value, and that, too, at no very distant period.

The working of the currency during the past four months cannot be regarded as having been very seriously against us, as to it is due, in a very marked degree, the development of a large import trade.

The export trade is certainly checked by it, but there is no reason to doubt that the free and unrestricted circulation of the dollar, by adding to the metallic currency of the country, will lead to a mutual and rapid development of both an import and export trade.

2. *Apparent Breach of Treaty by Government in not enforcing the observance of Contracts.*

The non-fulfilment of contracts by merchants in a position to carry out their engagements, appears to us in the light of a grievance against the Government, as it is in its power to enforce their observance.

It is needless to recapitulate cases, as the archives of the Consulate can furnish you with abundant proof of how constantly and shamelessly the native merchants break faith with foreigners, and depart from their engagements, with the apparent approval of their rulers. One case, however, may be mentioned, which was brought before your notice by Mr. Keswick on the 17th February, 1860. The contractor was Mi-tsu-i Haizen, a large merchant of this place, and said to be the wealthiest in Japan, connected with the Government, and acting as its banker throughout the Empire. The produce contracted for was silk and oil, but only the most trifling quantity of each was delivered.

This case has been in your hands for nearly a year, and you are doubtless well aware what steps the Japanese Government has taken to enforce the observances of mercantile engagements upon its subjects.

3. *Official interference with Merchants in disposing of Produce.*

Official interference with the sale of produce to foreigners we believe to be systematic, though difficult of proof. We all know that every sale and every purchase effected by a Japanese merchant has to be reported to officers specially appointed to keep a record of every transaction, and a note of the price. We cannot assert that a system of extortion exists, but as evidence of the fact that there is interference with trade, contrary to Treaty, we conceive the two following statements will suffice:—

Mr. H. J. Hooper can assert that within the last two months he has been desirous of contracting for manufactured copper, and was unable to do so in consequence of the native merchants assuring him, that although on their own part willing and anxious, they were not allowed in consequence of the Government having on the nineteenth month of the present Japanese year called in all outstanding contracts, and given the merchants warning not to enter into any new ones. This he can prove by a gentleman who was present when he sought to make such contracts, but in the interests of his business he cannot of course give up the names of the merchants who for the reasons above stated, and these alone, refused to contract.

Messrs. Tatham & Co. bought ten piculs awahi from Tchkawayah. It was delivered, but upon examination four boxes were rejected. On inquiring why these four boxes were not taken away, their godown coolie said the merchant was in prison, whereupon his house was visited, and the shop found shut up. The head-man was confined in the house, and he stated that all his servants

were in prison. Captain Vyse spoke to the Custom-house officials, who promised to release the prisoners, but the shop is still closed, and the merchant is thus debarred from delivering other produce purchased from him.

4. *Want of System at Custom-house, and inadequate Wharfage accommodation, &c.*

Under this head we have most serious obstructions to trade to complain of, in the want of all system in transacting business at the Custom-house. It may be, and we believe it is the case, that there are a sufficient number of interpreters to transact all business with promptitude and despatch, but they do not appear in the room for granting permits and receiving duties when they are most required. Occasionally there are two, but more frequently only one interpreter to attend to this department. And from the not unusual absence of interpreters altogether, foreigners experience most vexatious and unnecessary delays.

We have also to complain of the course adopted with permits, which the Custom-house grant indiscriminately, and not according to priority of application. It does not unfrequently happen that one man has to wait for hours, while another who has come after him is attended to first, and this without the application of the one being more difficult to grant than that of the other.

For remedying these evils we would beg to suggest that there should be a greater number of interpreters placed in the outer room for the special purpose of translating permits, and that all such be granted according to the order in which they are received.

Another point to which we would call your attention is the frequent change of interpreters and other officers connected with the Custom-house, the present system appearing to be, that as soon as an officer becomes at all acquainted with the routine of the particular department under his charge, he is removed and replaced by one totally ignorant of his duties, and the inconvenience of this is especially felt at the examination-house.

With respect also to the examination-house it is frequently the case that produce remains for hours uninspected, waiting for the permit to ship. We would suggest, in order to facilitate the shipment of produce, that so soon as brought to the jetty, it should be inspected, weighed, and put into boats, to be detained until production of the permit.

At the present time the supplying of cargo-boats is entirely in the hands of the Custom-house, and though we are of opinion that it might be beneficial to allow of public competition, we do not wish the system changed, provided the Government is prepared to furnish boats sufficient for the requirements of the port, such boats being covered and constructed so as to protect the goods they are intended to carry.

Owing to the state of things in China, for some months past, the export trade at this port has been restricted in a great measure to tea and silk; and the inconvenience arising from an insufficient supply of cargo-boats has not been felt to any great degree; but looking forward to the probable revival of the trade in general cargoes, we would suggest that either the Government allow the supplying of cargo-boats to be open to public competition (in which case special stipulations for obtaining boatmen would have to be made), or that it should guarantee to keep up a sufficient supply of boats, properly built, with a view to protecting the goods shipped in them, from rain, and that an equitable scale of charges be agreed upon.

On the 9th of September, 1860, several of the Government cargo-boats were wrecked, and we believe we are correct in stating that none of the boats then destroyed have yet been replaced.

Another evil is the coolie system. At present two coolie-masters, authorized by Government, have the supplying of coolies, and they fix what scale of charges they think proper, as it is impossible for foreigners to obtain labour except through them. The injustice attending such a system is great, and we would suggest that either foreigners be allowed to employ coolies irrespective of the masters, or that a scale of charges be agreed to more in accordance with the wages paid to the coolies, and made binding upon the masters.

Daily experience proves that the present wharf for landing and shipping cargo is totally inadequate to the business requirements of the port, and as trade increases this inconvenience must be more and more felt; we would,

therefore, suggest that three new wharves be constructed, and that at each of these there should be an examination-house and proper officers to inspect the goods.

5. *Occupation of Land.*

We are not aware that any complaint of not affording facilities for the occupation of land and houses on sites agreed upon by the Japanese and foreign authorities can be made against the Government. Unaccountable and to many of us most vexatious delays have been experienced in obtaining land, but you are probably better informed than we are with whom the blame rests.

6. *Security of Life and Property.*

Under this head we have little to say, as it is needless now to dwell on the sacrifices that have already taken place. Apparently the Government is anxious to protect us, and if we may judge from the precautions taken to secure life and property, we should also say it could do so effectually. We feel a certain amount of reserve, however, in speaking on this subject, as doubtless you are in possession of more reliable information than we are.

We have, &c.
(Signed) W. KESWICK.
&c. &c. &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

Extract from the "North China Herald" of March 16, 1861.

Minutes of a meeting of British residents at Yokohama, on the 19th February, 1861, convened by Her Majesty's Acting Consul, for the purpose of taking into consideration a Report and the proceedings of a preliminary meeting on the subject of existing grievances and obstructions at this port.

Captain F. Howard Vyse, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, *in the Chair.*

THE Chairman having explained the object of the meeting in the terms of the circular of the 14th instant convening it, said he would be glad to receive any proposition, or hear any explanation bearing on the subjects for discussion.

Mr. Edward Clarke begged the Chairman to read the Report of the preliminary meeting referred to, as he (Mr. Clarke) was yet ignorant of what was embodied in that Report.

The Report being read—

Mr. Clarke said: Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the privilege of addressing this meeting on behalf of myself, and also those parties present who may not have had an opportunity afforded them of reading the reply sent to Her Majesty's Consul by those merchants of Yokohama who received invitations to to attend the private meeting held, at Mr. Keswick's parlour, on the 7th instant, and I beg to take this occasion of heartily thanking you, Sir, for the kindness and consideration which you have shown this meeting, by reading the contents of that document, with which I am now made acquainted for the first time, barring what I have learned by hearsay: and I must now claim the indulgence and patience of you, Sir, and also of this meeting, if, in my attempt to criticise portions of a document with which I can only be very imperfectly acquainted I may unintentionally commit some errors, arising chiefly therefrom, and partly also to the short space of time during which I have been resident in Japan.

Without wasting the valuable time of this meeting on minor topics of grievances which others are, or have been, so much better able to deal with, I will now venture to approach at once what I consider to be of the pith and marrow of that which concerns this meeting; I allude, Mr. Chairman, to the currency question, and, however simple it may appear in the abstract, to hear that a resolution was carried by a majority, at the preliminary meeting held on the

7th instant, to the effect "that the Mexican dollar be allowed to find its own level, &c., &c.," still I humbly think that it will be trenching too much on the good sense and patience of this meeting to suppose for one moment that the Mexican or any other dollar or coin whatsoever could ever find its own level, so long as the Japanese Government, for obvious reasons, is determined that it never shall. It is, nevertheless, quite true that Article X of Lord Elgin's Treaty apparently tends somewhat in support of that resolution; but if, Mr. Chairman, we give to this Article the careful consideration and interpretation which it deserves, we shall find that it is subject to the same rules which guide the Queen's Judges in giving interpretation to clauses in Acts of Parliament, which, however well framed at the time of being enacted, are sometimes found in practice to be almost inoperative: in these cases, the Judge is permitted to take upon himself the responsibility of interpreting the meaning of the Act, and the motives of the law-makers for framing the clause. Following out this principle in its integrity, I will, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, endeavour to elucidate to this meeting what I take to be the meaning and intention of Article X of the Treaty with Japan, or rather such portions of that Article as appear to me to bear practically on the aforesaid resolution.

In the third paragraph of Article X, it reads thus:

"As some time will elapse before the Japanese will become acquainted with the value of foreign coin, the Japanese Government will, for the period of one year after the opening of each port, furnish British subjects with Japanese coin, in exchange for theirs, equal weights being given, and no discount taken for recoinage."

I am of opinion, Mr. Chairman, that nothing can be clearer than the intention and meaning of the third paragraph of Article X, and I think also that it is quite competent to this meeting to interpret it in a large sense. It was self-evident to the framers of the Treaty (and the foresight displayed does them infinite credit) that some time must elapse before foreign coin could become current in this country, but, as it was desirable to fix a definite period, twelve months was the short space accorded for the exchange of weight for weight coins, and, doubtless, the framers (for the major part at least) thought such a period ample; but unfortunately the contrary is the fact—a twelvemonth has not been enough—and such being the case, I humbly think, Mr. Chairman, that we have a right to fall back upon the meaning and intention of Article X of the Treaty, and in accordance with this I beg, Mr. Chairman, to put the following resolution to this meeting:—

"That, in the opinion of this meeting, it is desirable that Her Majesty's Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary be humbly requested to take such steps as he may see fit and desirable to obtain from the Japanese Government a fresh grant of time for the exchange of Japanese for foreign coins, less the deduction of such a per-centage as will be found to remunerate the Japanese Mint, but which, in the opinion of this meeting, should not exceed a maximum royalty of 4 per cent."

Mr. W. Keswick begged that before pronouncing on the currency question, the meeting would well consider whether the exchange system would, in the end, be to the advantage of foreign trade. He (Mr. Keswick) was of opinion it would not; and certainly thought it wiser, with a view to the future, to abide by the Treaty, and to endeavour to make the foreign coinage take up a position and find its way here as elsewhere. Where a large trade had to be conducted, the expense of coinage and the delays that would attend in every stage of such a system in Japan, and the evident impolicy of such a step in its future consequences—all spoke strongly in favour of abiding by the Treaty stipulation on this head.

Mr. Clarke again rose and made the following rejoinder:—

At the risk of repetition he must beg to remind Mr. Keswick that he was but very imperfectly acquainted (for reasons already stated to the meeting) with what was termed the chief point at issue, but in reverting to that portion of the currency question which tended in the direction of making a legal tender of the Mexican or any other dollar, in what he believed to be an independent State, populated by a people of high spirit, and who, moreover, possess a coinage superior in some important respects to that of the States of Central Europe (more particularly those composing the Zollverein), to wit, the admirable bron-

coin of one tempo, which he then held in his hand, and he must beg to record it as his deliberate conviction that the French might with equal justice insist on the five-franc piece being made a legal tender tender in England.

Mr. Clarke's motion, seconded by Mr. Elmstone, was then put to the meeting—for the motion, 10; against it, 24—Resolution carried by 14.

No other motion being put, the Consul then addressed the meeting, stating that he was very glad to meet so large a body of the British residents at this port, not only to hear what observations they might wish to make on the several matters to be taken into consideration, but on his own part to give them such information as might be in his power, to assist them in coming to a right conclusion. In furtherance of this object there were some data in respect to the steps which had hitherto been taken by the British authorities that he would avail himself of the present occasion to put them in possession of, the better to enable them to deal in a practical manner with the question to be discussed. To prevent doubt or misapprehension as to the details he had committed them to paper, and before proceeding to read them he would further say that he not only was glad to have this opportunity of meeting them for the purpose of taking into consideration many questions directly affecting their interests,—because the full and fair discussion, with a free interchange of opinions, was, he thought, one of the best modes of arriving at the truth,—but he hoped the proceedings of that day might go far to remove many misconceptions, and prepare the way for a better understanding in future in all that concerned their mutual relations and the position of residents in the country. The following statement was then read by the Consul:—

I ought in the first place to inform you that the letter of the Committee nominated at a preliminary meeting, and which was addressed to me on the 15th instant, inclosing the Minute of the proceedings, was duly laid before Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, and I am directed to inform you that he read the whole with great interest, and observed with satisfaction the excellent spirit in which you had set about the consideration of the grave matters brought under your notice. I am further to assure you of his earnest desire to contribute by every means in his power to the improvement of your position generally; and the removal of any grievances that can be shown, upon full information of all the local conditions, to admit of a practical remedy.

He has instructed me accordingly to afford you every information as to the steps which have hitherto been taken by the Japanese Government and authorities towards the improvement of trade, the security of life and property, the Custom-house system at this port, and the occupation of land for building purposes; and to enable me to do so more effectually I have had access to all the sources of information the Legation affords. I think you will see in what I shall now lay before you abundant evidence of watchful regard for every legitimate interest, and that no efforts have been spared by Her Majesty's Envoy, in communication with the Government at Yeddo, to advance these interests and avert the dangers which have menaced both you and them. It will probably best promote the objects of the meeting if, in the data I now wish to lay before you, I follow the order observed in the despatch of Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, and subsequently in the proceedings of the preliminary meeting and the letter of the Committee.

The Currency.—The Treaty stipulates, that "all foreign coin shall be current in Japan, and shall pass for its corresponding weight in Japanese coin of the same description." That has not hitherto been the case, and while there is no dispute about the obligation of the Government of this country to do all that is in its power to give effect to this clause there is a question, and a difficult one, as to how far it is in the power of this, or any other Government, to force a foreign coinage into general circulation, and at a fixed rate or valuation. The Japanese Government say it cannot, and even in the case of a single coin—the dollar—that it has already, as a Government, done all it can do, and failed; that it has issued an Edict throughout the Empire making all foreign coins legal tenders, weight for weight—that it has even attempted, with the concurrence of the foreign Representatives, to secure the circulation of the dollar (at something less than weight for weight, in view of the facility of exchange) and stamped a certain number with a Government stamp of three itzebus, but still they only find circulation at the ports, and that varying at a depreciated rate of two, or

two and a half itzebus, while in the interior there is reason to believe they have no currency.

Is there any remedy for this?

That is the question for consideration. Because it is to remembered that no Treaty can be invoked to effect an impossibility. Many may believe that the Japanese Government are not acting with good faith in the matter, but are themselves the chief impediments to the free circulation of the dollar at its full value, and that in any case they have the power if they had the will to secure their currency both at the open ports and elsewhere. But it must be remembered, on the other hand, that the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of forcing a foreign coinage on a people, is of universal experience, however despotic or absolute the government. In China, where they have no coinage to displace, where a coinage of any kind is a great desideratum, and where dollars of Spain and of American States, all of the same (or nearly the same) intrinsic value, have for the last twenty years been in circulation at five ports on the coast, with the Government of the country passive in the matter, having no obvious interest one way or the other, this free circulation throughout the country is as far as ever from being attained. Even in the case of those districts where our large dealings in tea and silk have, so to say, forced foreign specie into circulation, the result was not the general circulation of dollars bearing all a pretty equal value, but an unmeaning preference for the only one of those that was absolute and could not be reproduced—the Carolus dollar—to which obsolete coin an entirely fictitious value was attached by the Chinese, continually increasing until they were at last used up, and not to be had at all, to the depreciation of all other dollars some 30 or 40 per cent. The circulation of a Western coinage in an Eastern country must then be admitted to present great difficulties, and some that may be quite insurmountable, even where there is no active influence of a Government to prevent its currency, or even no want of good faith to help. On the other hand, although it is to some extent an evil to the foreign merchant not to be able to circulate the coinage of his own country, and buy produce with it, weight for weight, against native coins, the Committee have rightly shown it is not so great an evil as has been often represented, nor is it altogether unmixed with good.

If it tends to restrict the export trade of Japanese produce, it certainly no less serves to increase and develop a trade in imports. And again whether the dollar be nominally rated by the Japanese at two and a-half itzebues, or at two, it does not follow that more dollars must be paid for a chest of tea or a bale of silk than if they were rated at three or more; because it is to be assumed that the foreign merchant will only give as many dollars as he calculates it is worth, to leave him a fair profit; and if they were to circulate at their weight-value of 311 or 312 per 100 dollars, competition would still keep up the price of Japanese produce to the same margin of profit.

Lastly, no large trade could be conducted by means of this coinage only, any more than it could by shillings and sixpences. Such, at least, are some of the considerations which it appears desirable should be carefully weighed, and kept in view, before any proposals are made, by means of more or less determined effort and action upon the Japanese Government, to alter what actually exists; and which perhaps may only be altered by risking some greater or unforeseen derangement in monetary and commercial relations. These suggestions are thrown out in view also of a considerable diversity of opinion among the community here, which is at all times an additional reason for caution, and for mature deliberation in any steps recommended. It may true that the Government does in effect prohibit the circulation of the dollar in the interior, and will only give two and a-half itzebus in exchange when Japanese take their dollar to the Mints (or that there are extortions or bribes which bring it down to that), but we shall never be in a position to prove it; and Her Majesty's Envoy, I know, believes it a very profitless, and not a very dignified or politic course, to persist in assertions reflecting on the character of the Government, which he cannot support by proof, and they meet by a flat denial.

It seems probable that they have the means of purchasing the produce, or otherwise working the silver mines in Japan, so as to obtain the bullion at a less rate than two and a-half itzebus for a dollar weight. Of course, by so much less as they can thus obtain it, the exchange of dollars is a dead loss of revenue. If this be the fact, it is vain to hope the Japanese Government will frankly and

honestly subject themselves to this loss, whatever Treaty stipulations may require to the contrary.

The second subject for consideration has relation to the various impediments traceable, more or less distinctly to Japanese officials, in the way of trade; and restrictions not in accordance with the Treaty, or the free sales and purchase of goods.

The non-observance, or enforcement of contracts, the Committee place at the head of these, and, no doubt, it is a serious grievance. Within the last month, it is true, greater efforts have been made by the Japanese authorities here to fulfil this obligation than in all the antecedent period; yet this, I fear, is rather to be traced to circumstances connected with the present political situation than any settled determination to give effect to contracts.

But in reference to a practical remedy being found, I confess, I am not sanguine. In China, I am told—after twenty years of effort and experience—little progress has been made in this direction, though precisely the same grievance exists; so much so, that a mode of transacting business has grown up, which, except in the case of Chinese of well-established character, rarely leaves it in the power of the native dealer to inflict loss upon the foreign merchant. In exceptional cases, where this has not been done, an appeal to the native authorities, in nine cases out of ten, leads but to one of two results. If the Chinese dealer is a man of means, and only dishonest, he is squeezed as long as he has anything squeezable, for the benefit of the mandarins and their subordinates; if poor, he may get a bambooing or imprisonment: but in neither case does the creditor get anything for his pains.

Something may be done by persistent representations and remonstrances; but I fear it will be long before either my best exertions on the spot, or those of Her Majesty's Envoy at Yeddo, will remove all cause of complaint under this head. It is true the Governor, upon more than one occasion, has proposed to take off the head of the defaulter by way of a caution to others—and possibly it might be effective—but I confess to some scruples in accepting such composition for the payment of debt; and some doubt whether it would be as satisfactory to the plaintiff as even a small dividend.

The official interference with the sale of Japanese produce is, I conceive, a much more serious evil. I wish I could honestly tell you I thought it easier of remedy. I have not the slightest doubt in my own mind that the grievance exists to the full extent stated, but the evidence is unproducible, and were it otherwise in any one or two cases, the only result would be a more secret and astute mode of going to work for the same end. The spirit of official meddling and restriction seems a part of the very constitution of Japan. The Government and whole class of officials seem incapable of abstaining, or even understanding how the country could be governed without it. The ruling classes believe the country is being ruined, as it is, by too large and unrestricted foreign trade. The Ministers tell Her Majesty's Envoy this nearly every time he sees them. They have long been urgent, on the alleged ground of public opinion and general discontent from the enhanced price of everything (attributed exclusively to foreign trade) for the deferring of the opening of any other ports. And they urge it on the double ground of a necessity for the country and to prevent a revolution or sanguinary outbreak, which would be fatal to foreigners themselves and possibly put an end to all relations. The late menace of general massacre was referred to by them as a proof of the truth of their statements on this head. Whether this restrictive and retrogade policy is founded on Japanese views of political economy, combined with the hostility, on other purely political grounds, of a large party among the ruling classes, or the result of a hostile public opinion and general discontent, with a view to prevent a catastrophe, is open to question. Whether, in fact, the repeated menace of attack and series of assassinations have a political origin, and are to be taken as part of a policy which has been carried out either by the Government of the country, or in spite of it, by those who wish to create political troubles, is matter for grave consideration, and a question on which even the foreign Representatives are not unanimous. But as respects the hope of inducing the Japanese authorities, under such circumstances, to abstain from meddling, with a view to promote and not restrain the free development of trade, I confess I see little of promise in the future. When pressed on this

subject they have even hinted, by no means obscurely, to one of the foreign Representatives at Yeddo, that there were more evils than breaking a Treaty if it should be found really ruinous to a country in its operation; and, upon another occasion, they proposed openly to seek the consent of all the Treaty Powers to a limitation to be fixed for all articles of export for a term of years, especially oil, silk, tea, and vegetable wax. I am authorized to mention these facts of deep interest to you all, and in order to show you clearly how great the difficulties to be encountered in any efforts to secure the full and honest execution of Treaties, in respect to trade, with a Government that can deliberately contemplate the rupture of all relations with foreign Powers as a lesser evil than a rigorous execution of Treaties which they regard as impolitic and imperious, and have indicated plainly enough that if they are driven to choose between a civil and a foreign war they should not hesitate to accept the latter in preference.

The want of system in the Custom-house and inadequate wharfage accommodation are of all the obstacles to trade those which may best admit of gradual and certain improvement, and I am quite ready to endeavour to give effect to your suggestions, and the same I should say in reference to the interference with labour and cargo-boats, respecting which all you propose is, I think, perfectly reasonable.

We come now to the occupation of land, in which the Committee speak of "unaccountable," and, what has appeared to many, "vexatious" delays, in obtaining building sites. Yet nothing admits of more easy explanation. I need hardly remind you that when the port was first opened it was a question between the Japanese authorities and the foreign Representatives which side of the bay offered the most eligible site for the permanent objects of trade. The British and American Ministers both saw cogent reasons for preferring Kanagawa, in a permanent point of view, while the majority of the merchants, arriving by ones and twos, seemed to find greater advantage in view of immediate facilities on the Yokohama side, where the Japanese desired to fix them, and had gone to great expense with that object. Both may have been right from these separate points of view, the Ministers looking to national and permanent interests, the merchants to what was individual and temporary. That is a question which need not be discussed now, and it is not, in fact, before the meeting. But as there has been no little misconception (I do not wish to use any harder word) as to the real facts and the action of Her Majesty's authorities, it may not, perhaps, be without advantage to all if I offer a few words in explanation in respect to the past, as tending to clear the way to a good understanding for the future.

We will not discuss who was right or wrong, or whether anything better could have been done at first than to leave the question to be decided by events, the progress of the settlement being left to itself in a great degree. It is no very grave reproach to those who have only temporary interests at stake, to charge them with preferring these to any future permanent advantages. So neither is it a very legitimate subject of reproach to Consul or Ministers, who by office are the representatives of interests that are national and permanent, if they should keep these constantly in view, as the more important, whatever may be the pressure of that which is individual and fleeting, and follow the line of duty thus indicated without fear, or seeking after popularity. Of course the two classes of interests cannot always be very perfectly reconciled to each other, and this will lead to a conflict of interests and opinions. But in such a contingency you have at least the satisfaction of knowing that neither the Consul nor Minister can have any personal interests to consult; they neither trade nor deal in land. And it is going very far a-field for adverse motives to attribute to either petty feelings of spite and ill-will because British subjects may have thought their own views the best, and acted upon them to the best of their power, in a matter so nearly concerning their interests. I will not tell you, therefore, no such feeling has ever existed, because I will neither pay you nor myself the bad compliment of assuming that you ever believed it possible, or that this could be a rational mode of explaining the difficulties you experienced in getting land. In truth, the impediment and sources of delay lay so completely on the surface, that but for the assertion in the letter, that they were considered unaccountable, I should fear to take up time by telling you what all must know.

and could apply to yourselves for the solution of the supposed mystery. However, to make further misapprehension impossible, I will remind you that as the Japanese authorities desired nothing better than that the merchants should settle themselves at Yokohama rather than at Kanagawa, the former needed no aid from Minister or Consuls to get all the land available for their purposes, into their hands; and things were allowed accordingly to take their own course, without official intervention or obstacle on my part, while an ample site was being secured on the opposite side of the bay at Kanagawa, as a measure of precaution, if nothing more, to meet future contingencies. But in this interval, the few who had first arrived had got into their hands all the land available; and a cry arose, that there was no more room; and as fresh merchants arrived no more building sites could be obtained. This might perhaps have been foreseen when the Japanese offered the site; but as it did not particularly affect those who first arrived and were enabled to secure what they themselves wanted or desired, it had not prevented a settlement being formed where no provision existed for increase or expansion. The question then arose, what was to become of merchants arriving each successive month, with equal claims as their predecessors to building sites, space, and accommodation to follow their vocation? Some of those already in possession may have had more than was really required for their legitimate wants, and it was certainly true that they held their land without any legal or valid title; but to resume possession of the land, and re-distribute, in a more impartial way, the whole area already built over, was an undertaking open to many objections, besides its difficulty and the trouble it would entail, however consistent with legality, and even with strict justice. What then was to be done for the houseless and landless? The merchants were themselves powerless to obtain more than the Japanese authorities had already assigned for the whole Foreign Settlements. It was under these circumstances that Her Majesty's Envoy came to their aid; and insisted, since the Japanese Government had made Yokohama the site, that the limits should be adequately extended and more land be given. It can hardly be supposed, by those who have the least experience of Japanese officials and local conditions, that this could be effected without effort or expenditure of time. Even when a large additional tract was conceded in principle, it was still necessary that it should be cleared, by buying out and removing a considerable village population; and the merchants who most desired land evinced no readiness to advance the necessary funds. Yet this was obviously the first step towards obtaining possession. Not only the land then had to be obtained by the unaided efforts of Her Majesty's Envoy, but the funds, and they were finally obtained from the Japanese Government by him, as an advance on the security of the land. The ground, too, was, after this, cleared and surveyed. The process of clearance was a slow one, with infinite difficulty effected, and it proved a source both of delay and difficulty, which can be deemed unaccountable by those only who never considered the circumstances. And yet this same process of eviction and clearing land in occupation is notoriously difficult; and often a very slow operation in many countries more civilized than Japan, especially when people are forcibly dispossessed for the benefit of others, and those of an alien race. Even then, unless the whole tract, as in the old site, was in the first instance to pass into the large grasp of a few, not unwilling to invest their funds in land as a stock-in-trade, more or less to the prejudice of all who might be less amply provided with funds, and certainly to the damage of all who might come after, it was obviously necessary some principle of allotment and distribution should be agreed upon, and certain conditions of tenure, in order that every one might possess a clear legal title to his property. But to any such arrangement, however useful or obviously necessary, there were necessarily many parties, all of whom must be consulted, as they had each a voice in the matter; the foreign Consuls and local Japanese authorities here, the Ministers both foreign and Japanese at Yeddo. Is there any one here who thinks agreement on such matters, involving both principle and detail, is so simple and easy a matter that no differences of opinion could arise, no impediments or causes of delay and difficulty? I trust to have sufficiently explained, then, why those who desired land, after the old location had been all absorbed and appropriated by the first comers, could not immediately get their wants supplied. So far from the delays already experienced being "unaccountable," I cannot help thinking, as I look back on all that has been gone through, that the most unaccountable of

all things would have been the absence of delays and serious difficulty. It is at all events in my power to assure you that no exertion has ever been wanting, either on the part of Her Majesty's Envoy or myself, for their removal; and I am happy to be able also to inform you that the last of the difficulties (as I hope, and so far as I know) has now been removed.

The conditions of tenure have been settled, as you will find them embodied in the printed Land-Regulations, and form of lease or "Certificate of Title" on the table, subject only to the final confirmation of the Japanese and Foreign Ministers, in which I do not anticipate any difficulty, as they have already been submitted in draft and approved. It is in the nature of a leasehold tenure; transferable, without fine or charge of rent, in perpetuity; the next best thing to a freehold, and equivalent in all but the rent. You will perceive only one scale of rental has been referred to; nevertheless, it seems desirable here, as at Nagasaki, that a difference should be made between front, middle, and back lots. The rental for land demanded by the Japanese authorities does not appear unreasonable, and they assure my colleagues and myself that it is estimated on the actual value in the locality to Japanese. It is 10,875 mommé for one troboo, a troboo peing 6 feet square; which is little more than a tempo according to the present rate of exchange. In round numbers that would give for a square area of 100 troboo, that is, 600 square feet, a rent charge of 108¾ tempos, a little more than 6 itzebus, and as there are 4,840 square yards to an acre, unless I have made any mistake in the calculation, they offer you building ground at the rate of 144 itzebus, or, say, at the present rate of exchange, about 57 dollars per acre.* But as the front lots are undoubtedly more valuable than the middle or back lots, it would probably be fairer—as the Government demands for the whole area, as laid down on the plan before you, a sum equivalent to the rate specified—to fix different rentals for the different lots according to situation. Nothing, however, has been finally determined on this point yet, and I am quite ready to hear any opinions on the subject. The total amount paid for clearing the ground has been 10,211·66 dollars, of which 3,398·66 was raised by the sale of choice in lots, and the remainder has been advanced by the Government to be repaid without interest, as the remaining lots are taken up. I hope shortly now to see the streets according to the plan laid down, and all the lots acquired fenced in, when nothing stands in the way of the proprietors turning them to account, and building such accommodation as they require.

Finally, as to the security to life and property, which is the first and most essential condition to any development of trade. I appreciate the reserve the Committee have manifested in dealing with a subject which, if it has its special dangers and difficulties, has also its paramount interest; and if I am constrained in some degree to follow their example, I am sure you will believe it is from no indifference, either to your security or your natural desire for information. The steps recently taken by Her Majesty's Envoy, in concert with the Representatives of France, Prussia, and Holland, while it must satisfy you that he regards in the most serious light whatever menaces your security, is also a sufficient indication that he thought some considerable danger existed; or, at all events, that there was that in your position and of foreigners generally in Japan, which rendered it an imperative duty in him to take some decisive step. Whether this may prove successful and attain the objects he and his colleagues have in view, as fully or as promptly as I would fain hope, it is impossible, in the present state of pending negotiations, to say with any certainty. In the meantime his temporary removal here among you, is itself a security and a pledge of safety, for it lessens the danger of any attack, by increasing the responsibility of the Government, and it gives it, therefore, additional motives to prevent it. And when he leaves us, either to return to Yeddo or to proceed elsewhere, you may rest assured the security of your position here will equally occupy his attention. It was not his own personal security he came here to ensure, but the improvement of yours and our position generally in Japan; and, whatever steps he may feel called upon to take, I am authorized to assure you all, that they will be taken with due deliberation, having in view the equal necessity of averting by every means in his power any interruption to trade, or disaster to yourselves. I

* *Note by the Chairman.*—There was an error here; it was found later that the rate stated was per mensen and not per annum, thus multiplying the rate by 12 for the year, or, say 684 dollars per acre.

would only say in conclusion, that I am sure you will readily see the necessity of contributing to this end by avoiding to the utmost, all causes of quarrel or collision with the Japanese, either officials or others, and by abstaining from all unnecessary exposure in going about the Settlement after dark; with such precautions I trust this alarm of dangers menacing foreigners generally, will, like many preceding, pass over without more serious consequences, and that it may be with permanent advantage to our future relations.

After some desultory conversation on the subject of a church—no one having any further observations to make on the subject announced for discussion—the Consul concluded by suggesting the desirability of forming a committee to give effect to the wishes of the community regarding the erection of a church.

It was then proposed by Mr. S. Maine that Messrs. Ross, Clarke, Marshall, and Bell, with the Consul as Chairman, should form the Committee.

Mr. Bush seconded the motion.

Mr. Boyle thought the affairs of State should be finished before those of Church be introduced. He, therefore, proposed that the other topics touched on in the merchants' letter be discussed before this meeting. This motion finding no seconder fell to the ground.

Mr. Marshall proposed and Mr. Boyle seconded a vote of most cordial thanks to the Consul for the manner in which he had conducted the meeting, for the admirable statement he had made, and for the valuable information given upon all that concerned them.

The meeting was then dissolved.

(Signed) F. HOWARD VYSE,
Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul for Kanagawa.

No. 11.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 26.)

My Lord, *Yokohama, February* 23, 1861.

REFERRING to my despatch of the 31st ultimo, inclosing my official letter to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, communicating my reasons for withdrawing from Yeddo, I have the honour to inclose copy of their reply, and also my rejoinder.

Your Lordship will perceive that, without showing any impatience at the delay, I have simply proposed, in the event of a further indefinite time being required for their deliberations, to profit by the opportunity in the interval of inaction to visit the ports named in the Treaty to be opened hereafter, and such other places as may occur to me.

Determined to resort to no menace in order to bring the Council of the Tycoon to a more reasonable view of the obligations imposed upon them by Treaty, and yet feeling all the importance of obtaining a speedy and satisfactory solution of existing difficulties, it has appeared to M. de Bellecourt and myself, who now alone remain of the four Representatives originally agreeing to leave the capital, that the known reluctance of the Government to allow the enjoyment of the Treaty right of travelling in Japan, expressly reserved to the Heads of Missions, is likely to have all the effect of the strongest menace, in determining and quickening their movements, without any of its objections.

I confess I shall be much surprised if they allow us to take our departure without an effort to get us back to Yeddo in preference; and as we are quite prepared to meet any proposition to that effect in the most moderate and conciliatory spirit, only demanding a formal pledge on the part of the Tycoon and his Council of measures to insure greater general security, and a position for ourselves as foreign Representatives more consistent with the dignity and honour of our respective Sovereigns, I trust the result may be our speedy return. As I have taken steps, however, to secure the transmission of later despatches (which will also arrive earlier viâ Marseilles), I will not now enter further into the question of probabilities, which the few intervening days may resolve into certainties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

The Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Alcock.

(Translation.)

WE acknowledge the receipt of a despatch from your Excellency dated January 26.

We have understood your precise (decided) communication respecting the apprehension of the murderers of foreigners, and the neglectful conduct of the yaconins, as it has been hitherto.

As this also excites in us impatient sorrow, it is indispensable that every measure should be adopted to settle this. And this can only be properly done after repeated deliberation. However, as this is an important matter, the deliberation will require time, which, we fear, will of itself cause it to be postponed; therefore, we send your Excellency this answer at once (beforehand).

With respect and consideration, &c.

29th day, 12th month, first year of Mann Enn.

(Signed) KOODSIE YAMATONO KAMI.
ANDO TSOOSIMANO KAMI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Mr. Alcock to the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

Yokohama, February 13, 1861.

I HAVE received the letter of your Excellencies dated 9th February, in answer to mine of the 26th ultimo; I am glad to learn that you fully acknowledge the existence of grievous causes of complaint, and the necessity of adopting effective measures for their removal.

I cannot feel surprised that the Government should deem the subject of such grave importance as to require repeated deliberations, or complain that these necessarily occasion some delay in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. I would only observe, that indefinite delay is not without its dangers in the present critical posture of affairs. The exceptional position imposed upon the Representative of Great Britain, in common with many of his colleagues, cannot indeed continue much longer without risk of grave complications arising, injurious alike to Japan and the other Treaty Powers concerned. It is for your Excellencies, therefore, to judge what time is needful for the deliberations to which you refer, weighing well the possible consequences of a too protracted delay in bringing all the questions now pending to a satisfactory settlement. And I need hardly add, that the only settlement that can be accepted, as either permanent or satisfactory, must be such as shall permit foreign Representatives to resume their residence at Yeddo, not only free from actual danger, but equally from the perpetual menace of violence which has hitherto existed, until it constituted part of a system of intimidation and coercive restriction, not more derogatory to the Sovereign States they represent, than injurious to the credit and dignity of Japan as a nation.

Perfect immunity from every species of violence, insult, or intimidation, as well as from every kind of interference with his free action, is the right of every foreign Minister by Treaty. His further independence of all restrictive measures in regard to his dwelling and personal intercourse with subjects of Japan is not only most expressly provided for in the existing Treaties with the Tycoon, but it is a right common to all Diplomatic Agents, in whatever country they may be, universally recognized by the law of nations. This right, Government officials have long been permitted to violate with impunity; and this, no less than the outrages directed against the life or persons of foreign Representatives, must needs be amended by any measures it may be proposed to take.

As your Excellencies, however, fix no term for your deliberations, which may therefore be prolonged indefinitely, it is my purpose to employ this interval, during which no satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at, by travelling through the country, visiting all the ports, and more especially those on the east and

west coasts, the opening of which according to Treaty the Japanese Government desires to defer. After personal observation I shall be better enabled to decide what advice should be tendered to Her Majesty's Government on this question, in connection with our relations with the Government and people of Japan generally. When your Excellencies have concluded your deliberations, and are prepared to bring all pending questions to a satisfactory termination, should I not already have returned, you can let me know by courier.

To prevent any difficulty or possible misunderstanding on the part of the local authorities at the different places I may visit by sea or land, it would probably be well that you should order Matabé, the official interpreter you have attached to the British Legation, to accompany me for the purpose of explaining to all whom it may concern, my rank, and the right of travel throughout the Empire which by Treaty is secured to the head of a Mission. Nor would it be amiss, I conceive, with the same view of preventing any obstruction to such Treaty right by ignorance, if your Excellencies sent a general circular throughout the Empire, directing proper facilities and courtesy to be shown, and further inclosing me a certified copy, that it may be communicated to any authority or Daimio with whom it may be necessary or desirable to communicate.

I purpose embarking shortly on board one of Her Majesty's ships of war, and in the first instance I shall proceed to Hiogo; and I have to request therefore that a competent pilot may be immediately ordered.

If your Excellencies see fit to direct Matabé to join me here, I will take care he is properly accommodated in the same ship. It will not be convenient, however, to provide accommodation for any other Japanese officer, either ometsy or yaconin, and I must therefore decline receiving any such officer.

With respect and consideration,

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 12.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 26.)

My Lord, *Yokohama, March* 1, 1861.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 23rd ultimo, inclosing copies of my correspondence with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Yeddo, I have now the satisfaction of stating that I believe this is the last despatch I shall have to address from Yokohama.

An Envoy from the Tycoon, Sakai Wo-okionoski, the same I had originally suggested, was sent down from Yeddo on the 21st of February, to communicate with M. de Bellecourt and myself, and, as will be seen by what followed, to enter into such arrangements as might be found necessary to insure our return to the capital, and induce us, for the present at least, to abandon our expressed intention of visiting different parts of Japan, in virtue of the Treaty right secured to the Legations. This, your Lordship will remember, is exactly what I had anticipated would be the result of our communication to the Ministers, announcing our intentions, in reply to their vague and dilatory action.

The inclosed documents will suffice to put Her Majesty's Government in full possession of all the leading circumstances of the negotiations for our return which followed; beginning with our conferences with the Japanese Plenipotentiary held at Yokohama on the 21st and 22nd of February (Minutes of which are numbered 1 and 2), and ending with a final conference on the 27th, at which it was arranged a formal invitation, in the name of the Tycoon, should be sent in writing to M. de Bellecourt and myself, inviting our return to the capital under the conditions set forth in the Minute of the first conference. An official communication of the Ministers, of the 26th of February, was received in the interval.

This final acceptance and invitation (No. 4) was duly received to-day, as agreed, and to-morrow we shall embark on board Her Majesty's ships "Encounter" and "Pioneer," the Chargé d'Affaires having, at my request, had the latter placed at his disposal for the day, in the absence of any French vessel able to convey him back to the capital.

I have announced to Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Kanagawa my purpose

of returning, in a despatch (No. 5) which he will circulate for the information of the community.

It seems only necessary to observe, passing the several steps of the negotiation and the inclosed documents in review, that several important results have been attained, and many more have been traced out, which it may require time and further effort to secure in a practical shape, especially as relates to the position of the foreign community and the interests of trade at Yokohama. These, however, have been so distinctly specified and discussed on the spot, that they may be considered in a fair way for ultimate accomplishment.

The principal of these may be shortly enumerated. In the preamble to the Minute of the first Conference, care was taken to place on record certain important facts serving as a basis for the whole negotiation :—

1. The temporary withdrawal of the foreign Representatives, to avert danger to existing relations, and in order to give the Tycoon and his Council of State time to adopt measures on their side.

2. The recognition, on the part of the Tycoon and the Great Council, of just causes of complaint; their regret at the exceptional state of affairs resulting; and their desire to put a term to it, by the return of myself and colleagues to the capital.

Then follows the conditions of their return; the first consisting of a formal pledge of the Tycoon, by and with his Council of State, to provide effectually hereafter for the security of the Legations, and their exemption alike from violence and menace, and, under this assurance, his invitation to resume their posts.

The other conditions were matter of detail, to give effect to the first; the last being the public recognition, on the part of the Government, of the return of the foreign Representatives, who had left under menace of violence and insult, under circumstances wholly different in character, and with marks of respect to the national flags, by a hitherto unused distinction of a Royal salute at the moment they were hoisted.

This last public homage and mark of respect, I had rightly anticipated, was that which would cost the most to secure; but finding it impossible to secure our return without this concession, it was finally agreed to.

Under these circumstances, it appeared to me, as to my colleague, that the objects for which we had accepted so many sacrifices and such grave responsibility would be fully attained by our return. The false position in which foreign Representatives had been placed by the Japanese Government perpetually warning them, and through them all their countrymen, of danger and threats of massacre, under a practical disclaimer of their responsibility, or, at all events, of their power to prevent either the one or the other, would cease. Their position would not, on the face of it, be one utterly derogatory to the nations they represented; life, either their own or that of their countrymen at the ports, might not in effect be perfectly secured: this, in the present state of the country and its Government, might be unattainable, but there could be little doubt that a great step towards that end would have been made. Lastly, various manœuvres and devices, designed apparently to lower the foreign Representatives in the eyes of the people, and to restrict them from all free communication, were formally repudiated; and the maintenance of those existing, or the creation of new expedients to the same end, if not rendered impossible, would certainly be made more difficult.

The second Conference was entirely taken up with considering the grievances and position of foreigners at the great trading port in the immediate vicinity of the capital, and which was in some sense made to share the peculiar dangers and disadvantages attending the close vicinity to the centre of Government, and sources of hostility or disaffection either to the Government or the policy they were ostensibly pledged to carry out in their relation with foreign Powers. Having profited by the opportunity my temporary residence at Yokohama gave me to inform myself fully, both by observation and a reference to the merchants called upon by the Consul to come forward and freely state all their grievances, and in what direction they thought a practical remedy could be found with increased facilities, I was fully prepared to enter at length into the subject, and to insist upon many important measures, involving both principle and detail. The bases there laid down will serve me now for a programme, to be worked out step by step, until the whole of the measures proposed shall have been adopted.

In the meantime the removal of the Consuls to the Yokohama side, an object long desired by the Japanese, has been conceded, on the only condition I have ever consented to entertain the project, namely, that the Consul should have a site on the bluff or hill-side beyond the settlement and the canal boundary they had made to circumscribe foreigners and isolate them. There is thus an effective innovation on the stereotyped "Decima" policy of this Government.

While engaged in these negotiations Mr. Harris wrote to advise his colleagues that the bluff had, in our absence, and at his request, been given up for the residence of all foreigners. On communicating this to the Envoy and the Governor, in M. de Bellecourt's presence, they declared that no such arrangement had, to their knowledge, been entered into. Mr. Harris has since seen the Ministers, and, I believe, obtained some further assurances, more or less to the purpose; but be this as it may (and it is indeed of no great importance), it is already distinctly understood, as the result of our negotiations, that the Consuls shall immediately have sites on the hills, and hereafter, if room be wanted, the merchants.

I will not take up your Lordship's time by referring, in detail, to the many difficulties which it has been necessary to overcome before these negotiations were fairly begun, and with a view, indeed, to their initiation, nor to those which, at each step, have subsequently been experienced. Still less need I dwell upon the anxiety of my position, or sacrifices of personal convenience and property, which are the unavoidable conditions of the hasty withdrawal of a large establishment and its precipitate reinstalment between two places of residence in the East. I am better pleased to inform you that we have all borne our share cheerfully in view of the political necessity and the public interests engaged; and if mine has been necessarily the largest, whether as regards damage to effects or responsibility, I am well repaid in the satisfactory nature of the result; and had it been necessary to sacrifice all the property and household goods I possessed in Japan, your Lordship will feel, I trust, assured that I should not have hesitated with such objects before me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Minute of a Conference held at Yokohama, February 21, 1861, *between Messrs. Alcock and De Bellecourt, and Sakai Okionoské, Envoy of the Tycoon.*

THE Undersigned, the Representatives of Great Britain and France, having temporarily quitted Yeddo under menace of violence, in order to avert serious danger to the relations hitherto existing between their respective countries and Japan, and to give the Tycoon and his Council of State time to adopt measures due to the position of Diplomatic Agents, for their security from every kind of violence or insult; and the Tycoon and Gorogio on their part, seeing cause to regret the necessity for this step and the continued absence of the said Representatives of two Western Powers with which he has friendly Treaty relations, having sent Sakai Okionoské, member of the Second Conncil, to confer with Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and His Imperial Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the best means of putting a term to this exceptional state by their return to the Legations in Yeddo, it has been agreed and determined that:—

The Tycoon, by and with his Council of State, formally engages to provide effectively for their security, together with that of the members of their respective Legations, and their exemption alike from menace and violence; and under this assurance invites them to return.

In reference to the assurance conveyed in this formal pledge, the means to be taken have been further specified, to consist principally in the following measures:—

The former escorts of mounted yaconins having proved inefficient and inadequate to the end proposed, the foreign Representatives will in future be accompanied, with their own free consent distinctly understood, by mounted guards chosen from those of the Tycoon's troops who can be best depended upon for loyalty and courage. They will comport themselves with the same scrupulous

regard. in every respect, to the dignity and rank of a foreign Minister that they observe towards Japanese of similar rank; and any complaint of failure in this respect will be instantly redressed by the removal of the party offending, and such other steps as may be deemed fitting by their own authorities. They will have the most peremptory and explicit orders to permit no two-sworded officer or other person to insult by offensive word or jest, and still less by violence, any member of the Legations placed under their safeguard; but in the event of any such offence being suddenly committed under their eyes, they will take determined steps to arrest the offenders, either themselves or by the aid of police in the nearest stations.

The better to aid in this object, police-stations shall be established within certain reasonable distances, wherever they do not already exist, throughout the city, in which able and courageous men shall be placed, with the most explicit orders, on the first appeal or signal that a foreigner is in danger or insulted, to proceed without delay to the spot and endeavour to arrest the party offending. And these police-stations shall each have a number in plain letters painted on the front that they may be certainly recognized, and in order that complaint, if unfortunately necessary, may be made with certainty and effect. But it is clearly understood that if this mounted escort consisting of a portion of the Tycoon's bodyguard should not answer the purpose, the foreign Representatives have resolved to provide themselves with escorts of their own countrymen.

As the personal security of the members of the several Legations has been much prejudiced by the habitual want of respect and the undue familiarity of the yaconins and other officials attached to the Legations, nominally for the protection and honour of the respective Ministers, but in reality, as it has proved, only for purposes of surveillance and unauthorised interference in violation of the perfect freedom and independence which is the first right of a Diplomatic Agent, extending to every individual, high or low, in his establishment; and seeing that the Ministers and their officers have been greatly lowered in public estimation by the people perceiving how they were treated by the Tycoon's officials rather as prisoners of State subject to the control of said subordinates than as high dignitaries who are really subject to no Japanese control or jurisdiction whatever, have thought they might insult or outrage them without fear; it is distinctly agreed that all this system of disrespect and interference shall be put an end to, and that a short set of instructions, the substance of which is appended, shall be placed in the hall of each of the Legations signed by the proper authorities for the guidance of the yaconins.

And it is also clearly understoed that the dwellings of the said yaconins are no more to be within the precincts of the Legations, and that at the French Chargé d'Affaires' Legation all the temporary buildings for the yaconins are to be removed out of the courtyard, and not one to be left standing, and this is to be done before the return of M. de Bellecourt.

The vigorous prosecution of measures for the discovery and arrest of all who have been hitherto or may hereafter be guilty of attacking or murdering foreigners is distinctly pledged, and especially in the case of Mr. Heusken strenuous efforts shall be employed to arrest the murderers.

Finally, as it is generally known that the Representatives aforesaid left Yeddo under menace of assassination derogatory to their position, and their departure has further tended to unsettle the public mind, it is essential, in the interest of good order and harmony, that the return of the Ministers at the invitation of the Tycoon and Gorogio should be equally generally known, and be marked by circumstances calculated to restore them in the eyes of the people to the position of honour and respect which is their due, and show that they return not as simple individuals, but as the Ministers of two Treaty Powers under the especial safeguard of the Tycoon and his Government; it has further been determined and agreed that on the disembarkation of the two Ministers they shall be received at the landing-place by the Governors of Foreign Affairs, two of whom will accompany each to their Legation, and at the moment the flags are hoisted at the British and French Legations, at a preconcerted signal a Royal salute of twenty-one guns shall be fired from the batteries for each, and this salute will be returned from one of the ships of war, British or French, at the anchorage, the Japanese flag being hoisted at the main while the salute is being fired in token of the reciprocal feeling of amity and good understanding. thus happily re-established.

It has been agreed that an official letter from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs recapitulating and assenting to these propositions, and requesting the Ministers in the name of the Tycoon to return to Yeddo, shall be delivered at Yokohama within six days from the 23rd instant, that day being included, in which case the Ministers will be prepared at once to resume their post at Yeddo.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, *Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.*
DU CHESNE DE BELLECOURT, *His Imperial Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General.*

February 22, 1861.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

Substance of Instructions for the guidance of the Yaconins.

DECLARING their duty to be to protect and do honour to the Ministers by being on the spot to carry out their wishes.

Prohibiting their entrance within the Legation unless sent for.

Prohibiting their interference in any way unauthorised by the Minister himself, either with the servants of the Legation or the free entrance and exit of any Japanese, whatever his rank or calling.

Prohibiting their exacting any kind of fee or bribe from tradesmen selling goods at the Legation, or dictating to them the prices they should charge.

And the dismissal of the party infringing any one of these rules on the simple representation of the Minister shall follow inevitably and without delay.

Inclosure 3 in No. 12.

Minute of a Conference held at Yokohama, February 22, 1861, *between Messrs. Alcock and De Bellecourt, and Sakai Okionoské.*

THE foreign Representatives began by stating that, at the Conference yesterday, they spoke only of Yeddo, the want of security there, and the conditions essential to their return.

To-day they had to consider what was required for the security of the community at Yokohama and the Settlement, one of the principal objects of the steps lately taken on their part, and the consideration of various matters affecting its condition and the commerce of the place.

There was much to be done. Some things which required outlay and would entail expense; others only required better system. But as regarded expense, it was to be borne in mind that the trade returns just completed for the year ending December 31, 1860, showed the Japanese Government had received in that period nearly 200,000 kobangs in Custom-house duties from the foreign merchant; they were bound, therefore, to keep an efficient establishment both for the transaction of Custom-house business, and the maintenance of order and security outside; to make bridges, wharves, and jetties, and meet generally in an efficient manner all the requirements of the place, which properly devolved upon them as a Government.

1. *Locality, Extension of Land, &c.*—Among the things immediately required to place the Settlement in a proper state as to security, salubrity, and facilities for the prosecution of trade, the following were specified as the principal:—

Measures for the drainage of the Settlement, in connection with the building of a bund along the whole of the old and new concession, not less than 50 feet wide, to form a main road along the sea-beach, and three substantial jetties, one additional in the old site, and two new ones between that and the canal. Also two bridges across the said canal in a line with the main roads of the Settlement, not less than 25 feet in width.

The bluff stretching towards Treaty Point on the other side of the canal, it

was stated, afforded the only fitting and convenient site for dwelling-houses, and for residences for the Consuls, if these were ever to take up their residences at Yokohama. Additional sites must, therefore, be allotted there. The foreign Representatives present had been officially informed by the Minister of the United States of America that on the 8th instant Simma Boozen no Kami had been sent to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to say that, although too much occupied at the closing of the year to write an answer to the American Minister's request, he, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, consented to the extension of the Yokohama site over the hills, only it would be impossible for the Government to give the same effectual protection to those who might build on the hill as was now given at Yokohama. Sakai Okionoské replied that he had heard of no such arrangement, and Matsudaira Iwamino Kami, the Governor of Yokohama, declared he was equally in ignorance of such contemplated extension, and was wholly without instructions. He could, therefore, take no action without specific orders from Yeddo on the subject.

2. *Police, &c.*—There were other matters of police to be taken into consideration in connection with the obligations of the Japanese Government and the Treaty rights of foreigners.

It is expressly provided by Article III of the Treaty with Great Britain, and Article III of the Treaty with France, that at the place where the respective subjects of each country should be located at the several ports, "no wall, gate, or fence should be erected, or anything done which may prevent a free egress or ingress to the same."

Nothing could be more plain or explicit. It was unquestionable, therefore, that no barriers, walls, fences, or fortifications could be erected round the site occupied by British or French subjects without a flagrant breach of Treaty, save by and with the clear and explicit consent of all the Contracting Parties. Certain barriers, &c., had however been erected at Yokohama, on the plea that these were necessary for the protection of foreigners during an exceptional period of danger, and the foreign Representatives had given a conditional assent, that is to say, they did not oppose them, provided they were only provisional to meet an exceptional state of affairs, and were only erected at such points and under such conditions as to the opening and shutting of gates, &c., as they, the foreign Representatives, from time to time should fully approve.

It was now time to see what had been done in this direction, and how far they could be consenting parties to the whole.

In the first place, now the location had been extended, there was a barrier dividing the French from the rest, which not only had no longer any meaning or use, but was, further, a source of annoyance, impeding free communication, and it, therefore, must be immediately removed.

In the second place, keeping in view their Treaty rights, the foreign Representatives then present could not consent to any watch-house or police-station, gate or barrier, being within the limits of the concession to foreigners, upon any plea or pretext whatever. If the Japanese Government entered into an obligation to erect none round the quarter assigned to foreigners, still more were they bound to erect none such within the limits. If any such existed, therefore, they begged they might be forthwith removed. Within the Foreign Settlement, foreigners would take care of themselves; and at the barriers, which for a time it might by common consent be deemed expedient to retain surrounding the Settlement, the foreigners would in like manner, provide watchmen and porters at the gates, who alone should have any voice as to either the ingress or egress of any foreigner. And as regards the ingress or egress of Japanese, some understanding must be come to between the Consuls and Governor as to the orders to be given, and the measures to be taken for the security of the whole, the prevention of crime or disorder, and the avoidance of unnecessary interference.

But there were certain measures which the British and French Representatives desired to suggest, and were disposed strongly to urge as of primary importance for general security in reference to the police generally:—

1. That the Government should adopt a distinguishing mark easily recognizable by foreigners, to be conspicuously stamped or embroidered on the dress of every Government officer employed, or to be employed at any time at Yokohama. And these alone should be authorized to carry out any orders in which foreigners were concerned.

2. That those whose duty it should be to watch over the security of the Settlement, maintain order, &c., should always be in sufficient force for that end.

3. That no armed man should be allowed to enter the foreign limits, unless he were the bearer of a pass from the Governor.

4. That the Japanese Government should take into consideration the expediency of carrying out some general measure for preventing two-sworded men entering with their arms the Japanese Settlement.

If these measures were satisfactorily carried out, the foreign Representatives of France and Great Britain would then be prepared to consider the means of authorizing the arrest, by such easily distinguished police officer, of any British or French subject committing a breach of the peace, or otherwise offending against the laws. But as the laws of Japan were not specified as those obligatory upon foreigners, who are placed under the protection of their own, and the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective authorities, they can only be made subject to any Japanese laws the objects of which are not already attained by the laws of Western States, by special enactments. Western laws are, however, held to cover all the ground required for the maintenance of good order and social right, and probably may be found sufficient. If otherwise, it must be previously agreed upon by the Japanese authorities and foreign Representatives what laws of Japan, if any, might, for the maintenance of peace and good order, with propriety be enforced on foreigners, not otherwise subject to them by Treaty. The same must then be clearly notified by their respective authorities for general information, one month before they come into operation.

3. *Custom-house.*—In the administration of the Customs there appeared to be a great want of alertness in the officials, and of system. There was a general complaint on this head among the merchants, who suffered grave prejudice. They complained more especially of the constant change of officers, by which everything is continually thrown into confusion; and they have to deal with officials who know nothing of their business, for the moment one begins to know something of it he is sent elsewhere. This was a great grievance, which ought to be remedied without delay.

Either more interpreters are required, or they should be better distributed. It was complained that only one was to be found in the outer room, where merchants come with applications for permits; and they sometimes have to wait several hours before the translation was made, and the permit could be obtained. Moreover that a proper order was not observed, as some are more favoured than others. Every one should receive his permit according to priority of application, without favour or partiality; and there should be at least two interpreters to attend to this part of the business.

Another grievance consisted in the general interference of Government officials, to the prejudice of all trading transactions. They not only did not afford the facilities which by Treaty the Government was bound to give, but they created obstructions wholly contrary both to its letter and spirit—first, by small guard or watch-houses scattered everywhere, and especially at the back of the Custom-house, for the express purpose of making inquisitorial and unjustifiable examinations of the native dealers as to what they had sold to foreigners, what quantities, at what prices, &c., with which it was maintained the Government had no business whatever. They moreover subject the goods to an examination, to the great inconvenience of the merchants, without just cause, since all goods had to be taken to the examination-house before shipped, and ought only to be examined once.

Another vexation consisted in the delay which took place before the goods were examined. It was proposed in future that when goods were taken to be examined, while the permit was being made out, the examination should take place at once, and their transfer to a boat be allowed, there to wait until the permit was received.

There were obviously great abuses and deficiencies in the whole system of boat management. In the first place, the Government could by Treaty claim no right of monopoly in cargo or passage-boats. By Treaty every foreigner had the clear and undoubted right to hire labour of any kind, when and where he chose, without Government interference. If, therefore, with the consent of the foreign Representatives (and it could not be without this), boats for the loading and unloading of ships were placed under some kind of superintendence, the

better to ensure regularity, it was an essential condition that there should be a larger number of boats, such a number, indeed, as the requirements of the trade might render necessary; and if merchants were to be restricted to these it must be according to certain established rules to be observed on both sides, and at a fixed rate or tariff of prices.

But there was not only interference of an arbitrary and vexatious kind with cargo-boats, but even passage-boats, so that no foreign resident could obtain one without a permission from some Government official. This was an intolerable interference with the liberty of the subject as secured by Treaty, and must immediately cease. Within ten *re* of Kanagawa foreigners were at perfect liberty to go, by land or by water, to any place within that distance, without communication with the Government officers, and equally without permission asked or obtained of any one; in a word, without question, let, or hindrance.

It must be distinctly understood, therefore, that the foreign Representatives now acting would not tolerate, or in any sense submit to, such a flagrant and vexatious violation of clear and specific Treaty rights. Far from this, it was the bounden duty of the local authorities to take care that foreigners were subjected to no injury by the extortions or caprices of the Japanese boatmen. A certain number should be always ready for hire, and at a fixed tariff, publicly advertised, and any well-founded complaint of refusal or exaction made to the Japanese authorities should lead to their immediate punishment. They may be ordered, under no circumstances, to convey foreigners in any direction beyond the ten *re*, but no other restriction on the freedom of the foreigner could be sanctioned. It was stipulated by Treaty that British and French subjects alike should be free to go where they pleased within those limits, and no interference with this right could or should be permitted.

A similar grievance and complaint existed as regarded the hire of labour generally at Kanagawa and Yokohama.

Article VIII of the British Treaty with Japan says: "The Japanese Government will place no restrictions whatever upon the employment, by British subjects, of Japanese in any lawful capacity." By what right, then, could the Japanese Government impose the obligation on foreigners of applying for permission to some superintendent of coolies, and leave them, at the same time, entirely at the mercy of this said master of coolies as to the number, the time, and the rate of remuneration? This was a flagrant abuse, and must be at once corrected. Either foreigners must be left free to provide themselves with labour, and make their own terms, or, if it could be shown, to the satisfaction of the foreign Representatives, that some system and arrangement would be better in the interest of all parties, then the organization of coolie labour must be conducted under such regulations as to the facilities to be afforded every merchant, and the rate of remuneration, as should no longer leave room for vexatious interference or extortion, and these regulations must first be fully approved by the said Representatives.

Complaints have been also frequent of the non-fulfilment of contracts, and the impossibility of obtaining any redress. Latterly, however, much has been done by the present Governor Matsudaira to remove such causes of complaint. It only seemed necessary, therefore, to observe that it was the undoubted duty of the Japanese Government, under existing Treaties, to take measures, when appealed to by a foreign Consul, for the enforcement of all legal contracts between a foreigner and a native dealer, as it was equally the duty of foreign authorities to do justice if any Japanese complain of failure of contract or engagement on the part of a foreigner.

Formerly there were complaints, also, of the illegal detention of goods at the Custom-house. This grievance, however, had also ceased under the present Governor, and it was now distinctly understood that, while a seizure of goods under charge of fraud or smuggling might be made by the Custom-house, they could not be confiscated, except by a judgment given on evidence and the merits of the case by the Consul, and that no detention of goods beyond the time necessary for the case to be brought before the Consul, and judgment given, could be justified. If the judgment were for confiscation, all claim to them ceased on the part of the foreigner; if on the contrary, they must at once be given up to their owner.

In connection with obstructions to trade, and the measures necessary to give greater freedom and facilities in accordance with Treaties, it was impossible to

overlook the currency. By existing Treaties the Japanese Government had agreed that all foreign coin should be current in Japan, and should pass for its corresponding weight in Japanese coin of the same description. It was scarcely necessary to remark that no foreign coin had yet been made current on these conditions. Sakai Okionoské observed that the Government had desired to give full effect to this stipulation, and to that end had taken all the steps they thought best calculated to lead to the desired result. An edict had been promulgated throughout the Empire, declaring all foreign coin a legal tender at the rate specified. They had, furthermore, stamped a certain number of dollars with a Government stamp of value that all Japanese might recognize it. What further measures could be taken remained to be considered.

In this the Representatives acquiesced, observing, however, that the obligation on the Japanese Government still continued to give effect to the Treaty stipulations on this head.

Under the three heads of—1. Extension of land and facilities for trade; 2. Police regulations, and arrangements for security, and the maintenance of order; 3. Custom-house administration, and the facilities for trade required under it;—the whole of the measures at this time necessary having thus been explained in detail it was agreed by the foreign Representatives present, and Sakai Okionoské, that the whole should be reduced to writing, to be submitted to the Government at Yeddo for deliberation, and that the necessary steps might be taken for the removal of all grievances and just causes of complaint upon these bases.

In accordance with this understanding the above Minute has been duly prepared, and is now forwarded to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, *Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.*
DU CHESNE DE BELLECOURT, *His Imperial Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General.*

February 28, 1861.

Inclosure 4 in No. 12.

The Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Alcock.

Translation.)

AT the interview of Sakai Wookionoské with you and the Chargé d'Affaires of France on the 22nd of February, at Yokohama, you gave a proof of your upright heart in consenting to return to the capital out of friendship for us; and we have very well understood the different propositions you made in writing, as being desirable for changes to be made for the future.

With reference to this subject we also wish to make some changes in order to set your mind at ease; therefore, the matter will be settled according to your demand (wish), but, considering that the means for carrying out these measures ought to be adopted with caution, owing to the difference of our customs and habits, we have again sent Wookionoské to you to testify our friendly feeling, and to deliberate (discuss) with sufficiency on the desired proposals.

There is, however, no objection to your proposals, but it is not unlikely that a different way of carrying out these measures may be a means of re-assuring the public mind, although our intentions are the same, and it is for this very reason that we have again sent Wookionoské to discuss with you.

As this is properly the foundation of the everlasting and imperishable friendship between your country and ours it ought to be carefully settled: this is quite clear, and unnecessary to waste any more words to explain; therefore, it is desirable that you should take the Tycoon's intention and ours into consideration, discuss the matter maturely, and settle all for the benefit of both parties.

With respect and consideration.

17th day of the 1st month of the 2nd year of Mann Enn (February 26, 1861).

(Signed) KOODJI YAMATONO KAMI.
ANDO TSOESIMANO KAMI.

Inclosure 5 in No. 12.

The Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Alcock.

(Translation.)

WE hereby have to make a communication to your Excellency.

We have received the Minute of the Conference held at Yokohama on the 12th instant (21st February), between you and the French Chargé d'Affaires and Sakai Wookionoské, and have accepted the proposals contained therein. The matter will, therefore, be arranged as was subsequently communieated to you by us.

Finally, we earnestly desire you, even in the name of His Majesty the Tycoon, to return to this capital, which we, have to propose with respect and consideration.

19th day, 1st month, 2nd year of Mann Enn (28th February, 1861).

(Signed) KOODJI YAMATONO KAMI.
ANDO TSOESIMANO KAMI.

Inclosure 6 in No. 12.

Mr. Alcock to Acting Consul Vyse.

Sir, *Yokohama, March* 1, 1861.

IN my despatch of the 25th of January, I informed you of my withdrawal from Yeddo, and my reasons for this important step. I am now about to return, at the earnest desire of the Great Council of State, who invite me, in the name of the Tycoon, again to take up my residence in the capital; and I have every reason to believe that return will be under circumstances much more favourable to the maintenance of friendly relations, and the security of life, than those which existed for a long time previous to my departure with my colleagues. The chief object I had in view has thus been attained, and in a shorter period than I could have fairly hoped. Perfect security may, indeed, be more than the Government of this country, as it is at present, can undertake to insure; but it is enough that the Council of State, acting on the behalf and in the name of the Tycoon, should formally acknowledge their responsibility, and pledge themselves to take all such steps as may best accomplish that end. This they have done in clear and explicit terms; at once adopting those measures which I, in common with my colleague the French Chargé d'Affaires, thought it my duty to suggest as primarily needful.

As regards the community at Yokokama therefore, and their safety, I feel in a great degree, reassured. And I leave to-morrow not only without anxiety, but, after a month's residence among them, with a fuller knowledge than perhaps could otherwise have been obtained of their wants, and the obstructions to trade at the port. These have already been very fully discussed with Sakai Wookionoské, the Member of the Second Council sent down from Yeddo as the Tycoon's Envoy, in the presence of the Governor, Matsudairo no Kami, and yourself; and the bases laid down in that Conference, if they can be carried out, will, I have no doubt, go far to remove all real grievances, and effectually protect the interests of our merchants. It will be my business in Yeddo, when in direct communication with the Ministers, to promote this object; and I trust, at no distant period, some practical benefit may be experienced. And in the meantime you may assure the British residents at Yokohama that I return to the capital with increased interest in all that may relate to their well-being and the prosperity of the port, in which their own is involved.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 13.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 26.)

My Lord, *Yeddo, March* 2, 1861.

I AM happy to be able to report that I have returned to Yeddo under conditions that promise the realizing of the principal objects which, in common with my colleagues of France, Holland, and Prussia, I had in view, when deciding on the necessity of a temporary withdrawal.

I came up from Yokohama to-day, in Her Majesty's ship "Encounter," and hoisted my flag at the British Legation, under a Royal salute from the Japanese batteries, as previously agreed upon. M. de Bellecourt arrived at the same time in Her Majesty's ship "Pioneer," there being no French ship of war on the spot capable of furnishing him the means of transport, the "Dordogne," the only one in port, having been nearly wrecked on her way here, and being unfit to move.

We were both received on the landing-place by the Governors for Foreign Affairs, with a large cortège of officers, and each was conducted to his respective Legation in state. As we passed the gates the flags were hoisted and the salutes from the batteries were fired.

The programme laid down in previous conferences with the Envoy of the Tycoon, dispatched to us at Yokohama, was thus faithfully carried out; and the salutes were returned by Her Majesty's ships "Encounter" and "Pioneer." As soon as I had reached the Legation, a Governor for Foreign Affairs arrived on the part of the Tycoon, to convey his congratulations and express his satisfaction at my arrival.

The objects contended for in the first instance, your Lordship is aware from my previous despatches, were of such paramount importance that whatever risks and sacrifices might attend the struggle for their attainment, we felt bound to accept them. There is the more satisfaction, therefore, that within a month (to a day) of our departure, when all looked so unpromising and doubtful, and it was confidently predicted by the only foreign Representative who adopted a different policy and remained behind, that we should never be allowed to return—the flags of Great Britain and France again float over the Legations, receiving for the first time in the history of our relations with the Japanese a Royal salute. In truth this, of all the conditions insisted upon by my colleague and myself, was the one most reluctantly conceded, as being contrary to their usages and never done before, although urged upon them by myself when the ratifications of the Treaty were exchanged on my arrival, and again twice subsequently by Mr. Harris, on the part of the United States, when the Japanese Embassy embarked on board the American frigate, and also on its return in another ship of war of the United States. Not only has this outward manifestation of respect to the national flags of foreign Powers been secured, but the Representatives who left the capital, refusing to accept a position of tolerance and humiliation, subject to perpetual insult and menace of assassination which the Government did nothing effective to prevent, also refused to return, save at the express invitation of the Tycoon, and under a formal pledge of his responsibility for the future security of the lives of all foreigners, and freedom from violence.

Finally, it is to me, as I am sure it will be to Her Majesty's Government, peculiarly a source of satisfaction that these important results have all been effected without once resorting to any menaces, either by the presence of a fleet, or the intimation that force under any circumstances was contemplated. Thus the very ground on which Mr. Harris based his whole course of action, charging all his colleagues with inevitably provoking a collision and bringing all the horrors of war and rapine on the country, have been signally refuted by the result.

Having, however, declined continuing a correspondence with the United States' Minister, which I considered as profitless as it promised to be endless, I have contented myself with simply announcing in a short letter, copy of which is inclosed, the return, under satisfactory conditions, of such of his collegues as were on the spot, and left him to draw his own infrences as to the correctness of the conclusions which in the beginning, and three weeks subsequently, he so warmly asserted and defended.

I cannot conclude without calling your Lordship's attention to the hearty, willing, and most effective aid received throughout this trying period from the senior naval officer here, Captain Dew, of Her Majesty's ship "Encounter." I esteem myself especially fortunate in having such co-operation, and my former relations with Captain Dew in China, in equally critical circumstances, have been most agreeably renewed here, with undoubted advantage to the public interests.

I had requested Captain Dew to keep Her Majesty's ship "Roebuck," in anticipation of my return to Yeddo, so that Her Majesty's Government might receive by the 15th March mail from Hong Kong the earliest intelligence. This I hope will have been secured, and although necessarily brief from the necessity of closing the mail immediately on my return, and in the midst of all the confusion of a reinstallation in a half-emptied house, the information now conveyed will suffice to relieve your Lordship's mind of any anxiety as to the end.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Mr. Alcock to Mr. Harris.

Sir, *Yeddo, March 2,* 1861.

HAVING announced to you my departure from Yeddo a month ago, under circumstances fully known to you, I have now the honour to inform you of my return, in accordance with the earnestly-expressed desire of the Ministers, writing in the name of the Tycoon.

I have only further to add, that my colleague the Chargé d'Affaires of France and myself come back under conditions previously arranged with Sakai Wookionoské, a member of the Second Council, sent to Yokohama as an Envoy of the Tycoon's to that end.

These conditions appearing to us fully to realize the objects we had originally in view in withdrawing from the capital, we have readily, without hesitation, acceded to the desire of the Tycoon and the Gorogio to return without further delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 14.

Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 26.)

(Extract.) *Yeddo, March 3,* 1861.

I FORWARD, with considerable satisfaction, in reference to the liberal arrangements your Lordship has been pleased to adopt, at my suggestion, for the greater efficiency of the establishment in Japan, the inclosed returns of the trade of Yokohama, together with a report from Her Majesty's Acting Consul.

It will be seen that this port has more than realized the most sanguine anticipations as to the amount of trade, despite many concurrent circumstances, political and commercial, adverse to its development. The amount of trade, indeed, far exceeds that which marked the unprecedented and rapid rise of Shanghae in its origin as a place of foreign trade. And although it is not to be expected that silk and tea will ever be shipped from this Japanese port to the same vast amount as from Shanghae in recent years, it is still encouraging to know that the first eighteen months the returns of the year show more than 1,000,000*l.* in exports, and more than Shanghae could boast as indication of its future greatness. The progress of the trade and the obstacles against which it has had to struggle, both in the commercial suspension at Shanghae, owing to insurrection and war, and the persistent efforts at restriction in this country on the part of Government officials, are so well and succinctly stated in Captain

Vyse's report, that it seems unnecessary to offer any recapitulation here of the chief points.

I would only remark, by way of comment, that there is no doubt whatever two of the principal disadvantages enumerated, the stoppage of exports to China and the currency here, have been anything but unmixed evils. They have both materially tended to develop, if not to force, an import trade which would hardly have otherwise existed in cottons and camlets, and other manufactured goods.

The want of a regular mail service between Japan and Europe, *vid* China, of a bank for European and American credits, and of the free circulation of a dollar or other foreign coin currency, are the three desiderata most insisted upon; to which may, perhaps, be added, as of scarce inferior importance, a good survey of the coasts of Japan, especially the eastern, for which I have already obtained the full consent of the Government here.

A stormy and unsurveyed coast are terrible obstacles to the navigation between the ports and the development of trade.

I will only further remark, in conclusion, that besides the absolute amount of trade, Great Britain has reason to be proud of the share which has fallen to her in the active competition of rival nations. The predominance of her commerce in the Eastern Seas was never better exemplified than in this neutral territory, where no exclusive advantage can be claimed by any from political Conventions. Of 103 merchant-ships, of all nations, of 40,905 tons, 52 were British, of 21,724 tons, something over one-half. British trade paid 30,000*l.* import duties against 24,000*l.* received for that of all other nations; so of the declared value of the trade. The comparison of the export trade is still more in our favour. Although America possesses peculiar facilities for a direct trade with Japan, from the near proximity of San Francisco, the passage to which has been made in thirty-five days, against five or six months, to any port in England, yet, with all this, fifteen vessels arrived from, and twenty-eight departed for, Hong Kong or London; whereas in American direct trade there were but six arrivals and five departures, and in Dutch but two arrivals and one departure, so entirely has the once-monopolized trade of Japan departed from Holland. These relative numbers furnish a very sufficient and conclusive answer to various paragraphs of American newspapers, often copied into our own, as so many well-averred facts, that American merchants enjoy, chiefly through the exceptional position of influence and favour occupied by their Representatives at Yeddo and the ports, like exceptional advantages in the prosecution of trade. It was scarcely worth contradiction before, since the facts would in time speak for themselves, and to the Returns appeal may now be confidently made for unequivocal evidence that no such exceptional advantages have ever been enjoyed in Japan by citizens of the United States, whether lay or official.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Acting Consul Vyse to Mr. Alcock.

Sir, *Yokohama, February* 19, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a series of Returns of the trade at this port, during the year 1860. In addition to these Returns, I beg to submit for your information the following remarks upon the importance of a place which but eighteen months ago was little more than a dismal swamp entirely unknown to the world. So recently opened to commerce, its activity and present advancement are striking proofs of the vast but as yet only partly developed resources of this country. As it is, however, it is pleasing to see the results the first year exhibits, and this in spite of covert restrictions upon commerce, the deteriorated currency of the Mexican dollar, and the unfortunate rebellion in China. With regard to the currency:—In all payments made to the Government, as for duties, &c. &c., the dollar is taken at its proper value as agreed upon by Treaty, viz., at the rate of 311 itzeboos for 100 dollars. But in transactions with the native dealers it is otherwise, the foreign coin being from the first depreciated, and at one time at a very heavy discount. In January 1860, the market value of 100 dollars was 280 itzeboos; in June, 300; and went gradually down to 200 itzeboos

in September last. Since then the dollar has somewhat improved, being now from 240 to 245 itzeboos per 100 dollars.

The consequence of this fluctuating depreciation was that the native dealers demanded payment for their goods in itzeboos, or, when none were to be had, in dollars at a greater or less discount. As in the long run no foreigner was able to comply with this request to any large amount, and the dollar became a matter of speculation, Japanese sellers at last simplified transactions by putting the difference between itzeboos and dollars on the prices of their goods and quoting them only in the latter coin.

Owing to increased demand and the continual fall of the dollar, the market opened in 1860 with a slight advance on the prices of the previous year, but still low enough to show a fair profit on shipments of silk and tea to London, whilst most other articles were less favourably situated. Although the dollar went down to 240 itzeboos per 100 dollars and prices gradually kept up, business in general remained brisk until the beginning of April, when the news of the rebel movements in China, and the stoppage of trade at Shanghae, reached this port. The effect was instantaneous.

A large fall-off in the exports from China being anticipated an eager demand arose for silk and tea, and prices were soon forced up to a height never known before; on the other hand, purchases of articles for Chinese consumption were almost entirely suspended, and all the goods stored intended for Shanghae were shipped to Hong Kong.

Shanghae itself, almost glutted with Japanese produce before, poured its stock into Hong Kong, Ningpo and other Chinese ports, so that the former place especially became, as well, soon overstocked with supplies from two quarters, and entailed heavy loss on the owners of goods bought here in a rising market. This trade has remained dormant ever since, and begins now only to show some signs of a revival as advices from Shanghae are of a more satisfactory nature. For silk and tea the demand continued good throughout the year.

With the exception of spelter, dyewoods, and a few medicines, the Japanese were not in the habit of buying imports to any considerable amount, until, through the stoppage of business at Shanghae, cottons and woollens were forced into this market.

Notwithstanding that supplies, much larger than the consumption of Japan at the time warranted, came constantly forward, most of them found eager buyers, and by degrees a regular business established itself, in which the sale of camlets, shirtings, chintzes, and American drills formed the main feature. The first arrivals went off at remunerative prices, greatly attributable to the desire of the natives to rid themselves of the falling dollar which foreign merchants accepted for full. With few interruptions the demand continued steady for some months, but, being out of all proportion with the supplies, rates began to droop, and already in October the very dangerous system of making sales on credit was introduced on an extended scale, in order to diminish the stock with which the place became glutted. It was also evident by this time that the natives had over-rated their wants, and the demand has, therefore, been limited ever since. There is, however, a better feeling prevailing of late amongst buyers and importers, who look for a further improvement in a degree as trade is resumed in China and the Japanese new year advances.

Judging from the experience the last nine months have taught, two important results may with safety be drawn from it, namely, first, that the Japanese are really in want of certain produce and manufactures superior to their own, or which they do not possess at all; and secondly, that they are able to pay remunerative prices for them provided the export business flourishes: and taking these considerations as a base there is no denying that, however small the import trade is at present when compared to that of other countries in the East, it will augment from year to year, and become in due time a profitable branch of commerce with Japan.

With respect to exports I entertain the same hope, and with still more reason when we recollect that at a port opened only a year and a half ago, in a country unaccustomed to trade with foreigners, such startling results have been produced as the annexed Tables and Returns present.* I think we may rest satisfied with the first year, and hope well for the future.

The greatest drawbacks to sound trade in this place are the low currency

* These Returns have not yet arrived in England.

of the Mexican dollar and the interference of the Government in all commercial transactions, especially with the sale of produce, by regulating prices: the course of events may overcome the former, but the latter is not so easy to remedy, and I can only hope that a clearer insight into commerce will gradually be gained by the Japanese authorities, and induce them to adopt more liberal measures.

There are two things which, could they be brought about, would, I am persuaded, greatly promote the commerce of this place, namely, the establishment of a bank for European and American credits; and secondly, the starting of a regular mail service between this and Shanghae by way of Nagasaki.

This latter desideratum was at one time attempted to be supplied by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. If we may believe rumour the attempt to establish such a line is about to be resumed. Activity in shipping has only reigned as long as there was no lack of bulky articles for China; when their shipments ceased to be profitable, freights took a downward tendency, from which they are not likely to recover until the trade with China is restored to its former importance.

A reference to the accompanying Returns and Statements, especially to Nos. 5, 6, and 17, will show the important part British shipping has played in the business of this port during the past year.

Of 103 merchant-vessels, of 40,905 tons, which entered the port of Kanagawa during the year 1860, 52 were British vessels of 21,724 tons, more than equal to the aggregate of American, Dutch, and French shipping.

The total of import and export duties and shipping-dues paid by American, Dutch, and French vessels to the Japanese Government during 1860 amounted to 24,000*l.*, while that paid by British vessels alone during the same period amounted to 30,000*l.*

The total of the declared value of imports in British vessels during the past year was 133,000*l.*,—or considerably more than double the aggregate of the declared imports in American, Dutch, and French vessels, which amounted to only 65,000*l.*

So, of a grand total of 824,000*l.* worth of declared exports, 432,000*l.* worth, or greatly more than one-half, left in British vessels alone.

Although America presents peculiar facilities for a direct trade with Japan, seeing that passages from San Francisco to this port have been made in thirty-five days, yet, by a reference to Return No. 2, it will be observed that the direct trade with Great Britain and British Colonies has taken the lead, since fifteen vessels of all nationalities arrived from and twenty-eight departed for London or Hong Kong; whereas American direct trade had but six arrivals and five departures, and Dutch only two direct arrivals and one departure.

The difficulty of obtaining reliable information regarding the trade at this port during the latter part of 1859, and the great disproportion in the development of business during that period, and either half of 1860, render it hard to make any fair or useful comparison. On the whole, however, British interests have been on the advance, and everything tends to justify the conclusion that they will continue to hold a place of first importance at this port.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. HOWARD VYSE.

No. 15.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 26, 1861.

YOUR despatches dated from the 19th ultimo to the 3rd of March were received this morning, and will be laid before the Queen.

I have only time before the departure of the mail to express to you the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the termination of the differences between the Representatives of foreign Powers and the Government of Japan, and at the return of Her Majesty's Minister and of the Minister of France to Yeddo.

Her Majesty's Government are entirely satisfied with the judgment and firmness displayed by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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No. 16.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 26, 1861.

I HAVE already expressed to you in my previous despatch of this day, the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have received your account of the termination of your differences with the Japanese Government.

Her Majesty's Government sincerely hope that no further difficulties will intervene to impede the development of trade with Japan, or to interfere with the cultivation of the most friendly relations with the Government and people of the country.

As to the further facilities for trade to which, in your despatch of the 1st of March, you refer as desirable to be obtained, I need hardly tell you that it is the wish of Her Majesty's Government that you should take advantage of every suitable opportunity for pressing upon the Japanese authorities the advantage which both countries would derive from their being conceded.

The manner in which your return to Jeddo was effected, and the honours and attention paid to you on the occasion by the public authorities, were highly satisfactory; and I shall gladly bring under the notice of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the tribute which you pay to the services rendered to you, in the difficult position in which you have been placed, by Captain Dew, of Her Majesty's ship "Encounter," as reported in your despatch of the 2nd of March.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.